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Sol Price: Retail Revolutionary
The FedMart Years—1954 to 1975
By
Robert E. Price

“The first Fed-Mart was the genesis of discount warehouse clubs, which now sell about 7 percent of the nation’s food and sundries and are growing at twice the pace of supermarkets.” Neil Morgan, San Diego Union-Tribune, 1997.

Sol Price, born in the Bronx in New York City on January 23, 1916, was the son of Russian Jewish immigrants Samuel Price and Bella Barkin who arrived separately in 1904 but both passed through Ellis Island in that year. Since Sam and Bella were from the same area in Russia, they had much in common and were married in 1910. Sam Price, suffering from tuberculosis, followed his doctor’s advice and moved to San Diego in 1928, with the rest of the family traveling by train to join Sam in 1929. They purchased a home in Burlingame, an attractive subdivision south of North Park on Palm Street, which at that time was primarily a Jewish neighborhood.

Sol, an excellent student, attended San Diego High School, graduating in 1931 at the age of fifteen.

After graduation, Sol moved back to New York with his mother, brother and sister. They drove across country during the Depression and Sol saw the results of farmers losing their land. It made a deep and lasting impression upon him at this early age. Sol attended New York University in Washington Square for a time, but the family decided to return to San Diego after a year. Once again they drove across country, this time taking a scenic route through Canada. Upon returning to California, Sol attended San Diego State College for one year in 1932 while his brother Henry worked at Plaza Jewelry, a pawnshop. Sol spent the next year at University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), where he experienced the Long Beach earthquake of 1933. He saw the ceiling crack over his head.

Robert E. Price, a native San Diegan, graduated from San Diego High School and Pomona College. He began his career at FedMart in 1965 and served as CEO of The Price Company from 1976 to 1993. Price is presently Chairman of the Board of PriceSmart and President of the Price Family Charitable Fund and Price Charities. His current writing project is a biography of his father Sol Price.
Sol attended the University of Southern California (USC) where his last undergraduate year counted as his first year in USC’s law school. Shortly afterwards, Sol’s parents were divorced in 1934 and his mother decided to take Sol and his sister back to New York in 1935. Sol worked during the day and attended New York University at night. They moved back to California and lived near USC in 1936 so Sol could finish school. He received his bachelor’s and law degrees in June 1938. In the top ten percent of his class, he was awarded the prestigious Order of the Coif. He passed the California State Bar Exam and was admitted to the state bar in November.

During this time, Sol had maintained a strong friendship with Helen Moskowitz, whom he had met while attending San Diego High School. Helen was born in San Diego where, following her high school graduation, she attended USC. She and Sol were secretly married in January 1938 but both continued in school, lived apart, and “kept up the appearance of dating, etc.” Helen also received her Bachelor of Arts degree in June 1938 from USC and so they decided to confess that they had married in Las Vegas the previous January.

Sol was offered a job as City Attorney for the City of Oldale in the San Joaquin Valley, but chose to move to San Diego where his father-in-law Max Moskowitz had arranged for him to open his legal practice in the office of Weinberger and Miller. Shortly after the beginning of the Second World War, Sol began working at Consolidated Aircraft while continuing to build his legal practice. Jacob Weinberger had withdrawn as an active member of his firm to serve as San Diego’s City Attorney from 1941 to 1943. He was then appointed to the California Superior Court (1943-1945) and eventually to the United States District Court in 1946. Weinberger’s departure provided Sol the opportunity to represent many of Weinberger’s clients, especially Jewish businessmen and Jewish charities: “I became a lawyer in the Jewish community for all the Jewish charities. I drew up the papers for the Jewish Welfare Society (Jewish Family Service), the Guardians, and the
Hebrew Home for the Aged.” One of Sol’s clients, Mandell Weiss, would later ask Sol’s assistance in launching the FedMart business venture.

After World War II ended, Sol represented a variety of business owners dealing with all aspects of their legal needs. “The big thing about the practice during the War and during all those years [after the War] was that I was dealing with small businessmen and I was very involved not only with their legal problems but their overall business as well. I handled bankruptcies, real estate deals, partnerships, divorces and estates. Over a period of time I really learned far more from my clients than I ever learned in law school, and because I involved myself so deeply, I think that is where I began to accumulate the knowledge and interest in business.”

In 1946 Sol opened his own legal office in partnership with attorney Frank Nottbusch. Their office was on the fourth floor of the San Diego Trust and Savings Building at Sixth and Broadway next to another new law partnership, the firm of Alex Cory and Edward Schwartz. Within a few months the two firms merged and, in 1952, added another partner, Tony Procopio, to become the firm Procopio, Price, Cory and Schwartz.

What Sol particularly enjoyed by being a lawyer was helping his clients solve their problems, especially business problems. His father-in-law Max Moskowitz, a successful businessman, had died in 1947. Max and his brother-in-law had been partners in City Junkyard, a scrap metal business. They sold City Junkyard during the World War II years and invested the proceeds from the sale in real estate, which included a city block located at Palm Street and Sixth Avenue.

After Moskowitz’ death, Sol tried to assist
his mother-in-law with her business interests. He convinced her that she should trade the Sixth and Palm property, which was not producing any income, for a warehouse building on Main Street in the southeast area of San Diego. The Main Street property was acquired by Bertha Moskowitz in 1953. Sol’s next step was to find a tenant for the Main Street warehouse.

In 1953 Sol’s client and now close friend Mandell Weiss invited him to visit a store in Los Angeles. Weiss and his business partner Leo Freedman owned Four Star Jewelers located on Broadway in the Spreckels Building. Four Star Jewelers sold retail and wholesale. The business had hired a young Navy veteran, Larry Bertrand, to handle the wholesale customers—primarily military PXs. Bertrand also had a non-military customer in Los Angeles, Fedco, a membership department store. Fedco was fast becoming Four Star’s largest customer, which is why Weiss suggested that Sol tag along to see the store.

What Sol and his Four Star Jewelers partners saw at FedCo impressed them. The store had been created to serve United States Postal Workers almost as a cooperative. Fedco was selling a broad range of non-food merchandise at very low prices. The store was filled with customers, some of whom were driving from as far away as San Diego to shop at Fedco.

On the drive back to San Diego there was a spirited discussion about Fedco, the membership nature of the business, how much business the store was doing, and
the fact that many people from San Diego were willing to drive that far to shop. Weiss thought that Fedco could operate successfully in San Diego. Sol even had a building for Fedco, the vacant warehouse on Main Street near Harbor Drive and Sicard Street.

At that time, Fedco was not interested in a San Diego location. Weiss recalled: “Fedco didn’t want to have anything to do with us. In retrospect, we were lucky.” Sol figured that if Fedco wasn’t interested, he and his clients would open a Fedco-style store. “Fortunately,” Sol later recalled, “most of us had backgrounds that were alien to retailing. We didn’t know what wouldn’t work or what we couldn’t do.”

At the time that Sol was preparing to open what would become FedMart in 1954, San Diego shopping was concentrated in the central area of the city. The downtown retail business community was tight knit and comfortable selling merchandise at full retail prices. Traditional retailers priced their products under the umbrella of Fair Trade Laws, laws that gave manufacturers the right to set and enforce minimum selling prices for their products. Retailers offered a wide variety of products, large selection within product categories, and presented themselves as having something for everyone. Retail business hours were 10:00 am to 6:00 pm Monday through Friday, shorter hours on Saturday and closed on Sunday. Customers received, and expected, a good deal of personal service, including gift wrapping. Shopping centers were barely on the horizon.

But consumer behavior was beginning to change. Unlike the 1930s and 1940s, the early 1950s saw a major shift in consumer behavior. Soldiers returning from World War II and the Korean War were starting their families—they had good jobs and money to spend. A new form of retailer, the discount retailer, was beginning to respond to consumer demands. E.J. Korvettes, White Front, Gemco, and Fedco had begun to change the way people shopped by discounting...
Sol was not thinking about the traditional retailers or the discount retailers who were beginning to open in the northeastern United States. But he was convinced that he had found the perfect fit for his mother-in-law’s empty warehouse at 2380 Main Street—a retail tenant modeled on the successful format developed by Fedco in Los Angeles. Sol was excited and once he got excited about an idea he thought about it day and night. He would often stay up late into the night with his lawyer’s yellow legal pad and pencil writing down his thoughts and calculating financial numbers. Sol convinced himself that the numbers worked. He was ready to start FedMart.

Sol handled the legal matters associated with launching the business and helped raise the start-up capital. The business was capitalized with $50,000 of equity. Sol’s law firm purchased a 10 percent share while Sol and a number of other investors including Mandell Weiss and Leo Freedman provided the balance of the money. The initial $50,000 was a modest amount of money that was used to buy fixtures and equipment, inventory, and to fund other start-up expenses. Years later Sol would say: “When we didn’t know what we were doing, it only took $50,000 to start a business and five years later, when we were really experienced at running FedMart, it took $5 million to open.”

The business name FedMart was a variation on the Fedco name and served not only as the public identification of the store but also as the name of The FedMart Corporation, a non-profit corporation whose mission was to serve the shopping needs of Federal workers and their families. Opening a membership retail store in a warehouse in an industrial area of San Diego broke just about all conventions in 1950s retailing. The warehouse site was situated almost directly across the street from the tuna canning factories and not far from the Thirty-Second Street United States Navy Depot.

FedMart was clearly different from the downtown retail merchants. To begin with shoppers had to qualify for membership by working for the federal government or being veterans. They were required to purchase a $2 lifetime membership in order to shop. In contrast to other retailers, FedMart was open 12:30 to 9:00 pm Monday through Friday and 9:00 am to 5:00 pm on Saturday. The shopping hours were designed for the convenience of civil servants and military families who found evening shopping more convenient. Products were displayed on makeshift fixtures rather than fancy display cases.
Most products were sold self-service except for jewelry. Compared to the department stores that might offer fifteen models of an item, FedMart offered two or three. FedMart members paid for merchandise with cash or a check, although credit was available for larger purchases such as furniture. The store’s range of products included mattresses, clothing, luggage, furniture, hardware, housewares, sporting goods, appliances, cigarettes and liquor. FedMart refused to sell products whose prices were protected by Fair Trade Laws.

From the day that FedMart opened for business on December 3, 1954 the store was “an immediate and spectacular success.” Sol recollected: “We had anticipated
that we might do $1 million the first year but it ended up approximately three times more than we expected. It was the hottest thing to hit San Diego in a long time.”

Those early FedMart days were not without challenges. In addition to the difficulties imposed by Fair Trade Laws, some of the downtown merchants tried to cause problems: “Right before we were going to open, a guy came in to the FedMart premises. He represented himself as being a bedding inspector for the State of California who’s responsible for seeing that things like pillows and mattresses do not have any dilatory stuff in them. Here comes this bedding inspector and he has a long list of questions that he hands to Leo Freedman (who was President of FedMart at the time). And, the questions had nothing to do with pillows and mattresses. I politely and firmly told him to get the hell out of the place, if he wanted to close us down to take his best shot. We never heard from him again.”

As a result of the bedding inspector experience, Sol concluded that FedMart management had to be “super careful about what we did. We started developing rules of behavior especially with regard to representations of things (information) we were putting out to the public. So, in reviewing the history of FedMart, it is certain that the company never used a superlative in the printed material—it did not use comparative pricing. As a result, FedMart’s whole approach to the way we marketed to people from then on was totally different than the conventional approach.”

Sol’s experience as an attorney representing clients, and his own moral code, became a foundational feature of the FedMart business. He described his business philosophy as “the professional fiduciary relationship between us and the member. You had a duty to be very, very honest and fair with them and so we avoided sales and advertising. We have in effect said that the best advertising is by our members...the unsolicited testimonial of the satisfied customer.”

In contrast to the founders of Fedco who had created their
store as a not-for-profit business, Sol and the other founders of FedMart wanted the new business to succeed as a financial enterprise. Therefore, they established a for-profit company, Loma Supply Corporation, alongside the non-profit FedMart Corporation. A few months after FedMart had been in business, the two corporations were reorganized so that FedMart transitioned to a for-profit company. Loma Supply disappeared and the FedMart Foundation was set up as a charitable foundation whose mission was to provide college scholarships for San Diego area high school graduates. The FedMart Foundation would eventually award thousands of scholarships during the next twenty years.21

Sol’s role in the FedMart business was initially as attorney, business advisor, and investor. During the months following the opening and as the business continued to prosper, he began spending more and more time at the Main Street location. Mandell Weiss recalled: “He (Sol) stood on the sidelines for about a year or two. He was running down here, running there, and I told Sol, ‘You know, it (FedMart) needs a head.’ He then gave up his law practice and became the head of the FedMart Corporation.” Once Sol was firmly in charge, he created a culture at FedMart that reflected his creativity, style, and values. He had an exceptional ability to understand, use, and quickly compute numbers that related to any aspect of the business.22

Sol’s approach to business and the way he made decisions were rooted in a New York City culture characterized by humor, emotion, and a very direct way of speaking to people. Jim Sinegal, founder of Costco, began working at FedMart shortly after the Main Street store opened. Describing the first time he met Sol,
Sinegal recalled:

It goes back to 1954. I was given a call by someone who was working...in a new store down on Main Street in San Diego, and they had some mattresses to unload and asked me to help out, and it was a dollar and a quarter an hour, and so I said sure. I was out of school for the holiday vacation. So I went down there...and the next day I'm carrying a mattress into the store and I hear a voice: “What the hell are you doing there? Put that thing down before you break your back. Or worse yet, break something in the store.” So, I turned to somebody who was there and I said: “What ticked him off? And who in the hell is he?” They said: “He's Sol, he's not mad. That's just Sol.”

Rick Libenson, a co-founder of Price Club and a former executive of FedMart, described an experience he had with Sol at the Kearny Mesa FedMart store that opened in 1958:

He comes in one night and we were exceptionally busy, the sales floor was shot and it was a mess and I'm out there pulling cardboard, turning the egg rack, making sure the milk case is full, just trying to keep our heads above water. We were drowning. Sol finally grabs me by the shoulder and yanks me back to the warehouse. He drags me back there and he's got me by the shoulder and he looks me in the eye and says: ‘you're not running this place. It’s running you.’ And I mean he was yelling and [he was] on me. The main message has stuck with me my entire life. It made me change everything I did. After that day, I just stayed ahead of the business.

On describing Sol as a leader Jim Sinegal said: “He motivated us to do our very best, not just because he had a formidable presence, but we really did not want to let him down. We idolized the guy. We thought about him on a continual basis. What would he do? How
would he handle this situation? And, it influenced our lives."

At the time that FedMart opened, traditional full-priced retailers were beginning to lose sales to discount stores. White Front, Gemco, and Fedco operated discount stores in Southern California. The term “discount store” was coined because of the way discount stores priced their merchandise—a discounted price from the manufacturer’s suggested selling price. The discounted price was usually a price that beat the traditional retailer but still preserved as much mark up as possible for the discount store. Sol never wanted FedMart to be labeled a discount store so he came up with a new description: low margin retailer. His pricing approach was to start with the cost of a product and to mark up the product as little as possible so that the gross margin covered the selling costs and left a small profit for FedMart investors. Although the difference in pricing approach was subtle, Sol believed that FedMart would deliver a better price by being a lower margin retailer.

One of the early innovations at FedMart was selling packaged food products and non-food merchandise in the same building. It all started with Planters Peanuts. One of the original FedMart investors, William Schmidt, suggested that FedMart
should sell canned Planters Peanuts. At first Schmidt purchased a small number of cases, but they sold so well that eventually the peanuts were being delivered in full truckloads. The peanuts were stocked everywhere, including around the building columns. Sol said, “we sold so many of those Planters Peanuts that the President of the Planters Peanut Company came to San Diego, to see with his own eyes how one store could do so much business with his product.” Gradually, a complete food department including fresh meat and produce became a standard feature of FedMart stores.

Sol was constantly looking for new product categories for the FedMart members. In addition to being the first to sell food and non-food merchandise in the same store, FedMart was an innovator in selling prescription medicines at lower prices than traditional drug stores. Wayne Malloy, a San Diego area pharmacist, opened FedMart’s first pharmacy at the Main Street store in 1961. Pharmacists throughout San Diego County were outraged that one of their own would disrupt and betray the pharmaceutical community. Malloy received death threats and had a rock thrown through his living room window. Over time, other pharmacies began to lower their prices providing a benefit to thousands of consumers.

FedMart’s drive to find new ways to bring lower prices to its members eventually led to the introduction of its own brand, the FM brand. One of the fundamental requirements for the FM brand was that the quality of the product be equal to or better than the equivalent branded product and sell for significantly
less. The FM brand became so well accepted that a photo of Cesar Chavez was taken showing him drinking a can of FM Cola with the caption: “What kind of a man drinks FedMart Cola?”

Sol pioneered large consumer package sizes. The examples that he frequently pointed to were powdered washing machine detergent and liquid bleach. The largest detergent box sold in grocery stores was Tide at 84 ounces. Using the FM brand, FedMart sold a 20-pound tub of detergent. An even larger size was tried, but customers found the size just too heavy to carry to the checkout stands. Bleach had traditionally been sold in 32-ounce containers. FM bleach was sold by the gallon. The gallon size eventually replaced the smaller sizes entirely in the market place.

Sol’s business philosophy was that he wanted a long-term relationship with the FedMart member built on loyalty and trust. Low margin pricing and high quality merchandise were fundamental features to this long-term relationship. Even the refund policy was designed to re-enforce loyalty. “Everything we sell is guaranteed unconditionally. We will give an immediate cash refund to any customer not completely satisfied with a purchase made at FedMart. No questions asked.”

Sol also wanted a long term, trusting and loyal relationship with FedMart employees. In a bulletin to FedMart employees Sol wrote: “You must feel confident that you are working for a fine and honest company. Somehow, we must make this mean to each of you that you will be permitted, encouraged and sometimes even harassed into growing with the company to the limit of your ability. We believe that you should be paid the best wages in your community for the job you perform. We believe that you should be provided with an opportunity to invest in the company so that you can prosper when it prospers. We believe that you should be encouraged to express yourself freely and without fear of recrimination or retaliation. We believe that you should be happy with your work so that your occupation becomes a source of satisfaction as well as a means of livelihood.”

With the successful experience of the Main Street store, FedMart expanded throughout the Southwest, opening stores in Arizona, New Mexico and Texas. In 1958 FedMart purchased property on Kearny Mesa on land just west of Montgomery Field. At that time there were no retail centers in Kearny Mesa; in fact, Convoy Street had not even been constructed. The Kearny Mesa Store located at 8001 Othello Street was an instant success. FedMart’s corporate offices were located on the second floor. Sol had his office at the Othello Street location until 1969 when he moved his office to the sixth floor of the Fifth Avenue Financial Center at Fifth Avenue and Laurel Street.

Sol Price’s influence on retailing was pro-
found. While at FedMart, he reduced prices throughout the marketplace, developed new packaging techniques, introduced consumers to self-service shopping, and developed the one stop shopping format. The strongest evidence of FedMart’s impact on the retail world occurred in 1962 when Walmart, Kmart, and Target opened their first stores.

Perhaps one of the finer tributes to Sol Price came from a competitor, Sam Walton, founder of Walmart and one of the great retailing pioneers: “...I learned a lot from Sol Price, a great operator who had started FedMart out in San Diego in 1955 (1954). I guess I’ve stolen—I actually prefer the word ‘borrowed’ as many ideas from Sol Price as from anybody else in the business...I really liked Sol’s FedMart name so I latched right on to WalMart.”

In 1963 Sol decided that it was time to eliminate the membership shopping requirement and FedMart was henceforth open to the public. FedMart continued to open new stores, especially in Southern California. In 1971 FedMart’s flagship store opened across the street from the Sports Arena on Sports Arena Drive. FedMart would remain a publicly traded company until it was sold in May 1975 to retailers from Germany. The new owners were unsuccessful in remaining true to the principles that had built FedMart into a well-respected retail business. FedMart closed its doors in 1983.

Sol Price’s storied retail career didn’t end in 1975. A few months after being fired from FedMart in December 1975, he founded The Price Company. In July 1976 the first Price Club opened on Morena Boulevard. For the next 17 years Sol Price and The Price Company created an international merchandising company growing...
Sol Price: Retail Revolutionary

to 100 locations, $8 billion in sales and 21,000 employees. In 1993, The Price Company and Costco merged. After the merger, Sol Price formed a public real estate company, Price Enterprises. But he wasn’t quite finished with bringing lower prices to consumers. In 1996 he launched PriceSmart, today a public company operating smaller Price Club/Costco type stores in Central America and the Caribbean. During the last twenty years of his life, Sol Price increasingly devoted his time, energy and financial resources to philanthropy in San Diego County. His charitable contributions to the San Diego community live on most notably in the Aaron Price Fellows Program and the City Heights Initiative.32

Sol Price was the epitome of intelligent planning, innovation, and a willingness to take risks. While he cared about giving a good return to shareholders, Sol cared deeply about the people he was serving—he genuinely hoped that he could make their lives better. The most memorable and treasured times of his life were his Fed-Mart years, during which he revolutionized retailing. In the years following the opening of the first FedMart in 1954 the retail world was totally reinvented.

Sol Price passed away on December 14, 2009, mourned by his family, all who knew him, and even those who had never met him. To some he was an amazing businessman with a wonderful sense of humor, to others a kind and generous friend. Many people sought out Sol’s advice; others received his advice without asking. Sol was a lifelong Democrat and his support in San Diego was much appreciated by Presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton. In 2007 then-candidate for president Senator Barack Obama called upon Sol at his home in La Jolla. Sol was concerned that the young senator was over-scheduling himself and advised him to include his wife Michelle on campaign trips so he could spend more time with her.33

Jim Sinegal, CEO of Costco, was talking to a reporter who said, “You must have learned a lot [from Sol].” Sinegal answered, “No, that is inaccurate, I did not learn a lot, I learned everything, everything that I know, that was the impact he had on me.”34 Sol remained modest and unassuming and would seldom take credit for revolutionizing the retail business.

Sol’s granddaughter Sarah Price-Keating has kept a special envelope entitled Lessons with Grandpa that “represented a language that grandpa understood so well. The language of numbers, logic, order and the concept of time.... He

Dignitaries attend Window Rock ribbon cutting. FedMart adds pharmacies.

Navajo shoppers at FedMart Window Rock, Arizona. Simple displays feature FM brand in original cartons.

Convenient 54” high displays and 6 foot wide aisles. Stocking FedMart shelves. ©SDHC UT85_h3319 #1.

explained to me that we always have more time than we think. Grandpa lived his life ethically. Sol knew the difference between right and wrong but the example he set [for us] was enough.” Sol also was a wonderful family man who could balance his professional and personal life. He was devoted to his wife Helen and their marriage spanned seventy years. Sol and Helen raised two sons, Robert and Laurence, who shared in Sol’s world of business.

Sol Price’s legacy is the gift he left to consumers in the United States and around the world—lower prices and a better quality of life. Despite his New York upbringing, San Diegans can claim him as their own.

NOTES

1. He had a brother Henry, two years older, and nine years later his sister Evelyn was born. Much of the material regarding Sol’s early life is contained in an oral interview entitled Sol Price, Oral Interview, Vol. I, The Younger Years, 1916-1972, and transcribed in the early 1990s. It is in the Price Family Private Collection and will be referred to as Price, Oral Interview. Regarding his name, the story goes that “he dropped out of Fordham because the law school enrolled him as Solomon. His name was Sol.” Neil Morgan, San Diego Union-Tribune, July 31, 1997.

2. Sol’s parents came from the same small town of Smolovitz in the general area of Minsk, today in Belarus. His mother Bella Barkin had left her parents behind and lived with cousins. They joined a number of people in New York from the same town. After arriving in the U.S., Sol’s father worked in the garment industry and helped David Dubinsky organize the International Ladies Garment Workers Union. He later manufactured women’s coats and suits and helped organize the Manufacturers Association.

3. Sol had his Bar Mitzvah in New York but his father did not attend because he was already in San Diego. Sol’s father received a disability pension from his insurance company of $500 per month so the family was able to live fairly well during the Depression.

4. Bernard Lipinski and Sol Brown were neighbors in Burlingame.

5. Price, Oral interview.

6. Sol’s brother Henry had to have his appendix removed in London, Ontario, at Catholic hospital. In those days it was necessary for a person to remain in the hospital for ten days with an appendectomy, so they spent that time in Canada. Because of the Depression, the doctors did not charge them.


8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Mandell Weiss, who emigrated from Romania to New York, moved to San Diego in 1919 and began to work in a downtown store, which he later owned. He was in the jewelry business—
Mutual Jewelers—and began investing in downtown property. Sol Price became his lawyer and
good friend. Mandell Weiss, Oral Interview by Sylvia Arden, December 3, 1985, San Diego History
Center Archives. Weiss died in 1993 and left a valuable legacy in San Diego.

12. Alec Cory and Edward Schwartz opened a small law office in the San Diego Trust and Savings
Building at Sixth and Broadway after World War II next to the busy and “more established firm”
of Price and Nottbusch, who began sending them business. The two firms merged in 1947 as
Price, Nottbusch, Cory & Schwartz. In 1951 Nottbusch left to join his father’s law practice and
A.T. Tony Procopio became a partner in 1952. When Sol Price left in 1954 to head FedMart they
added new attorneys. Ed Schwartz accepted a judicial appointment in 1959 that developed into a
distinguished career on the bench.

13. Harry Hargreaves and Emmanuel “Manny” Savitch joined the firm that became Procopio, Cory,
Hargreaves & Savitch LLP in 1967.

14. Max Moskowitz, born in Russia on October 18, 1862, came to the United States in the late 1890s
and traveled to San Diego in 1912. A Mason, he retired in 1944 and died in 1947. He was survived
by his wife Bertha, three daughters and four grandchildren. Burial was at Home of Peace Cemetery.

15. Weiss, Oral History.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.

20. James D. Sinegal, co-founder and CEO of Costco, is a graduate of Helix High School and San
Diego State University. He began his retail career at FedMart in 1955. He eventually advanced to
Executive Vice President responsible for merchandising and operations. He has served as CEO at

21. In 1999, the Foundation name was changed to the current Federal Employees Scholarship Foun-
dation. By 2000, its 44th year, 5,055 scholarships had been awarded with a total value of $1,402,100.
In December 2010, the Foundation decided to award its annual scholarships to the students of
Reality Changers, a program based in City Heights.


24. Libenson, Oral Interview, Price Family Private Collection. Richard Libenson was a director of
The Price Company from its formation in 1976 until October 1993 and was an executive officer of
The Price Company from 1976 until October 1989. He is presently a director of Costco Wholesale
Corporation.

27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
32. Sol Price’s charitable giving centered on the Aaron Price Fellows, the Price Student Center at
UCSD, The Price Chair in Public Interest Law at USD, and the City Heights Initiative.
34. Sinegal, Price Memorial Service.
Colonel D.C. Collier

“An Inspiration to the Citizens of Today”

By

Richard Amero

The gregarious and confident Colonel David Charles Collier (1871-1934) was a lawyer, real-estate developer, public servant, amateur archeologist, dabbler in minerals, and consultant in the holding of expositions. On October 11, 1936, in the second year of the California Pacific International Exposition, San Diego honored his memory by placing a plaque on the west wall of the California Quadrangle in Balboa Park. Designed by sculptor Frederick W. Schweigardt, it shows Collier in the process of signing his name, an image used by the colonel in numerous real estate ads. Beneath the salutation, “Yours for California,” and Collier’s signature are the words:

COLONEL DAVID CHARLES COLLIER
A man of vision - a dynamic leader - a developer and builder
A great and lovable character
The creative genius of the Panama-California Exposition of 1915
An inspiration to the citizens of today.

Collier was one of San Diego’s best known characters at the turn of the twentieth century. He had a strapping figure, a leonine mane of hair, and flamboyant clothes. After returning from a visit to Brazil in 1912, he appeared at public meetings booted and spurred, with a striped poncho made of alpaca hair, a wide belt with knife attached, and an enormous sombrero on his head. He most often wore a five-gallon Stetson hat, a No. 18 turndown collar, and a Windsor tie, causing a New York reporter to ask, “Is he real or is this just theatrical makeup for a West-

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erner?" Later Collier explained, "Oh, I just like the combination. It makes me easy to find in a crowd. Few other men would wear such a getup." His hype was done with humor, a pat on the back, and a wink of the eye.

Born in Central City, Colorado, August 14, 1871, Collier was the son of David Charles Collier and Martha Maria (Johnson) Collier. Collier, Sr., a lawyer, a judge and the manager of the Central City Register, decided to move the family farther west. Along with his father, mother, brother Frank and sister Mabel, twelve-year-old “Charlie” arrived in San Diego on the steamer Orizaba in 1884. Collier, Sr. built a house at 1545 Sixth Street, between Cypress and Cedar, and became a law partner of Alfred Haines in 1889.

Charlie completed his education at Russ High School located on the southern edge of City (later Balboa) Park. During recess he would go down Waterworks Canyon (today’s Cabrillo Canyon) in the park to eat his lunch under a pepper tree. The only trees in the park at that time surrounded the waterworks. The remainder of the park was left to the native chaparral and cactus that grew on hardpan in the area.

At age fourteen, Charlie became a janitor, a messenger boy, and then a bookkeeper at the First National Bank located at 904 Fifth Avenue. While filling a tank with gas from a jet for H.D. Priens, a druggist at Fourth and E Streets, he lit a match. The explosion blew out a window and nearly cost him his life. Young Charlie learned an early lesson about explosives. At sixteen, he built what he called “a shack” at the corner of Pacific Avenue (today Coronado Avenue) and Bacon Street in Ocean Beach. He called the shack the “Alligator Rock Lodge.” It was a small dwelling at first but Collier kept adding to it.

By 1891, at age twenty, Collier, Jr. had passed the state bar exam and become a lawyer in his father’s office—Collier and Haines—located at 1545 Sixth Avenue. Apparently Charlie had a tendency to be quick tempered since The San Diego Union, August 21, 1895, mentioned that he got into a fist fight with J.P. Hirschler in the latter’s bookstore at 1530 F Street.

Following his father’s death in 1899, Collier became a law partner of attorney William R. Andrews, secretary of the Board of Trade in San Diego. In 1900 Charlie entered a new partnership with Sam F. Smith. As many of his clients were unable to pay him in cash, they gave him real estate they considered worth-
Colonel D.C. Collier

less. He subdivided this land, put in utilities, planted trees, and sold lots through the Ralston Realty Co., organized in 1904. In 1905 he organized the Easton-Collier Co., and in 1908 the Western Investment Co.18 Also in 1908 Collier built the Point Loma Railroad to provide better transportation to his subdivisions. He sold the railroad to John D. Spreckels in 1909 when Collier decided to buy out his partner A.H. Howard’s interest in Ralston Realty. Collier changed the firm name to D.C. Collier and Company in 1909.19 Through these companies, he subdivided and sold lots in Ocean Beach, Point Loma, Pacific Beach, University Heights, Normal Heights, North Park, East San Diego, Encanto, La Mesa, and Ramona.

A marriage to Ella May Copley in San Diego, January 1, 1896, ended in divorce, November 11, 1914.20 His wife was the sister of Congressman Ira C. Copley of Illinois, who would later become the owner of the San Diego Union and Evening Tribune. Collier, his wife, and two sons, David Copley Collier and Ira Clifton Collier, lived at Alligator Rock Lodge. The lodge had become a large house with a bathing pool and a Japanese garden.21

As his business prospered, Collier took a leading role in the community as a financier, politician and citizen. He won a case against the County Auditor in January 1900 when Judge Elisha S. Torrance ruled interests and penalties cannot be charged on costs of property being sold to redeem taxes.22 Collier owned the first phonograph, a Berliner Gramophone, and the first automobile in San Diego, an Oldsmobile he purchased in 1900.23 It moved along at 25 miles per hour and could cover 50 miles on three quarts of gasoline.

Collier, always seeking new investments, bought five mines in the Julian-Banner district in 1900. In 1905, he invested in the Santa Maria Land and Water Company in Ramona.24 After that, he built a home on stilts near Hatfield Creek on the road to Ballena, a scenic area in northeast San Diego County. Like other men, Collier sought the goodwill of his fellow citizens, but, more than any other factor, he was propelled into a whirlwind of activities by the irrepressible force of his exuberant energies. He was not content to sit back while opportunities presented themselves throughout the county.

In 1905 Collier persuaded the City Council to override the veto of Mayor John L. Sehon and to purchase water from John D. Spreckels’ Southern California Mountain Water Company.25 This began an on-going feud with Mayor Sehon, who served the city from 1900 to 1905. Perhaps believing that his efforts would be
better appreciated at the state level, Collier served on the staff of California Governor J. N. Gillett from 1907 to 1911, which still allowed him to continue his never-ending variety of activities in San Diego. 

In 1907 he built a home and poultry farm in La Mesa Springs, and then turned his attention to building a railroad line from San Diego to Ocean Beach in 1908-09. 

In 1909 Collier built the Ocean Beach School, planted trees, put a road through Collier Park in Point Loma, and donated decomposed granite to surface the driveways and sidewalks of El Cajon Avenue. 

During the previous year of 1908, while serving as president of the San Diego Chamber of Commerce, Collier organized San Diego’s reception for the U.S. Navy’s Great White Fleet. The visit of the fleet, designed to promote support for the navy under President Theodore Roosevelt, was greeted by San Diegans as a future possibility of improving San Diego as a deep-water port. The fleet had to anchor in the ocean off Coronado because the harbor had not been sufficiently dredged to accommodate the large naval vessels.

Collier’s activities on the Chamber varied from censuring a local firm that was reflecting poorly on San Diego to engaging in unpopular outbursts. On August 3, 1908, when at a political meeting in the Garrick Theater, he rose from the audience to protest an unscheduled speech by Captain John L. Sehon, former San Diego mayor. The audience yelled “Sit down!” and “Go back to the woods!” Collier’s quick-tempered response did not win him any friends: “Yell, yell! Yell, I want you dogs to yell every time I snap my fingers. Yell and bark. Every time I snap my fingers, I want you dogs to bark.”

In 1910 Collier organized and became president of the Aero Club of San Diego. In January of the following year he persuaded Glenn Hammond Curtiss to bring his aviation company to North Island. The Curtiss School of Aviation at North Island remained open for three years during which time Curtiss produced some remarkable students of aviation. Graduates who had learned to fly his biplanes set world records while others just took advantage of North Island to learn the new sport. By the time the school closed in 1913, North Island had become known as one of the nation’s outstanding aviation fields. After taking his first flight in a Curtiss biplane...
flown by Charles Hamilton, Collier told a reporter: “When I die, I hope they’ll have biplanes for the funeral, for I know I’ll come to life for a second then and be able to wave goodbye to the bunch just before the clods begin to fall [on the coffin].”

Also from 1911 to 1913, Collier helped secure passage of legislation from the State of California giving San Diego title to its tidelands from National City to Point Loma. According to Carl Heilbron, the passage of this legislation gave “to the city of San Diego title to its tide lands, which are the basis for our present water front and harbor development.”

Collier, already ready with a cheerful slogan, was an extraordinary salesman and promoter of the San Diego region. Even maverick editor of the San Diego Herald, Abraham Sauer, fell temporarily under Collier’s spell, June 22, 1911, when he asked:

If it takes a steamer fifteen minutes to get up steam, how long will it take Collier? The answer is one second exactly, for that is what Colonel Collier did upon arrival. He exuded steam, injected it into the backbones of the dallying, shilly-shallying, doubting Thomases until, despite themselves and their knockings, backslidings and evasions, they cheered his words to the echo.

In 1912 Collier helped organize the Order of Panamá in order to call attention to the building of the Panama Canal. In 1913 he thought up the idea of using tiles from the ruins of the Spanish Presidio to make the cross now standing in Presidio Park. A plaque was placed at the base of the cross by members of the Order of Panamá in 1913 to honor the memory of Father Junípero Serra as founder of Mission San Diego de Alcalá, first mission and settlement in Alta California. The original plaque was replaced on July 16, 1969, marking the city’s bicentennial celebration.

The most important civic posts Collier held in San Diego were those of Director-General of the Panama-California Exposition from 1909 to 1912, and President of the Exposition from 1912 to 1914. He gave $500,000 of his own money to the Exposition, served without pay, and paid his own travel expenses on promotional trips to Washington, D.C., South America, and Europe. Consequently, his real estate business foun-dered and he became burdened by debts. Collier,
although never failing in his support, was compelled to resign the presidency on March 5, 1914.42

Collier chose the central mesa of Balboa Park as the site for the Exposition; proposed the California Mission as the architectural style; approved hiring Bertram Goodhue, a foremost authority on the Spanish Colonial style as consulting architect; insisted upon hiring Frederick Law Olmstead, a well-known landscape architect; and decided on the Indian background of the Southwest as the Exposition’s main cultural theme.43 Collier was a founder of the San Diego Museum (today’s Museum of Man), a manager of the American School of Social Research in Santa Fe, New Mexico, and a friend of Dr. Edgar L. Hewett, director of the School of American Archaeology and first director of the San Diego Museum.44

Collier’s role in enlisting U.S. Congressional support of the San Diego Exposition did much to advertise San Diego, but he failed to get government recognition because of opposition from San Francisco, which was organizing an exposition of its own. San Franciscans had acquired the support of conservatives in the Republican party.45 When the conservatives succeeded in defeating the San Diego Exposition’s bid for recognition, their triumph caused Collier to join the Progressive wing of the party.46

William Kettner, a San Diego Democrat who was elected to Congress in November 1912, managed in his mild, un-Collier-like way, to secure the recognition Collier had sought. Since President Woodrow Wilson and Kettner belonged to the same party, the recognition went through speedily, without the intrigues that had beset Collier.47

To show that they approved of Collier’s efforts for the Exposition, hundreds of San Diegans attended a reception in his honor held at the Spreckels Theater, April 22, 1914. As Judge Ernest Riall presented him with a loving cup, his admirers shouted “What’s the matter with Collier?” followed by the response, “He’s all right!”48 Collier told his enthusiastic audience that he
had accepted the presidency of the Pacific Southwest Railway. The railway would bring iron ore and coal from Colorado to San Diego, from which place ships would carry it around the world. He concluded: “I feel I am again spending my energy for that town whose virtue, when it is once in a man’s blood, makes of him a San Diegan in this life and in the life to come.”

Finding the Pacific Southwest Railway to be more talk than substance, Collier bought back ownership of D.C. Collier and Co. in May 1914. Still struggling with financial problems, he resumed his law practice in March 1915. The 1915 Panama-California International Exposition directors, who extended the fair for an additional year, appointed him a public relations commissioner in February 1916.

As a trustee of the defunct Wonderland Park in Ocean Beach, Collier, in April 1917, approved the transfer of ownership of animals in cages at the northeast perimeter of the Exposition to the newly formed San Diego Zoo. The Zoo paid $500 for the animals and the trustees waived a $2,000 balance. Also in April, Collier ran for City Council, but, owing to his championship of George W. Marston for mayor against popular Louis J. Wilde, he was rejected in the April 3 election. By claiming that Wilde would refuse to serve if he—Collier—were elected, Collier made himself look ridiculous.

After the United States entered World War I, Collier and Congressman Kettner offered Exposition buildings, land at Linda Vista, the site of Wonderland Park, and Collier Park to the U.S. Army and then to the U.S. Navy for the duration of the war. The Navy accepted the Exposition buildings as a training center. After sparring between Los Angeles and San Diego, in which Collier did not figure, the U.S. Army chose Linda Vista Mesa, consisting of 12,720 acres, as the site for Camp Kearny.
Ruth E. Everson became Collier’s second wife on November 14, 1915. Following her death on August 28, 1916, he married Clytie B. Lyon on December 13, 1919. Collier’s son David Copley Collier became a military aviator who was killed in a crash during World War I. His second son, Ira Clifton Collier, from whom he was estranged, became a newspaperman in New York City. Collier also had a stepdaughter, Clytie, by his third wife.

Taking advantage of contacts he had made while promoting the Pacific Southwest Railway, Collier left San Diego in 1918 to seek employment in Chicago. Instead, as a result of his meetings with Dr. Edgar Hewett from 1911 to 1914, Collier became involved in land speculation in New Mexico. At the same time, he obtained the consent of Hewett’s School of American Archaeology to send exhibits to the Panama-California Exposition. He focused his real estate interests on Santa Fe, Pecos, and Pojoaque. The last two places were former Pueblo Indian settlements that had been largely abandoned by Indians, absorbed by Spanish and Mexican land grants, or simply seized by squatters. Collier engaged in these promotional schemes through his Western Investment Company. As the name of this company implies, Collier was essentially investing in land in New Mexico for which in his usual flamboyant fashion he had ambitious plans.

Collier became a board member of the School of American Research (the new name of the School of American Archaeology), and also acted as business manager for the Santa Fe Community Theater Association. He had an office adjacent to the Santa Fe Plaza and had acquired the former Manderfield estate in Santa Fe, where he may have lived. As he was in arrears on a $5,000 mortgage, he was forced to give up this property in March 1921 at which time the Santa Fe Bank became legal custodian. The legally questionable deals that Collier enjoyed proved, in the end, to be a disaster, as one by one his land claims were challenged by Pueblo Indians, by former land grantees, by former partners, by lawyers, and by the U.S. government in U.S. vs Sandoval 1913. His promising investments had become disastrous losses.
Collier’s reputation as an Exposition promoter and as a Republican known in Washington, D.C., convinced President Warren G. Harding to appoint Collier as a representative to the 1922 Brazilian Centennial Exposition in Rio de Janeiro. At the end of the Fair, the Brazilian government declared Collier and his wife Clytie as guests of the nation and arranged for them to tour the principal states of the country.  

Collier returned to San Diego in 1924 and resumed selling real estate in a “drive-in” office at 1050 Ninth Street. His friends greeted him with a banquet at the San Diego Hotel. When his turn to speak came, Collier praised the cooperation that had made the Panama-California Exposition possible. Collier sold properties at Loma Portal, Wonderland Beach, Point Loma Heights, and Sunshine Gardens. His firm was responsible for the demolition of Wonderland Park and the construction of beach houses, cottages, and apartment houses from Voltaire Street to Point Loma Avenue.  

Collier left San Diego in February 1925 to accept the Director-Generalship of the United States Sesquicentennial to be held at Philadelphia in 1926 at a salary of $25,000 per year. He resigned on October 29, 1925, after Philadelphia Mayor Kendrick cut the number of exhibit buildings from seven to two and an auditorium. The Republic of Panama employed Collier as an exposition consultant in 1925-26. Nothing concrete resulted from this enterprise and information regarding Collier’s activities during the next six years did not reach the local press. He visited or lived at times in Philadelphia, Chicago, and New York City. In 1929 he was admitted to the Illinois bar. He may have acted as an intermediary in the sale of goods from Brazil during that time. In 1930 he contributed toward developing the theme of the 1933 Century of Progress Exposition in Chicago.  

In the fall of 1930, Collier returned to San Diego and resumed the practice of law. He lived on Park Boulevard, but visited a retreat near Ramona, possibly his former home at Ballena, whenever he could. Carl Heilbron, his former partner, owned the retreat. Much of Collier’s practice came from clients in the Ramona area. In 1931 he declared that San Diego could make its waterfront as attractive as Balboa Park, if it held a Centennial Exposition there. Most people in San Diego ignored the suggestion. Resilient by nature, a defeat could not keep Collier down for long. In June 1932, he came in fifth in an election for the Board of Supervisors. As a person who had spent most of his life selling real estate, Collier, not surprisingly, favored lowering property taxes.  

Power brokers in San Diego endorsed Frank Drugan’s plan for the California Pacific International Exposition after he had secured promises of both federal and
industrial support and exhibits from Chicago’s 1933 Century of Progress Exposition. They chose Balboa Park as the site for the exposition, to be held in 1935-36. No one thought to ask Collier for his opinions.73 “To Colonel Collier, more than to any other single individual,” wrote Carl Heilbron, “is due credit for the 1935 Exposition first because of his vision in creating the beautiful buildings and landscaping of the 1915 Exposition, and second, because he made the community exposition-conscious by his projected 1934 Exposition.”74

On November 13, 1934, Collier died of a heart attack at Scripps Memorial Hospital in La Jolla.75 He was sixty-three years old. Funeral services were held November 15 at the Bradley-Woolman funeral parlor under the auspices of the San Diego Lodge No. 35, of the Order of Masons. He was buried in the Masonic plot at Mount Hope Cemetery in San Diego.76 In 1936 Clytie Collier moved back East to live with her daughter. After she died on April 28, 1968, her remains were returned to San Diego for interment alongside her husband at Mount Hope Cemetery.77

Collier’s death prevented his obtaining permission from the U.S. Congress to pursue a lawsuit to win title from the U.S. Government for land at Fort Rosecrans. He claimed the government did not have clear title. If his suit had been successful, Collier would have received 75 percent of the profits from the sale of 85 estates. Judge Gordon Thompson, in the Superior Court, July 27, 1937, canceled Collier’s filing fee and discharged him as administrator of the estates as he was no longer living.78 The suit was another of Collier’s bold schemes. If he had won, he would again have become rich. As it turned out, he was close to bankruptcy when he died. His widow was left with $2,000 in uncollected fees for legal services and a debt of over $42,000 in claims against her husband’s estate.79

Collier had both friends and enemies in San Diego. He was a blustery extrovert with an ebullient manner that recalled Theodore Roosevelt’s over-flowing personality. Recognizing in him a kindred spirit, Roosevelt offered Collier the post of colonel in a regiment he was trying to form for duty during World War I.80 Collier was also popular among members of Congress from both parties and among businessmen from South America. Yet he was vulnerable as a politician. San Diegans saw the no-holds-barred, brass-knuckle side of his character in his feuds with mayors John L. Sehon, Grant Conard, and Louis J. Wilde.81 After Collier’s disillusionment with the Republican Old Guard in 1912, he aligned himself with George W. Marston, G. Aubrey Davidson, Joseph W. Sefton, Jr., and Carl Heilbron.82 A front man for Marston in the 1917 mayoral election, he tried to bring Marston’s aloof character within touch of the masses. He failed not only because his attacks on his opponents were outlandish but also because, in dirt-slinging warfare, his opponents (men like Sehon and Wilde) were as opportunistic and bombastic as he was.
Colonel D.C. Collier

Collier’s personal side was deeper and quieter than his boisterous public mask. We can only speculate about the reasons why Collier deferred to men whom he considered superior. Did he, like Sinclair Lewis’s Babbitt, know there was more to life than camaraderie and boastful promises? Did he feel that by contact with polished and professional people like George W. Marston and Dr. Edgar L. Hewett, he could somehow smooth out his own crudities and imperfections? We will never know.

Perhaps the numerous organizations that Collier belonged to can give us an indication of his expansive, forward-looking character. These were the Masons, Shriners, Elks, Archaeological Institute of America, National Geographic Society, California Historical Society, Sons of Colorado Pioneers, San Diego Chamber of Commerce, Ramona Chamber of Commerce, Order of the Liberty Bell, Chicago Athletic Club, San Diego Yacht Club, San Diego Rowing Club, Sojourners of Pen and Pencil, Philadelphia Boosters’ Club, Brasileira de Imprensa, and Instituto Geográfico e histórico de Bahia, Brazil. Because Collier was continuously active in establishing parks throughout the area, a number of them were named in his honor. These included Collier Park in Point Loma, Collier Park in Ocean Beach, and the 8-acre Collier County Park in Ramona.

Archaeologist and director of the San Diego Museum of Man from 1916 to 1929, Dr. Edgar L. Hewett paid tribute to Collier in a 1935 issue of El Palacio. His words are quoted because they convey a view of Collier as an exponent of “rugged individualism,” with all the ruthlessness the phrase implies:

One can only think of Colonel Collier as tremendously alive. He was the most dynamic personality I have ever known; a product of human evolution well described by the term “rugged individualism.” Every believer in humanity must hope and pray that the type may survive and increase.
NOTES

1. Collier received the title of “Colonel” when he served on the staff of California Governor J.N. Gillett from 1907 to 1911. *San Diego Union*, April 28, 1907, 2.


4. One of the ironies of history is the manner in which the achievements of people who were famous in their lifetimes are soon forgotten. In the span of 59 years, D.C. Collier has become little known and communities that had honored him are even removing his name from parks and schools in order to commemorate today’s important people.


15. *San Diego Union*, August 20, 1891, 5; Heilbron wrote that Collier entered the law offices of Collier & Mulford, of which Charlie’s father was senior partner, in 1886. This Collier is in fact William Collier—not D.C. Collier, Sr. Heilbron, *History of San Diego County*, 171.


17. *San Diego Union*, August 12, 1899, 5; November 6, 1899, 5; August 4, 1900, 6.


28. San Diego Park Board Minutes, December 4, 1908, San Diego City Clerk’s Office; *San Diego Union*, March 9, 1909, 7.

29. *San Diego Union*, January 14, 1908, II, 9; March 5, 1908, 3.

30. Vessels in the Great White Fleet included the battleships *Kansas, Maine, Alabama, Connecticut,*
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Nebraska, and others plus six early destroyers and several auxiliary ships circumnavigating the globe from December 16, 1907, to February 22, 1909. The squadrons were manned by 14,000 sailors and covered some 43,000 nautical miles. Even though the ships were constructed after the Spanish-American War, many were outdated and unfit for battle.

31. A meeting of the Chamber of Commerce was called on July 27, 1908, to investigate charges that the law firm of Crane and Andrews had tarnished the reputation of San Diego businesses by declaring that seventeen of them were on the verge of bankruptcy, erupted into a fight between Collier and Andrews. Taking Collier’s side, the Chamber ruled that Crane and Andrews had been “disloyal to the people of San Diego.” San Diego Union, July 28, 1908, II, 2.

32. San Diego Union, August 4, 1908, 1.
33. San Diego Union, November 2, 1909, 5; January 30, 1910, 6; January 26, 1931.
37. San Diego Herald, June 22, 1911.
38. San Diego Union, January 5, 1912, 2.
39. San Diego Union, September 27, 1913, 3.
41. San Diego Union, March 9, 1914, 1; San Diego Sun, November 14, 1934, B-1.
42. San Diego Union, March 9, 1914, 1; San Diego Sun, March 30, 1914, 1.
43. San Diego Sun, March 30, 1914, 1; John C. Olmsted to George W. Marston, July 7, 1911, George W. Marston File, San Diego History Center Research Library; San Diego Sun, June 18, 1910, 7; San Diego Union, January 28, 1911, 101; San Diego Union, September 8, 1909, 1; San Diego Sun, September 8, 1909, 2.
44. San Diego Sun, April 27, 1911, 3.
45. San Diego Union, February 5, 1912, 6.
46. San Diego Union, February 29, 1912, 10.
47. San Diego Sun, May 21, 1913, 8.
48. San Diego Examiner, April 24, 1914, 1.
49. San Diego Union, April 23, 1914, 1.
50. San Diego Sun, May 9, 1914, 9.
54. San Diego Union, April 4, 1917, 1.
56. San Diego Sun, April 7, 1917, 1; San Diego Union, April 24, 1917, San Diego Sun, May 1, 1917, 1; Richard F. Pourade, Gold In The Sun (San Diego: Union-Tribune Publishing Co., 1965), 226.
58. San Diego Union November 14, 1934, B-1.
59. The School of American Archaeology’s parent organization was the Archaeological Institute of America that sent exhibits to the Panama-California Exposition.
64. *San Diego Union*, October 5, 1924, Building, 4; *San Diego Union*, November 27, 1924, 20; November 30, 1924, Building, 4; February 15, 1925 Building, 3.
70. *San Diego Sun*, November 14, 1934, B-1.
73. *San Diego Union*, October 5, 1934, 9; April 8, 1950, B-1.
75. *San Diego Sun*, November 11, 1934, B-1.
76. *San Diego Union*, November 15, 1934, 3.
79. San Diego County Probate Court, Notice to Creditors, No. 21835; *San Diego Union*, December 6, 1934, 5.
81. *San Diego Union*, July 27, 1908, 6; *San Diego Sun*, April 3, 1909, 1; *San Diego Evening Tribune*, October 30, 1914, 1; *San Diego Sun*, October 31, 1914, 1. John Sehon served from 1901 to 1905; Conard 1909 to 1911; and Wilde 1917 to 1921.
San Diego’s civic leaders faced an economic challenge at the turn of the twentieth century: how to transform San Diego from a sleepy town into the thriving city they envisioned. The “boom” of the 1880s had left San Diego with a city-sized population and several possible avenues to achieve economic success—real estate, tourism, agriculture, maritime commerce—but no definitive niche. Looking to overcome this inertia and get the city moving, the San Diego Chamber of Commerce developed a strategy to persuade the federal government—specifically the United States Navy—to establish a facility on San Diego’s “perfect and ample” harbor. The various surveys the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Service conducted from the 1850s onward, and the Army Corps of Engineers’ supervision of the ongoing construction of the Zuniga Shoals Jetty, designed to create a deep, safe entry for large
vessels, had thoroughly familiarized the government with the advantages of San Diego Bay. Now, with the harbor as the focus, the Chamber leadership framed their campaign to bring a military installation to San Diego with the tangential expectation that if they could persuade the government to establish one facility, others would surely follow.

This was not the Chamber’s first attempt to lure a military facility to the city. Between 1893 and 1900, the Chamber had pondered other schemes to establish a naval presence in San Diego – a training school, a “hydrographic” office, and a dry dock and repair facility – all good ideas, but no successes. But this time the Chamber believed it had the answer—a coaling station. Navy ships generally needed to “coal” every two to three weeks, depending on the size of the vessel, and for ships patrolling the lengthy Pacific Coast, the only functioning coal station was in northern California’s San Francisco Bay. So, armed with the belief that the Navy needed a depot in the southern region of the Pacific Coast and that establishing one naval facility would lead to others, the Chamber opened a campaign in 1900 to convince the government to construct a naval coaling station on the shore of San Diego harbor.

Under the direction of President George Ballou, Secretary H.P. Wood, and the organizations’ Harbor Improvement Committee, the Chamber initiated their campaign with an onslaught of communications addressed to California’s United States Congresmen and Senators and the Departments of War and Navy. In April of 1900 the Chamber urged California’s Senators Thomas Bard and George Perkins and Representative James Needham to contact Secretary of War Elihu Root “urging the necessity for establishing a coaling station . . . for the navy on San Diego Bay.” The Chamber also pled their case to the Secretary of Navy emphasizing the “strategic position” of the port of San Diego offered the Navy and encouraging the “early commencement” of a coaling station. If the Navy did not entirely share the Chamber’s vision for wholesale naval expansion to San Diego, it did display a tempered interest in a coal station there. The Annual Reports of the Secretary of Navy in 1900 and 1901 reflected the Navy’s awareness of San Diego’s strategic location and indicated the desire to negotiate with the War Department to obtain land on the Point Loma Military Reservation to establish a coal depot.

Whether it was the Chamber’s efforts or the Navy’s influence, the coal station crusade appeared to move forward on several fronts. In mid-1900, Congress appropriated $2000 to investigate the “practicality” and “ advisability” of establishing another coal station on the Pacific Coast, which prompted acting Secretary of Navy, F. W. Hackett to select a “favorable site” for the depot near Ballast Point, immediately south of the federal quarantine station. At about the same time, U.S. Senator
George Perkins reported to the Chamber that a Naval Appropriations Bill had earmarked $700,000 for a new station. Shortly thereafter, following a congressional directive, the Navy ordered Captain W. L. Field of the USS Ranger to head to San Diego and undertake an investigation of potential depot sites. Field completed his harbor survey and in June 1900 announced that the Navy had indeed decided to build a coal station at a site “just above Ballast Point.” Admiral R. B. Bradford, the Chief of the Bureau of Equipment for the Navy, also added his personal support for a San Diego depot and suggested to Chamber Secretary Wood that any community support in keeping “costs reasonable” would certainly “ease matters” and “greatly facilitate” the chances of the government awarding San Diego the station.

With Congress acting and the Chamber and the Navy in tacit agreement, a San Diego coal station appeared a fait accompli, until the Navy unexpectedly imposed the caveat that the depot be located on the site of the existing quarantine station. The Treasury Department had established the health facility on a portion of the Point Loma Military Reservation in 1893 and the station was fully operational when the Navy first expressed an interest in the site. The Navy’s determined efforts to acquire the quarantine site appeared to be grounded in the belief that it was simply the best physical location for a fueling depot. The U.S. Treasury had undoubtedly selected the site for the same topographic characteristics the Navy then observed: a “bayside beach” that featured a gently sloping shoreline that could support buildings and offered ample storage space, a shallow inshore that was perfect for constructing a pier, and enough contiguous deep water to allow vessels to safely approach. The Chamber’s rationale for supporting the Navy’s acquisition of the site was equally straightforward; a depot on a site the Navy favored would, it was hoped, be a precursor to more naval facilities for the city. So began the Chamber’s efforts to resolve the convoluted “removal” issue, an internecine struggle between the Departments of Navy and Treasury that would haunt the project throughout the next decade.

Early in 1901, the Chamber sent Secretary Wood to Washington D.C. to represent their interests regarding the coal depot and he quickly made his presence...
known. Shortly after his arrival Wood reported back to the Chamber that at his urging, Admiral Bradford had agreed to pay a visit to San Diego to investigate the situation as a guest of the Chamber. The Admiral traveled to San Diego and did not disappoint as he declared his unqualified support for a coal station on Point Loma. Bradford was quick to point out that his approval was not premised on the desire of the “people of San Diego,” but on his assessment that the project was an “absolute naval necessity.” He also strongly advocated that the best location for a new depot was on land the quarantine station currently occupied. Accordingly, he urged the Chamber to apply pressure on Surgeon General Walter Wyman of the Treasury Department to obtain his consent to move the quarantine station to another site. Bradford was so adamant in his preference for the quarantine locale that he averred that if it was not secured, the Navy might cancel the project.10 Of course the Chamber was more than willing to accommodate the Navy and insure this did not happen.

The seemingly tireless Secretary Wood reacted quickly. He first arranged a meeting with Surgeon General Wyman and General O. L. Spaulding, the Assistant
Secretary of Treasury and head of the Quarantine Service, to discuss the “removal” issue. According to Wood the meeting went “affably” but provided no substantive results. Wood then turned his attention back to Admiral Bradford, a known depot advocate. Upon his return to the capital, Wood asked the Admiral to intercede personally with the Secretary of Navy, whose influence Wood believed would surely secure “the removal of the Quarantine Station without difficulty.” In April, Bradford informed the Chamber that Congress had granted the Navy a “good-sized allowance” to establish the station and as soon as the War Department turned over the land to the Navy, work would “immediately” begin. Then, whether it was Wood’s or Bradford’s direct intervention, the Admiral reported to the Chamber in May that he had met with Captain James Meyler of the Army Corps of Engineers, John M. Wilson the Chief of Engineers, and the Secretary of Navy John B. Long, and secured the application for land on Point Loma. In September the Department of War formally transferred to the Navy a 2900’ wide section of their land, immediately south of the Treasury reservation, for a coal station.

The Treasury Department was no idle participant in the matter and naturally took action to protect its interests. In November 1902, J. S. Raymond, a Treasury Department official, arrived in San Diego to investigate and solidify the Treasury’s position. Raymond noted that while there was the possibility of a change in venue, in his view the quarantine station was well located “right where it was.” From this point forward positions polarized: the Treasury Department met repeated relocation entreaties with insouciance and the Navy demanded the station be removed. The Chamber, of course, staunchly maintained their pro-Navy posture and bombastically asserted that the “public interest and the nation’s defense demanded” that the Navy acquire the Treasury lands exclusively for naval use.

As the removal issue progressed, the coal station received a meaningful endorsement in mid-1902 when the Navy’s General Board, an advisory cadre of senior Navy Admirals, which reported solely to the Secretary of Navy, recommended that plans for a San Diego depot go forward. A report from Admiral George Dewey, the Board Chairman, and naval war hero, explained that the Board had authorized the project based on San Diego’s geostrategic position as the only “harbor at the extreme south of our Pacific coast.” The Board’s approbation essentially marked the Navy’s formal approval of the project.

From outward appearances, by 1902 the Navy was committed to establishing the station. The Navy placed Assistant Engineer John H. Koop in charge of overseeing the development of the station and Admiral Bradford requested that the perimeter of the prospective site be fenced and plans drawn up to run a city water line to the area. But at the same time the pesky removal issue remained unresolved.

The removal negotiations continued into 1903 as the Navy still aspired to make the station the “largest on the west coast.” When Wood learned that the Navy was ready to transfer $90,000 to the Treasury Department as “compensation” for
funds it had expended to improve the quarantine station, he quickly arranged a meeting with the Navy Department to ensure that an accurate accounting of the proceedings found its way back to Congress. Senator Bard’s personal secretary accompanied Wood to the meeting. Wood left the conference with the impression that “a large coaling station” was in the making and confident that the station’s establishment would lead to future military development in San Diego. With a settlement in sight, the Chamber set about to ameliorate the contention between the Navy and Treasury and move the project forward.

Unfortunately the intransigence of both parties continued to stalemate any compromise and stymied the Chamber’s best efforts. In February 1903 Secretary of Treasury Leslie M. Shaw summed up the opposing viewpoints in a letter to Chamber President William L. Frevert. In his opinion, the Navy stubbornly saw the quarantine site as the only “desirable” location for the coaling station, and the Treasury firmly maintained the stance that any site change was both too expensive to expedite and “disadvantageous” to the department’s mission. In an attempt to mitigate discord, the Chamber identified and offered several alternate sites for the quarantine facility and vowed to bring “every influence” in their power to effect the relocation of the station. Following their earlier modus, the Chamber immediately prepared telegrams to the Army, Navy, and Treasury Departments, and to California’s Senators and Representatives, soliciting their assistance “in straightening out the differences between the Navy and Treasury departments and urging the removal of the Quarantine Station.”

In response to the Chambers’ appeals, California’s Congressional delegates went to work. Representative James Needham prepared an amendment for insertion into a pending House Sundry Bill that would “move the quarantine station near the jetty and give the whole of the water front to the Navy department.” Woods also heard from California Congressmen Milton J. Daniels that he was likewise preparing a bill to push the removal process forward. Needham went a step further and met with the new Secretary of Navy William H. Moody, who had earlier expressed some misgivings about the measure, and gained his support. Now an advocate, Moody tried to persuade Shaw that the newly proposed quarantine site was “an excellent one” which fulfilled in “every respect the recommendation of the quarantine officer at San Diego.” Exerting more pressure on the Treasury, Moody averred that the people of San Diego were “thoroughly” satisfied with the site and the “California delegation” was pressing him for a solution. As a final jibe, Moody blamed Shaw’s refusal to relocate the quarantine station as the reason the coaling project was on hold.

In the Senate, Perkins was equally active. He attempted to attach an amendment...
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to both a Senate Sundry Civil Bill and a pending Naval Bill to secure a change of venue for the quarantine station; the Conference Committee, however, refused to entertain either action because the deadline to submit new legislation had passed. Perkins then took a different approach and tried to convince the Navy Department to build the coaling station on any “available” government land. Finally, in November of 1903, the California Senator sought to enact a “special bill” as an amendment to a naval appropriations bill to facilitate the relocation and “carry out the wishes of the people of San Diego.”

Two other bills also circulated through the Congress in 1903 and early 1904. One allocated $50,000 to prepare a new quarantine site and remove the buildings and “appurtenances” of the old station and another for $200,000 to place a new quarantine station on a strip of land along the main channel of the bay. Both were designed to facilitate the quarantine removal and to fund the establishment of the coaling station on “blocks 93 and 94 of the La Playa,” which the quarantine station currently occupied.

Amid the removal commotion, in 1902 the Navy initiated construction of the coal depot on land immediately contiguous to the quarantine station. The Navy’s plans called for a steel pier with concrete supports to provide a working capacity of 3,000 tons, an approach pier with a steel trestle, two coal-loading towers, and an on-shore storage and handling plant with a 25,000 ton capacity. Over the next two years, the Navy Department slowly implemented their proposals and by 1904 had the rudiments of a working facility in place, along with plans for a new staff “cottage” and adjoining horse stables. The year ended with the Navy begrudgingly constructing the coal depot on the land immediately south of the quarantine station, while still coveting the Treasury site.

Supporting the Navy’s acquisition aspirations, the Chamber next approached the San Diego business community for support. In August of 1904 the Chamber met with local business leaders and prepared a statement to promote the coal depot. San Diego Mayor Frank Frary, John S. Akerman of the Chamber and forty plus San Diego businessmen signed the communiqué addressed to Paul Morton, the new Secretary of Navy. The Chamber and the business consortium played to the sentiments of the Navy, with the reminder that the service needed a sizable coal station in San Diego and that the land the quarantine station occupied had the potential to house a depot with the storage capacity of 50,000 tons of coal—making it the best choice.

The Chamber’s campaign received a boost in late 1904 when Assistant Secretary of War Charles H. Darling paid a visit to San Diego to inspect the harbor. Darling described the harbor as one of the “most important in the United States” and said the completion of the proposed Panama Canal would only heighten that
He also mentioned the need for the coal station and, with words that were music to the Chamber’s ears, acknowledged the possibility of a naval repair shop to follow, which could lead to a full Navy yard and dry dock facilities. As the year closed the Navy assigned Assistant Engineer R. E. Carney, USN, as the new station “custodian,” the Navy’s incongruous title for the person in charge of the coal station, and continued their desultory improvements on the depot. The Chamber also returned the energetic Wood to Washington to track the removal issue.

Wood reported back to the directors at the end of January 1905 that he had again met with Surgeon General Wyman and repeated the Chamber’s argument that the quarantine removal was both a “Naval Necessity” and essential to San Diego, for surely “one development would lead to another.” The obdurate Wood also contended that the newly proposed quarantine site was much better for their purposes and that the Treasury’s hesitancy had impeded the promised improvements at the coal depot. After one prolonged meeting, which included countless telephones calls between Wyman and Treasury Secretary Shaw, Wyman finally appeared to acquiesce to Wood’s view. Wood immediately met with Assistant Secretary Armstrong, who was then in charge of all quarantine matters, and obtained Armstrong’s promise “to earnestly and actively second any effort” the Navy Department might make in the removal matter.

Wood also set meetings with Secretary of Navy Morton, his assistant Charles Darling, and Admirals Converse and Manney of the Corps of Engineers, in each case securing their respective support. From these conversations, Wood was also able to persuade Darling to write a “strong letter” to Joseph Cannon, the Speaker of the House, requesting that Congress sponsor and “favorably” consider a “removal” bill. In his dealings, Wood reiterated that the Treasury should view relocation as a national measure, not a “local” one and that the action was both a naval necessity and for the “betterment” of the quarantine service. Shaw appeared to agree and co-signed a letter to that effect. Wood felt that while success was not yet “fully assured” he had at least “moved the rock upon which our plans had hitherto been wrecked.” But even with Shaw’s tacit approval, the reality was that the Treasury, with a fully developed and functioning station in place, was not likely to accept a perfunctory relocation of their facility.

With the Chamber’s machinations moving forward at the national level, suddenly a local snag appeared. The ownership of a portion of the submerged land upon which the proposed new quarantine wharf would be constructed came into
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question. It took action from the San Diego Board of Harbor Commissioners and a special session of the California State Legislature to successfully resolve that issue and grant the federal government ownership of the land in question. With that problem resolved, it was back to business as usual.

Briefly eschewing the removal issue the Chamber now pressed for more improvements at the depot. In May 1906 the Chamber submitted another formal resolution to Congress to properly “establish” the coaling station. The resolution covered much of the same old ground; it noted that San Diego was the only “deep water harbor South of San Francisco” and that “the necessity” for such a station was “apparent to all.” To accomplish this, the document requested $300,000 for further construction. In a tangential resolution the Chamber requested an additional $30,000 to dredge the area immediately in front of the depot pier to ensure that large ships could safety approach. As the Chamber prepared these resolutions, the San Diego Union optimistically reported that “one of the biggest naval coal stations in the United States” would soon be completed and that would hopefully spur federal interest in constructing a full naval yard in San Diego.

Despite the Chamber’s political maneuvering and the Navy’s complaints, the quarantine station continued to function and grow. In the midst of the removal controversy the new coal station custodian, Commander John H. Almey, USN Retired, took his shots at his next-door neighbor. In mid-1907, as Dr. W. W. McKay, the surgeon in command at the quarantine station, prepared to fence in his facility, Almey, with a hint of bias, complained that the Treasury had not only acquired the quarantine land in a “surreptitious manner,” but, quoting the Navy Chief of Bureau, had done so in a manner exhibiting a “want of courtesy and good faith.”

But 1907 was also a year of improvement at the coal station. The Navy requested and received permission from the War Department to expend $178,000 to install an upgraded wharf, and a new trestle and bunkers. Under Almey’s supervision, local

Great White Fleet - first boat to land - Coronado - 1908. ©SDHC 14071.
San Diego engineer Lew Harris made the soundings for the pier pilings and S. W. Mitchell, the supervisor of the contractor for the Pennsylvania Bridge, completed his preparations and started construction in January 1908.36

Despite the best efforts of the Chamber and the Navy, from its inception the coal station had moved forward erratically—a case of progress then pause—but by 1908 the depot was fully operational. Unfortunately, the harbor was not fully dredged and the ships of the Great White Fleet visiting in 1908 had to anchor off Coronado. Viewing the station's situation pragmatically, Almey's replacement, retired Admiral, H.N. Manney, commented in 1909 that any further improvements to the coal storage area would probably “trespass” into the quarantine grounds and affect several of its structures. Perhaps sensing the futility of the situation, he noted that the State of California had offered a new site for the quarantine station, but also observed that even if the State could facilitate the move, it would take years to construct new buildings and a wharf. Manny soberly accepted the “fact” that the continued growth of the health facility seemed to “indicate an absence of intention on the part of the Government to abandon” the present quarantine site.37

The relocation issue lingered on beyond the end of the decade with no definitive resolution. Treasury officials rightly based their reticence to evacuate the quarantine site on their physical possession of the land and the time and funds the Department had expended to establish the facility. The quarantine station pre-dated the coal depot by almost ten years and given the improvements, which continued into 1903, the reality of the Treasury abandoning the site, regardless of the collegial relationship of the Navy and the Chamber and their persistent efforts, was problematic at best. The Navy undoubtedly believed the quarantine station stymied the expansion of their coaling depot, but in reality any meaningful recourse was limited. As a consequence, during the years of this protracted debate, the Navy and the Treasury continued to upgrade their respective facilities and conduct operations on the original sites.

While the coal depot officially went on-line in 1904, the Navy’s indifferent commitment to the station left it a shoestring operation. In 1905 Carney complained that when the Navy reassigned his four-person staff back to the USS Chicago, it left him performing all the depot’s duties. As further evidence of the Navy’s seeming apathy toward the depot, the Navy Department reduced the depot’s staff to the point where the station went unmanned on Sundays and holidays, then released several more civilian employees and proceeded to cut the pay of these still working.38 As a result, the coal station custodians repeatedly badgered the Bureau for more help at the station. Both Manney and Webb requested a night watchman to guard against theft and be on the lookout for fires, which were common on the brush-covered peninsula. Gunner, USN, Retired, H. Webb, custodian from 1909–1911, also requested that two members of his launch crew be deputized as U.S. Marshalls to help patrol and protect the property around the station. The custodians received repeated requests from local citizens for jobs, but on average there were only two civilian employees on site from 1908 to 1910. In addition to the staff issues, the Navy Bureau slashed the station’s operating budget in half and routinely denied requests for additional materials and equipment.39

The location of the station’s headquarters was equally uncertain. The facilities for the station’s staff were so meager that the first three custodians conducted the business of the depot from an office in downtown San Diego. Almey, the fourth
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custodian, moved the operations to his leased home in Coronado, but was able to return downtown when the government assigned him an assistant. The custodian’s office did not make the permanent move to the La Playa site until 1908.40

Even the assignment of station supervisors reflected the Navy’s apparent waning interest in the facility. Boatswain L.J. De Ryder, who served from January 1906 into 1907, was the last active duty Navy person to be in charge of the station. Lieutenant Commander Holcombe served an interim position, but from that point forward the custodians were all retired Navy personnel: John H. Almey, Commander, retired, 1907-1909; H.R. Manney, Rear Admiral, retired, 1909; and H. Webb, Gunner, retired, 1909-1911, respectively.

The year 1909 offered the prospect of resurgence when the Bureau of Navigation contacted Manney requesting his views on implementing a new coal storage system at the depot. As per request, Manney issued a detailed report in May that outlined the system that he felt would best serve the station. He recommended a cable car system, the dimensions of the transporting trestle and even delineated the desired material for the superstructure. Manney suggested that the new system use two 500-ton “coal pockets” rather than huge bunkers, which would mitigate the amount of weight on the existing wharf and also allow for two hoppers with car tracks to be placed on each side of the wharf to facilitate loading. The report also included the reminder that the most efficient way to store coal was on an open concrete platform, or even on the ground; the Navy learned through experience that coal stored in enclosed bunkers was both susceptible to spontaneous combustion and difficult to handle when it became damp.41 As before, these plans failed to materialize and the station continued to exist on the edge of credibility.

Electricity came to the station in 1910 under Manney’s watch. The retired Admiral coordinated with San Diego Consolidated Gas and Electric Company to effect a plan to set poles and run electrical lines across the Military Reservation to serve the coal, wireless and quarantine stations. The coal station received current through a line originating in the quarantine station. In May, Manney reported to the Chief of Equipment that the electricity was in place at a cost of 10 cents per kilowatt-hour, but because of the distance from the city, San Diego charged the depot an additional $5.00 monthly fee. With the power in place, Manney requested lights be placed on the wharf to make it more visible to ships making the “sharp turn” at the sand bar situated in front of the station. But even the arrival of electricity raised a question of the stations’ tenability as Manney pondered if the
Navy—or he—would pay for running the power to his living quarters. 42

Aside from the station custodians, by 1910 most naval agencies perceived the station as a faltering enterprise. When Manney requested a steam launch and lighter for transporting his mail and supplies across the bay, Admiral Ward of the Board of Supply and Accounting denied the request on the grounds that it was his understanding the station was “abandoned.” Adding some salt to the wound, Ward suggested that the depot’s already meager budget should be further reduced. Officials in the Bureau of Navigation appeared to mirror that attitude, as it was their understanding that the Navy Department had “deferred” all action at the station. 43

If the bureaucratic slights of Webb’s own department were not enough, the local army post heaped on a personal affront. In April 1910 Webb complained to the commandant of Fort Rosecrans that some Army men had become a “frequent source of annoyance” to himself and his family. It seemed the soldiers often returned from town late at night along the military road that bordered the depot and indulged in “loud singing, boisterous and obscene language, catcalls and the like.” Webb complained that one evening at around 1:30am several soldiers stopped in front of his quarters and started using disgusting language: the soldiers apparently met Webb’s demands for quiet with insulting remarks rather than compliance. 44
A public view of the station produced a variety of opinions. San Diego civic leader and former Chamber President Rufus Choate declared that the station was never used simply because there was no coal at the site from 1904-1912—a fact that photos of the station belie— and blamed the lack of support on California’s contingent in the House of Representatives. With hindsight, Congressman William Kettner remarked that in 1901 the Navy had performed some dredging to “add a coaling station” but after the construction of a wharf the Navy abandoned the project. Conversely he stated in 1914 that some 900 tons of coal was stored on-site while the Navy awaited construction of the “colliers” to protect the material and thus “complete the plant.” Local reporter and author Max Miller offered a very different, perhaps myopic, perspective as he described the “one-time great coaling station” as once the “toast of the Pacific from Seattle to Mazatlan.” Likewise in 1911, the San Diego Union boldly pronounced, somewhat prematurely, that the presence of the coal station had confirmed the government’s recognition of the harbor’s “strategic importance” and San Diego’s value as a future “base of naval operations.”

Most references simply described the station as “incomplete.” In 1910, Congressman Sylvester Smith alluded to the completed “wharf and certain buildings,” but also mentioned that the lack of funding had postponed work on the coal handling plant. California’s U.S. Senator John D. Works pointed out to the Navy, lest they forget, that San Diego had an “excellent wharf” at the coaling depot, but unfortunately no bunkers or facilities existed for handling the coal. The Senator urged the completion of the depot to overcome the “inconvenience” which existed in coaling “government warships.”

The Navy’s disjointed efforts to improve the station continued throughout the decade and by 1918 the depot had evolved into an active, functioning fuel facility. As to the Navy’s irredentist designs on the quarantine station—it finally absorbed the old quarantine grounds some twenty-five years after the removal controversy began.

Between 1900 and 1912 the San Diego Chamber of Commerce waged an aggressive campaign, premised on the advantages of the city’s harbor, to convince the
Navy to establish a coal station on the bay. Looking to expand San Diego’s economy, the pro-business Chamber pursued the coal station in the belief that it would be the first of many naval facilities to follow. In this pursuit the Chamber pro-actively lobbied California’s Congressional contingent, the respective government agencies and unflinchingly supported the Navy’s efforts to usurp the federal quarantine station to make the depot a reality. The coal station became San Diego’s first permanent naval facility and, viewed in retrospect, was the city’s first tentative step in the developing relationship with the U.S. Navy.48

NOTES

1. The Chamber published several booklets touting the harbor between 1897 and 1900: “The Pacific Wave” was compiled to compete with San Pedro for federal funding for the harbor and “The Port of San Diego” was essentially a plan to improve the harbor with 174 fanciful piers situated around the perimeter of the bay. It is important to appreciate that the Chamber’s membership represented the most influential individuals in the city and their “resolutions” carried considerable weight in determining civic matters: the membership included, G. W. Hazard, George Marston, James Pierce, M. T. Gilmore, I. W. Hellman, Philip Morse, William Frevert, John Forward, Rufus Choate, Dr. Edward Grove, James A. Jasper, Waldo Waterman and Julius Wangenheim.

2. For the Chamber’s earlier activities in improving the harbor, see the San Diego Chamber of Commerce Regular Meeting Minutes, meeting, February 6, 1878, p. 65, Journal April 3, 1871 to March 3, 1887; meeting, December 13, 1893, p. 75-76, Vol., January 1893- July 1895; meeting, February 2, 1894, p. 93, Vol., January 1893- July 1895; meeting, April 27, 1900, Vol. 1900. Hereinafter cited as SDCCRM. See Bruce Linder’s The Navy In San Diego, for a great overview of San Diego and the Navy.

3. SDCCRM, meeting, April 6, 1900, p. 102-103, Journal 1900.

4. National Archives Branch Depository, Washington DC, letter, July 31, 1900, Wood to Secretary of Navy, Record Group #80, General Correspondence, Box #484, file 10924. Hereinafter as NARA, GC.

5. See, Annual Reports of the Secretary of Navy, 1900, Vol. 24, p. 297 and 1901, Vol. 25, p. 366, respectively. On a practical level, the war with Spain revealed the deficiencies of the Navy’s coal storage and handling facilities and the lack of conveniently spaced fuel depots. See the Annual Reports of the Secretary of Navy, 1898, Vol. 11, p. 26.


7. SDCCRM, letter, May 8, 1900, Congressman James C. Needham to Wood, p. 138, Journal 1900; letter, May 11, 1900, Bradford to Perkins, p. 133, Journal 1900; meeting, May 25, 1900, p. 141, Journal 1900; meeting, June 1, 1900, p. 155, Journal 1900; San Diego Union, May 6, 1900, “Coaling Station for Magdalena Bay,” p. 8 and June 17, 1900, “The Navy Department Decides To Establish It,” p. 1. Hereinafter cited as SD Union. SDCCRM, letter, July 16, 1900, Bradford to Wood, p. 174, Journal 1900. In mid 1900 Captain James J. Meyer of the Corps of Engineers, who was in San Diego supervising the Zuniga Jetty project, recommended some land north of the Quarantine Station. Navy Captain W. L. Field had earlier suggested an area near China Point, to the south, half way between the Quarantine Station and Fort Rosecrans, but Meyer objected that the channel there was too narrow, making it difficult for ships to maneuver.


9. This space at La Playa was the same location the Californios selected for constructing a warehouse that supported the hide and tallow trade between 1825-1830.

10. SDCCRM, meeting, August 17, 1900, p. 176-177, Journal 1900. There was a lingering question on
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The title of these lands so the Navy instructed Captain Meyler to prepare a report to confirm the government’s ownership to the land. See, Army Corps of Engineers, D. E. Hughes’ Report, “Quarantine Station – Point Loma,” February 23, 1901, in the San Diego History Center Collection.


13. SD Union, November 27, 1902, “As To The Quarantine Station,” p. 6.


17. SDCCRMM, letter, February 16, 1903, Needham to H.P. Wood, p. 361, Journal 1903. Proof that political exigencies create stance shifts, when Needham toured the quarantine station in 1900 he pronounced it in “excellent” shape and vowed to work for an additional appropriation to enlarge and “complete” the station. SD Union, April 16, 1900, “To Complete the Station,” “Congressman Needham Asks for $23,000 for Our Quarantine,” p. 6. SD Union, May 3, 1900, “San Diego Quarantine; Appropriation For The Station,” p. 5.


24. SDCCRMM, letter, March 16, 1903, Perkins to Wood, p. 408, Journal 1903. The Sundry Civil Bill, HR 17202, stated that “certain land adjacent to the quarantine station near San Diego, was transferred to the Treasury department, and for the preparation of a new site for the Quarantine station and the removal of the present quarantine station buildings thereto.”


30. The source of the appellation of “custodian” for the person in charge of the station remains unclear, but was the title the Navy used in their official correspondence. The custodians were: John H. Koop, 1902; Assistant Engineer, USN, R.E. Carney, 1904- January 1906; Boatswain L.J. De Ryder, January 1906–October 1907—he was the last active duty custodian; LCDR Holcombe, October 1907–interim; Commander, USN, Retired, John H. Almey, October 1907-March 1909; Rear Admiral HN Manney, USN, Retired, March 1909-December 1909; Gunner, USN, Retired, H.


33. SDCCRMM, “Resolution Regarding Establishment Of A Coaling Station At San Diego, California” and “Resolution For Deepening The Harbor At San Diego, California,” p. 516 & 517, Journal August 1906-January 1907. The resolutions were undated but chronologically placed in November or December 1906.

34. SD Union, January 1, 1907 “Some Facts on San Diego Harbor,” Section V, p. 33; and “San Diego Harbor,” Section III, p. 17.


44. NARA, NCSLS, letter, April 19, 1910, Webb to Commandant Fort Rosecrans, Vol. 2, p. 262. The over land route from downtown to the depot was around 8.5 miles and the nearest trolley stop was 3 miles from the depot.


46. NARA, GC, letter, January 14, 1910, Congressman Smith to Navy Department.

47. Ibid.

48. In 1910 the Navy had twenty surface vessels, and briefly, two Plunger Class “submarine torpedo boats,” based in San Diego, but within the next decade the government had established the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, the Naval Hospital, the Naval Operations Base, Naval Base San Diego and the administrative base for the Eleventh Naval District and the city was on its way to becoming a principal port for the Pacific Fleet. As the Navy’s commitment increased, the city also grew: from 17,700 in 1900, to 40,000 in 1901 to 75,000 in 1920.
Economics and Spirituality in the Entrepreneurial Development Strategy of the Franciscan California Missions:
The Historical Case of San Diego

By

Craig S. Galbraith, Curt H. Stiles, and Jaqueline Benitez-Galbraith

While there is a large literature debating Spanish mission and colonial activities in the region that currently makes up California, the vast majority of this work is either historical or anthropological in orientation. Few, if any, researchers have approached the issue as a clash between the region’s pre-colonial indigenous political economy and the mission based political economy. Not surprising, looking at history through different lenses may result in different views, colors, emphasis and even conclusions. Examining the history of indigenous populations, and the interactions with colonial forces using economic thought, has become increasingly important in recent years. As Nobel Laureate Douglass C. North writes, “The history of Native Americans... requires a far richer understanding of the complex nature of human cultures, and equally, of the fundamentals of economic and societal change that we have possessed.” With respect to the California mission period this is important for a number of reasons.

First, the business model followed by the Franciscan friars in California was just one of several possible strategies proposed at the time. The Governor of California, Pedro Fages, for example, urged a strategy of small free-hold farms with private ownership by indigenous families. This recommendation by Fages was mentioned in French naval officer

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and explorer Jean Francois de la Perouse’s journal during his 1786 visit to Monterey and Mission San Carlos Borromeo. Second, recent research suggests that a major factor determining post-colonial economic development is the nature of the institutional arrangements that the colonizing power brought to a particular region. When colonial powers established strong economic institutional and legal frameworks then the post-colonial indigenous population generally benefited when measured by various social and economic indices. However, when the colonial effort was focused on simply extracting natural or agricultural resources with little attempt to establish strong institutions the post-colonial economy generally stagnated.

The nature of the existing pre-colonial indigenous institutions also played an important role in the development equation. Certain pre-colonial indigenous economic frameworks, for example, better lent themselves to integration with colonial systems than others. Many developmental experts now believe that a region’s long term economic trajectory was ultimately determined by the manner in which colonial and indigenous institutions combined into post-colonial hybrid frameworks.

And third, by every modern definition of the word, the early Franciscan friars were entrepreneurs. The friars were innovative and motivated, and they ultimately assumed the personal risk associated with their ventures. As with modern entrepreneurs, they also attempted to optimize their actions to satisfy multiple personal, social and economic objectives.

This essay examines the early Franciscan mission strategy in San Diego within the context of modern economic thought regarding development. Our discussion is grounded in an examination of pre-colonial indigenous economic systems and the concept of “local public goods.”

Understanding Indigenous Pre-Colonial Economies

Centralization, Stratification and Public Goods in Indigenous Economies. An important responsibility of local government is to develop and distribute public goods to members of society. A public good, in economic terms, refers to products or services that have two characteristics, a) the use of the good or service by an individual does not diminish the ability of others to use the good or service, and b) all members of society have access to the good or service. Thus roads, police, and education are all considered local public goods. By “voting with their feet” individual households, each attempting to maximize what is important for them, will tend to congregate with similar households in geographical areas where local government offers public goods that satisfy their particular needs. This makes an argument for local authority and local institutions, since “decentralization” results in the accountability of the local governing elites.

In order for this to work, however, people need to actually have the opportunity to “vote with one’s feet.” Without intergroup mobility decentralization may not be very efficient. In pre-colonial societies, for example, without high levels of intergroup mobility decentralization into fragmented bands or small tribes often evolved into what is known as “decentralized tyranny.” For these static indigenous
societies, centralization of some institutions may, in fact, have been a better solution for the production and distribution of public goods. The rigidity of social stratification is also important in understanding pre-colonial indigenous economies. In more egalitarian groups, decentralization does occasionally result in the production of some local public goods that directly benefited that particular group. But there still remains the problem of public good “spillovers” that benefit a larger portion of the region, such as maintaining trade routes between population bands, agreements for water sharing between tribes, or well organized regional defense strategies against invaders. These broader public goods generally require some degree of centralization, even in egalitarian indigenous cultures. From a public goods perspective, the worst case scenario is a fragmented, decentralized society that is also rigidly stratified. In these situations few public goods of any type are provided since there is little incentive for the elites to support either the immediate tribal group or broader activities that benefit the region.

Carrying Capacity of Indigenous Environments. Another important factor in understanding indigenous economies is the notion of “carrying capacity,” or the ability of the environment to produce enough resources to support the population. A high population density to the point of reaching environmental carrying capacity makes spatial mobility extremely difficult, if not impossible. There is simply no more productive land available. In these cases, stratification generally increases, as wealthier families lock up the better farmland, fishing grounds, or water sources. In addition, efforts to control population growth, particularly among the lower, often landless classes, become necessary or starvation occurs. The problem becomes even more acute during droughts or other environmental changes. Since in many pre-colonial indigenous societies, females were generally associated with child bearing and family maintenance, as carrying capacity is reached, the protected status of females often vanishes. In extreme cases, ritualistic killings of
young girls, enforced abortion, or infanticide of female babies can occur.

Under these harsh conditions, for static indigenous bands such as horticulturists, the primary mechanism to increase the carrying capacity of the environment is the adoption of new ways to expand the land’s productivity. However, when the indigenous population is less reliant on permanent settlement, once carrying capacity is reached in one area, then it might be easier to simply migrate to another area, peacefully if there are not other groups within the targeted region, or forcibly if weaker populations stand in the way.

Contracts and Institutions in Pre-colonial Indigenous Economies. The basis for efficient economic institutions must be found in the notion of contracts. But it is not easy to develop a structured legal system that is sophisticated enough to allow efficient economic organization among non-related members such as employees, owners, customers, suppliers, transporters, and financiers. Without strong contract systems, the boundaries of economic organizations will always remain limited, ill defined, and inefficient.

This is important when understanding most indigenous, pre-colonial economies. For example the family-based economic traditions of Native American tribes must be placed within the context of pre-colonial technology. The relatively primitive technology, such as stone axes, flint tools, and wood spears used by pre-colonial North American populations demanded cooperative strategies to achieve some level of economic efficiency. Groups had to work together rather than as individuals. Due to the difficulties in contractually organizing unrelated people, the Native American peoples had to use related parties in the form of clans and families as economic entities. By its very nature, this results in relatively small, fragile economic organizations.

This understanding of economic institutions in societal evolution is a key area where anthropologists and economists often diverge. Anthropological research recognizes that kinship ties, extended families, and tribal networks function as economic transaction points but typically does not recognize the implications of this for economic output. In actuality, kinship ties, extended families, and tribal networks are relatively inefficient institutional frameworks for complex economic transactions. They exist primarily as a result of institutional failures due to limiting factors that make contracting between different people difficult, such as a proliferation of languages within a region, a lack of sophisticated written languages among trading groups, or endemic warfare between neighboring factions. The priority of economic institutions over kinship economies is clearly seen in world history. Once innovative technologies are introduced, oftentimes by contact with other, more advanced expanding societies, the kinship related market frameworks of pre-colonial societies are often revealed to be fragile and quickly abandoned as new institutional frameworks are adopted.

Similarly, anthropological research recognizes the existence of communal property when discussing pre-colonial indigenous economics, without giving adequate attention to the well recognized economic fact that communal property inevitably results in free-riders and overuse. Research has shown that private ownership of valuable economic assets was in fact the norm among pre-colonial indigenous populations. But in instances where there was collective ownership of an asset, such as a tribal lake, there would be a local elder to closely monitor problems such as overfishing. This was necessary since pre-colonial indigenous institutional
frameworks were generally not sufficiently sophisticated to allow multiple, unrelated parties to contractually manage these issues.

Pre-colonial indigenous warfare was also a collective effort, often with economic overtones, but without efficient institutions and contracts, centralized control over indigenous armed groups was relatively weak. This is evidenced by the competition between multiple spiritual shamans and war chiefs, the generally disorganized line of battle, and the fact that many tribal members would act as free-riders by electing not to participate in battle but instead benefit from a victory by robbing the vanquished or dead--common characteristics of pre-colonial North American indigenous warfare. In addition, since indigenous static populations were generally governed by class stratification that drew wealth upward into the hands of the upper class, warfare was seen as low status. It was generally avoided by the upper class unless there was certainty of victory and, for commoners, was not a guaranteed route to success. In contrast, the nomadic tribes typically had a leadership system that rewarded individual initiative. For these groups, exploits during conflicts often provided substantial status, financial rewards, and increased class mobility for those in the lower economic strata.

Based upon the recent literature in developmental economics and entrepreneurship, we therefore consider centralization, stratification, carrying capacity, spatial and intergroup mobility, and institutional sophistication to be the concepts needed to be understood for a more accurate understanding of the contact between the early mission system and the indigenous populations with the San Diego region.

**Socio-Economic Conditions of Pre-Colonial San Diego**

Economic life in pre-colonial San Diego was primarily a static, agriculturally oriented system combined with localized hunting and fishing activities. This resulted in a land tenure system often seen among other pre-colonial North American permanent societies. In particular, the San Diego indigenous economic system was based upon: a) private land, home, tool, and water ownership; b) private ownership of certain intangible assets, such as songs and medicinal formulas, c) inheritance and assignment rights of the assets, d) agricultural methods including primitive ditch based irrigation, fire clearing of brush, and some broadcasting grain-grass seed in fields, and e) a stratified, decentralized, and static political system of bands and chieftains/religious leaders that managed disputes and declared war. In modern terms, the native people of San Diego might be best described as static forager-horticulturists, with protein food sources obtained from hunting and fishing.

The land tenure and political system in pre-colonial San Diego, while similar to other static horticultural Native American populations, was probably made even more rigid by the high population density of the area. Best estimates are that approximately 17,000 individuals lived in the San Diego region in 1769 when the San Diego Mission was established. Since arable land was scarce in the region’s dry climate and the most productive land was located near water sources, the indigenous population had most likely reached its maximum environmental carrying capacity well before 1769.

Under these high-density situations, combined with the low intergroup mobility between the numerous bands in the San Diego region, static homesteads
became dominant. As previously discussed, economic theory suggests that horticulturists under these static conditions are often governed by a class stratification that draws wealth upward into the hands of the upper class or elites. This stratification is noted, in fact, by Florence Shipek in describing the San Diego Kumeyaay indigenous social structure where the upper class held the best land and hired the labor of the unlanded, poor classes. In these situations, the poor classes typically live on the fringe of the economy, often by begging, or as the early Spaniards constantly noted, by an “addiction to stealing.”\textsuperscript{15} Even Pedro Fages, later governor of California, noted very early that the local natives often killed the Spanish pack animals more for the purpose of “satisfying their hunger than by way of insult or of taking revenge.”\textsuperscript{16} These types of statements, and incessant well-documented thievery of food items from the Spaniards, clearly indicate a subsistence economic lifestyle at best, at least for a significant portion of the San Diego population prior to colonial contact.

Pre-colonial indigenous life expectancy was low. Infant mortality was probably very high due to malnutrition. Since there were no written records in pre-colonial periods, the best estimates come from similar forager-horticulturist or hunter-gatherer tribes with similar technology studied in more modern times, such as the Tsimane tribes in north-central Bolivia, that have remained isolated from colonial contact.\textsuperscript{17} These studies point to a very low life expectancy, somewhere between 15 years and 25 years, despite the fact that these tribes had probably not reached carrying capacity. Given the difficult chaparral terrain, the low levels of technology development, the arid region’s drought cycles, and the higher density of pre-colonial people in San Diego, it is likely that the average life expectancy for the immediate pre-colonial contact period would be more in the 15 to 20 year range for the population in general, compared to a life expectancy of over 40 years for Europeans during the same time period.

Organized warfare had low status in these stratified, local horticultural hierarchies. Local chiefs would not act warlike unless they were certain they would win; for the elites, there is simply too much to personally lose and too little to personally gain. This is well documented by a number of early Spanish land explorers, such as in the first Anza expedition in 1774.\textsuperscript{18}

In San Diego, the localized economic and social structure, combined with the high population density approaching environmental carrying capacity, had several implications. First, when the San Diego Mission was established in 1769, it was
clear that a large portion of the population in San Diego was barely maintaining itself at subsistence levels. There is no indication that the early San Diego missionaries or settlers, despite their small numbers, were able to trade with the local people to obtain food, because the local populations had no excess food to trade (with the exception of perhaps recently caught surplus game or fish). Because of the lack of food trade with the local population, the occasional supply ships from the nearest Spanish settlement at San Blas were critical to the survival of the mission and presidio population during the first ten years.19

Second, typical when carrying capacity of land is reached, population control becomes necessary. Young unmarried women, in particular, lose their protected status – a point made by several early Spanish observers.20

Third, technology in pre-colonial San Diego was essentially stone age. Trade and craft knowledge was low, even when compared with other North American tribes. In fact, there is little evidence of significant technological advancement among the San Diego population from the time Juan Rodriguez Cabrillo visited in 1542 to the establishment of the San Diego Mission in 1769.21

Fourth, although organized warfare was rare, indigenous violence was probably high. While there is little information regarding violence specifically among pre-contact San Diego population tribes, there is ample forensic and early observational evidence that points to a high level of pre-contact small group raiding and revenge killings among California tribes in general. The bio-archaeological record also suggests a relationship between violence and environmental carrying capacity throughout pre-contact California.22

Finally, ethno-linguistic diversity was high within the region. In the relatively small San Diego region, four different language groups have been identified.23 This high ethno-linguistic diversity is further emphasized in the Juan Bautista de Anza diary describing the first land expedition in 1774 from Sonora to San Diego, where a variety of languages was encountered along the way. The languages were oral, making it difficult to develop non-family related contracts and economic institutions across the region.

Table 1 provides a summary of the important and most likely structural economic and related characteristics of the San Diego indigenous people prior to initial contact with the mission system in 1769.24

Juan Bautista de Anza drawn by José Cisneros. Photo courtesy of the artist.
Table 1: Characteristics of the Pre-Colonial Indigenous Population in San Diego

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Probably Conditions in San Diego Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stratification</td>
<td>High Stratification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatively rigid class structure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralization</td>
<td>High Localization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political power centralized versus localized with village elites and chiefs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology Level</td>
<td>Low Technology, Stone Tools and Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of technology adoption and usage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnolinguistic Diversity</td>
<td>High Linguistic Diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of different languages or variants spoken within a relatively small area, or among different strata of society.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrying Capacity</td>
<td>Near or at Environmental Carrying Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergroup Mobility</td>
<td>Low Intergroup Mobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slave Ownership</td>
<td>Un-landed Segments Employed by Elites. No Clear Evidence of Slavery, however.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slave owners and/or un-landed segments working for Elite segments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence Level</td>
<td>Unknown, possibly high levels of raiding and revenge killings as documented in other California regions. Low levels of organized large-scale warfare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Level of Lower Classes</td>
<td>General Subsistence Level Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Sophistication</td>
<td>Low Institutional Frameworks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract law, land tenure, ability to organize unrelated parties, recourse mechanisms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Consistent with received economic theory, there is little evidence that pre-colonial San Diego society developed any significant public goods, either at the local level, such as an educational system, community based irrigation, or a crude health system,25 or at a broader level, such as maintaining trade roads, supporting a broader welfare system, or sharing water rights between tribes. In essence, given
the structural characteristics described above, under decentralization tyranny, in stratified societies with low intergroup mobility, few public goods of any type are provided. In addition, reaching carrying capacity without the means to either relocate or increase productivity through technology will inevitably result in both a poor laboring population segment bordering on starvation and a female population that suffers low status. This appears to be exactly the case in San Diego at the dawn of mission contact.

California Mission Activity

The eighteenth century Spanish Catholic missionary efforts within the vast regions of the southwestern United States and Northern Mexico were somewhat unique in world history. Unlike the majority of colonial intrusions, where missionary and Church activity took a secondary role to the more secular pursuits of economic speculation, political conquest, or mass immigrant settlement, the Catholic orders of Franciscans, Dominicans, and Jesuits took the lead role of settlement, administration, and cultural interaction with the local indigenous populations in these weakly controlled Spanish-claimed areas. In fact, the other two agencies that Spain used to colonize, presidios (forts) and government supported pueblos (towns), were simply not important in the earliest settlement period of California. The poorly manned presidios were established primarily to protect the missions, act as a local police force if necessary, and provide some security against piracy. Independent secular pueblos were generally non-existent in the colonial periods of our investigation.

The first mission settlement in Alta California was established in San Diego on July 16, 1769. There is a large literature, including articles in this journal, which detail the early mission period. We will note only the most relevant issues as they relate to our economic discussion.
The Entrepreneurial Spirit of the Franciscans

The economic and entrepreneurial strategy employed in the mission process was grounded in the overall spiritual orientation of the Franciscan Order established in 1209 by St. Francis of Assisi (1181-1226).26 The Franciscans were founded as a “mendicant” order whose members take strict vows of poverty, do not own property either as individuals or a group, tend to work as individuals or small groups in isolated areas, and depend directly upon charity. This orientation framed the Franciscan efforts in both Baja and Alta California in distinct ways.

First, the Franciscans were willing to go as very small groups to establish a mission and live under extremely impoverished circumstances. Second, from inception, the missions that the Franciscans established and operated were to be temporary. According to Franciscan economic and theological philosophy, they did not own the missions but simply managed them as legal agents for the local indigenous population who would then ultimately inherit the property and assets. This attitude was always made clear in the writings of the mission friars; for example, as late as 1827, Fathers José María Zalvidea and José Barona of Mission San Juan Capistrano wrote to Governor José María Echeandia of California, “all these lands did and do now belong to the Indians.”27 The notion of a land trust for the native population was supported under the laws of Spain.28

Third, due to the historical Franciscan mendicant philosophy regarding charity, they felt that the missions should also be charitable to the local population. Therefore when locals came to the mission to be baptized, they would often be given food in exchange. In fact, there were many instances when whole communities would come to be baptized but be turned away due to the lack of supplies to give them in return. In many missions, particularly in Baja California, only those near
death would be baptized due to the lack of exchange provisions.

Finally, with respect to the California Franciscans, most were highly educated, having studied abroad and at the Apostolic Missionary College of San Fernando in Mexico City where they received detailed instruction in local language, culture, and transferable technologies and crafts, such as tool making, horticultural sciences, and appropriate ranching techniques.  

The missionary fathers, particularly Father Serra who was quite familiar with the problems in Baja California, appear to have understood immediately the problem in Alta California only later described in more theoretical terms by modern development economic theorists. In order to achieve economic and spiritual development within the region, the mission strategy had to be designed to overcome the structural limitations existing in the local indigenous communities. Examination of the histories, letters and diaries of the early friars shows that they had four somewhat related objectives. First, to “save souls”, that is to convert the “Indios bárbaros” to Christianity; second, to reduce the extent of “immoral” behaviors, such as thievery, violence, and sexual promiscuity that was prevalent among some California native groups; and third, within the mission of Christian charity, to reduce poverty, increase the protection of females, decrease infant mortality, and increase health care. Given the carrying capacity problems and low mobility in the region, by necessity this involved enhancing the economic productivity of the region. Fourth was to hold in trust as protectors, and ultimately develop the economic base and value of the mission holdings for the native population.

Originally located near the presidio, the San Diego Mission experienced extreme difficulty in its early years. Most of the sailors that arrived in 1769 either died or were sick during the first year. The intimidating proximity of the presidio to the mission, and the mission’s diversion of its attention to tending the Spanish sick, made it difficult at first to baptize the local population. The crops failed in the early years due to lack of water and poor land, and there were few supply ships, as several were damaged in storms. In addition, important social problems arose among the Spanish soldiers that threatened to undermine the mission effort.

Fr. Serra also saw the inherent problems of the existing indigenous economy. By 1773, the Alta California entrepreneurial strategy needed to be made more comprehensive and refined. It is this strategic vision that framed the mission entrepreneurial strategy for the following 50 years. In particular:

1) The missions needed to provide centralized government to the local population in order to generate “public goods with spillover effects,” and overcome the stratified decentralized tyranny of the multiple local elites controlling the region’s rancherías. In essence, the Franciscan friars discovered that they needed to follow an economic strategy known as a type of “local capture,” that given the structural failures within the indigenous economy, the authority and responsibility for public good generation and distribution needed to be centralized. Within this context, this type of centralization would be what many modern developmental economists have described as a governmental and institutional process that is strong enough to provide public goods, secure contracts, and maintain stability but still provide a social and economic trust.
2) Education is one of the most important public goods. An important effort during the colonial period focused on formal education to facilitate “technology transfer,” in particular, training the indigenous population in various crafts and trades, such as tanning, higher quality pottery making, candle making, metal working, woodworking, horse riding and herding.

3) All of the missions, particularly the San Diego Mission that was initially built on less productive land, needed to obtain a regular schedule of supplies until the missions could become self-sufficient, not only for the survival of the mission and presidio personnel, but also as charity exchange goods to assist in the conversion of the local population.

4) The presidio Spanish soldiers needed to be tightly controlled and prevented from abusing local females.

5) The San Diego Mission had to be moved away from the adjacent San Diego presidio in order to become less intimidating and closer to the local, indigenous rancherías.

6) Productivity of the land, low under indigenous technologies, needed to be increased. Productivity could be enhanced by a) developing public good oriented to agricultural, such as reservoirs, a local police to control thievery, and a transportation system; b) grazing livestock (sheep and cattle in particular) would provide better protein food sources than occasional hunting of game and could be grazed on agriculturally unproductive land; c) agricultural productivity could be increased with mules, horses, and plows; d) new crops, such as grapes, corn, wheat, barley, and fruit trees would flourish in the Alta
California microclimates; and e) various crafts, such as food preservation and centralized flour milling, would increase productivity due to economies of scale and food storage and transportation advantages.

7) Encouragement of settlement by established Mexican families could help demonstrate the importance of family traditions and moral behavior.

Fr. Serra knew that this all had to happen fast or the entrepreneurial mission project would fail. By 1773 he was in Mexico City to plead his case and got a commitment from Spanish authorities on all of the above (26 Articles of Memorandum, #1, February 1773). In response to Fr. Serra’s efforts, the first overland Anza expedition was organized in 1774 by Juan Bautista de Anza to bring not only supplies but also herds, technology, skilled craftsmen, crop specimens, and a few families to the missions. Fr. Serra also got a commitment for more reliable supply shipping from San Blas, as well as authorization that education and administration of the native population would be centralized and be the responsibility of the friars. Finally, Fr. Serra received a new, revised set of authorizations, including the right to demand that any soldier who exhibited licentious or cruel behaviors toward the natives would be immediately recalled. Clearly Fr. Serra’s effort in Mexico City addressed the structural economic problems that he saw within the pre-colonial indigenous economy.

In 1774, the San Diego Mission moved to a spot approximately six miles from the presidio to be closer to the local villages. Land was more arable so crops were better and a few small herds were established. Baptisms increased dramatically. About this time, the San Diego Mission developed a strategy somewhat different from the other Alta California missions. The core Alta California mission strategy was highly centralized to house, educate, and train the baptized people within or near the mission property. In San Diego, however, since land was less productive in the immediate mission location, newly baptized people would be given limited instruction then rotated back to their villages. Only the unmarried young women and the more established neophytes, primarily families, would stay on central mission property in San Diego.

In 1775, a not unexpected attack occurred. In many respects, the attack illustrates many of the structural limitations discussed above. The local leaders from a number of the more remote rancherías organized an attack on the mission and the presidio. The attack fits the response one would expect from a highly stratified, localized system of elites when confronted with an expanding centralized mission government that was starting to provide important public goods to the community. Some of the poorer individuals within the attacking force might also have seen
an opportunity to acquire food and supplies from the mission. It was well known by the Spaniards that economics provided the main motivation for uprisings in the Sonora and California districts, and they specifically tracked the number of thefts as a primary leading indicator of an uprising since it indicated increasing desperation by the poorest subset of the local population. Since organized warfare was unattractive to established, localized elites, it was only pursued when those individuals felt that there was no chance of losing. This was exactly the situation in 1775 when the attacking force outnumbered the mission defenders by approximately 40 to 1.

Although the San Diego presidio had only about ten soldiers and the San Diego Mission had eleven Europeans/Mexicans (friars plus skilled workers), the organizers of the attack waited until several of the soldiers were out of the region on other activities. Approximately four hundred people attacked the mission while an equal number were to attack the presidio some six miles away. The presidio attack never materialized. The mission attack burned most of the mission buildings and immediately killed two people, including the mutilation of Fr. Luis Jayme, and one of the wounded died later. The majority of the mission attacking force quickly got distracted by the spoils of the attack, carting off the few relics and supplies of the mission, and tried, mostly unsuccessfully due to stone weapons, to slaughter the herd animals.

The attacking forces finally lost their cohesion and returned to their villages. The failure of the 1775 attack, in spite of the overwhelming numbers of the attacking force, essentially ended the elite’s power among San Diego’s more distant rancherías. The mode of attack verifies the structural limitations discussed above. First, due to decentralization among multiple elites within the San Diego region, there was no coordinated line of battle. Essentially, the attack was more of a mob action. Second, a major distraction during the battle was plunder, not only of mission material but also of food items. This indicates both an economic motive and a serious free-rider problem associated with the attack. Probably only a small number of attackers actually engaged the mission defenders in combat. Within a few months, a small squad of Spanish soldiers arrested the instigators.

No more violence occurred after the 1775 incident. By 1800, the San Diego Mission and other Alta California missions were firmly established, with irrigated farmlands, reservoir systems, deep wells, dedicated food processing, curing, and preservation as well as various trade and craft production activities, such as pottery, tanning, candle making, cloth weaving, and blacksmithing. Sheep and cattle ranching became dominant. In addition, a variety of new agricultural products, such as grapes, wheat, figs, barley, and corn were introduced to the region. The road system was improved between the native rancherias, and distant mission properties were now connected. According to statistics, the California missions started to produce substantial economic surpluses between 1800 and 1810. San Diego reported 1797 as its most successful year in terms of baptisms. Around this time, important trade markets also started to develop, initially with the local presidio and governmental agencies.

Problems started to develop around 1810 as the war for Mexican independence developed. Spain, already struggling financially, could no longer support its troops in California. Yet some of the missions, including San Diego, continued to grow and prosper. The primary reason for this continued expansion was the opening of
the export trade market. Although exporting was essentially illegal under Spanish rule, by the mid-1820s Spain could no longer enforce this ban, and many privateer trading vessels started to visit the missions to acquire export products. Due to its attractive and safe harbor, San Diego was one of the missions that benefited from the export market.35

The situation declined significantly after Mexican independence from Spain in 1821. The native population’s title to Mission lands was protected under Spanish law, but Mexican law did not provide the same protection, and the Mexican government did not support the mission strategy. In 1834-1835 the Alta California mission lands, including those of San Diego, were secularized by the Mexican government, the mission population drifted away since there were no more protection for them, and the best mission farm and ranch lands were confiscated by local Mexican officials, speculators, and ranchers, many of whom were retired presidio soldiers.36 Under secularization, the missions were to give one half of their movable property to the mission residents and to give to each head of a mission family four hundred square yards (simply a house and garden plot). Everything else, lands, movable properties, property of all classes, was transferred to the Mexican administrators. Native American families were given the opportunity to leave the mission or to work as laborers for the Mexican government. In San Diego, only about 10% of the remaining mission populations chose to work for the Mexican administration.37

California became a part of the United States as a result of the Mexican War in 1848; gold was discovered near San Francisco a few days before, forever changing California history. The population of California literally exploded overnight, and
the native population became an increasingly small minority of the total population. California entered the union as a free state in 1850. Ultimately those Native Americans who did not assimilate into the broader population were resettled on reservation lands similar to the rest of the United States.

Was the mission strategy successful? Success can be analyzed from different perspectives.

**Economic Output.** From an entrepreneurial point of view, the Alta California mission strategy, including the San Diego Mission, was a success, bringing large acreage under modern cultivation within a relatively short time span. According to official mission records, the San Diego Mission at its peak had over 50,000 acres. Crops included corn, barley, kidney beans, chick peas, and wheat. The San Diego Mission livestock herds included approximately 20,000 sheep, 10,000 cattle, and 1,250 horses. This is a remarkable level of productive activity considering that the vast majority of the San Diego region is an arid chaparral receiving less than 14 inches of annual rainfall. The mission produced economic surpluses for many years and resulted in an active trade market with the local Spanish and, later, Mexican governments. Being a well-sheltered port city, San Diego also benefited from the export trade market. As with all the California missions, after 1821 with Mexican independence, conditions declined rapidly in San Diego. However, from its inception in 1769 until 1834, for more than 60 years the mission generally created the majority of economic output for the region.

**Public Goods.** During the near half century of initial growth and stability, a whole generation benefited from a variety of public goods supplied by the San Diego Mission. As predicted by modern economic thought, the mission process centralized and standardized the institutional processes of economic activities, resulting in greater production and distribution of broad regional public goods. The road system between the interior and coast communities and between various valleys and rancherías was developed. Welfare and public health systems were established at the mission. Education of the native population, particularly in the productive crafts and skilled trades, was undertaken. In San Diego alone, a large
irrigation system was built, including a stone dam and a six-mile brick and stone irrigation conduit. Most of these public goods subsequently ceased, or fell into disrepair, with the fall of the mission system.

Technology Transfer. Land productivity, through enhancement of tilling and gravity fed irrigation, and crop diversity increased exponentially during the mission period, not only in the San Diego area but also throughout California. This was a key strategy to increasing environmental carrying capacity, decreasing poverty, and raising the status of females. Essentially, all the major groups of grain currently grown in California, plus the vast majority of grown fruits, such as apples, oranges, peaches, pears, plums, prunes, lemons, grapes, pomegranates, olives, and nuts were introduced by the Franciscans. Grapes and wine making were also introduced, particularly in the central area of California, laying the foundation for the modern wine industry. Most importantly, the Franciscans introduced livestock to the area, establishing ranching as the major industry utilizing previously unproductive land. Overall, the mission system was able to sustain both the local native population and the growing Spanish presidio and pueblo populations, while gradually developing a surplus for export.

Economic Buffering. The missions, including San Diego, expanded their land holdings by securing farm and ranching tracts as the area transitioned into modern economic production. This land was held in trust by the Franciscans under Spanish law, the Recopilación de leyes de los Reynos de las Indias of 1680, and was clearly understood as a trust by the friars’ own writings throughout the mission period. This was the Franciscan strategy and provides the basis for argument today in various legal cases. By holding land, technically in the name of the indigenous people who converted and now worked the land, the missions provided a protective economic buffer to the increasing pressure during the early 1800s from both retiring Spanish military personnel and new Spanish immigrant speculators that wanted to acquire the best land. The friars’ effort to discourage and dislodge Spanish and Mexican land squatters from mission land is often misinterpreted as protecting ownership, rather than protecting the “trust.”

After the mission system collapse in 1834, the lack of enforcement of earlier Spanish laws by the Mexican government, and then the ceding of California to the United States, combined with the population explosion starting in 1848, without the centralized Mission counterbalance, new immigrant land speculators, ranchers, and military routinely forced the natives off the best land.

Assimilation and Labor Force Advantages. Unlike the majority of indigenous people in the United States who were left to assimilate by their own means, or retreat to isolated lands and later reservations, during the peak mission period, over fifty percent of California’s indigenous population was
directly associated with the mission system. Many natives became quite skilled in important construction, agricultural production trades and crafts. This had important advantages. First, it potentially created a basis for successful assimilation for those natives that chose that direction, and second, for those that returned to their villages, it potentially provided a basis for local economic development. For example, in 1852 the Hon. Benjamin D. Wilson of Los Angeles noted, “these same Indians had built all the houses in the country, planted all the fields and vineyards. Under the Missions they were masons, carpenters, plasterers, soapmakers, tanners, shoemakers, blacksmiths, millers, bakers, cooks, brickmakers, carters and cartmakers, weavers and spinners, saddlers, shepherds, agriculturists, horticulturists, viñeros, vaqueros; in a word, they filled all the laborious occupations known to civilized society.” In particular, the natives became skilled, and highly prized “cowboys” in the post-mission period as the large secular ranches developed, often on old mission property. Wilson continues by noting that Indians constituted “the majority of the laborers, mechanics, and servants” of San Diego and Los Angeles, and “they all spoke the Spanish language, and a not inconsiderable number could read and write it . . . They had built all the houses in the country, had taught the new whites how to make brick, mud mortar, how to use asphalt on roofs; they understood irrigation, and were good herders.”

However, the two labor force advantages, speaking Spanish and trade skills, that the former mission population had in California during the 1820s to the 1840s literally evaporated overnight, particularly in the cities and more urban communities. With the gold discovery by 1850, the massive population growth also brought immigrants highly skilled in the trades while the primary language rapidly shifted from Spanish to English. In less than a decade the indigenous population no longer held the labor force advantages that had been acquired during the mission experience, with the exception of working as “cowboys” on the larger, more rural ranches.

**Disease and Violence Management.** One of the major criticisms leveled at the mission effort was the introduction of epidemic diseases into the indigenous population. There is no question that introduced disease severely impacted the Native American populations throughout North America, sometimes in devastating proportions, sometimes less so depending on the region and period being examined. In California, the native population was clearly affected by introduced diseases. One line of current thought is that these diseases entered California overland from Sonora prior to 1797. Another model is that the diseases were brought during the
initial mission expeditions to California, most probably by the soldiers and sailors. In examining the issue of disease, one must remember that the colonial process would have happened no matter what, with or without the mission system, and diseases most certainly would have been introduced regardless.

Many critics of the mission system argue that life expectancy was made worse by the policy of using dormitories for the neophyte population. Almost always this argument is grounded by examining mission records of births, deaths, and baptism to determine mortality and life expectancies. Based on these records, it is often remarked that the life expectancy of a “Mission Indian” was less than 15 years. \(^40\) However, this figure is misleading, and must be put into an appropriate context.

First, it must be remembered that the pre-colonial indigenous life expectancy in California was probably between an average of 15 and 20 years to start with, based upon current research, something that most modern critics of the mission system fail to mention.\(^41\) Second, it is now known from medical forensic analysis of skeletal remains that pre-colonial contact indigenous populations within North America suffered from a variety of debilitating diseases, including tuberculosis and pneumonia. Third, paleoanthropologists have also now documented increasing levels of malnutrition, poor health, and violence among indigenous people in the decades prior to colonial contact, which in turn resulted in a precipitous drop in indigenous life expectancy throughout much of pre-colonial United States. This situation was exacerbated by the overall crowded living conditions, poor sanitary practices, and generally promiscuous behavior (leading to more rapid transmission of infectious diseases) of pre-colonial native populations. Many have attributed these events to population levels within pre-colonial Americas reaching the carrying capacity of the environment, a situation that most likely existed in the mission region of California.

Fourth, since the mission system clearly represented a welfare state, including the provision of shelter and food for a baptism, and given the stratified structure of indigenous society, the mission likely first attracted the poorer, un-landed classes, rather than the landed, more affluent elites. This is supported by the descriptions of the early friars. Statistics regarding the relationship between class structure and life expectancy in pre-1900 United States (before the public good of government health support) indicate that the difference in life expectancy between high and low income levels close to 33%, and that the differences increase in more historical periods. In addition, research of the pre-colonial stratified indigenous populations in Mesoamerica and the Andes also indicates a large disparity.

Two girls on Campo Reservation, nd. Edward H. Davis Collection ©SDHC OP 86_15752-130.
in health, nutrition, and life expectancy, with the poorer strata of society suffering greatly. Using this argument, one might expect the original pre-colonial life expectancy of those lower strata indigenous people who most likely entered the mission system would be around 15 years. Thus the analysis of the mission population suggests no real difference, or the mission system might have actually increased life expectancy among the lower strata populations it attracted. In addition, baptisms often occurred only when death was near, thus inflating the mission death rates.

Regarding violence, early Spanish writers constantly cited the endemic violence of pre-contact indigenous populations throughout the Americas as a justification for colonial activities. In many cases the conquistadors made considerable efforts to suppress intertribal violence in the early colonial years. However, in some locations, such as in the upper Amazon and Chile, as more and more speculators arrived and established extractive business operations, such as the production of latex and nitrate products, combined with aggressive local labor policies, indigenous intertribal warfare often shifted to rebellions against the Spaniards. In California, however, other than a few isolated incidents, intertribal indigenous homicide and vengeance attacks were essentially eliminated by 1800.

Conclusion

The founding of the San Diego Mission in 1769 can be viewed to be the opening of a final chapter of economic development activities that had begun exactly 250 years earlier, with the arrival of Cortés on the coast of Mexico in 1519. This final chapter can be argued to be the end of the era of Spanish colonial economic development efforts, the end of the humanist inspired era of Catholic Church sponsored and funded economic development, and, maybe most dramatically, the last opportunity for the native population to develop the needed skills before being exposed to the powerful buffeting of unconstrained growth and globalization of 19th century California.

In economics, an important concept is the notion of “revealed preferences,” or the fact that an individual’s real preferences regarding economic decisions given various alternatives are actually revealed by their actions, not words or pronouncements. No indigenous person was ever forced to be baptized, participate in the mission system, or move onto mission property. It was voluntary. Clearly, every native that entered the mission system made a rational choice suggesting that the mission life, for them, was better than the option of not associating with the mission. They revealed their preference for the mission strategy over their native culture, health status, social condition and economic status. This appeared particularly to be the case for the young women in indigenous California societies. In other words, as well established in institutional economic thought, weak institutional regimes are easily abandoned and new ones quickly established as productive technologies become more efficient, institutional arrangements become stronger, and ultimately people benefit.

If the period of economic development is seen to run from 1769 to 1827, when Franciscan Fathers Zalvidea and Barona wrote to Governor Echeandia in protest, then the economic development opportunity for the indigenous people can be said to have lasted for about sixty years. This is a very short period for a people to raise themselves from an essentially subsistence, Stone Age economy with substantial
structural limitations, to being able to compete on a global stage. Given the brevity, Fr. Serra’s sense of urgency expressed in 1773 is understandable. Given how much was accomplished in so little time, the Franciscan entrepreneurial development strategy in Alta California seems remarkable. And it almost worked. Ultimately, however, the loss of the land trust with secularization and the ending of the labor force advantages with the discovery of gold doomed much of California’s indigenous population to the reservation system.

NOTES
2. From la Perouse’s (Jean François de Galaup, comte de La Pérouse) journal (M. Margolin, Monterey in 1786: Life in a California Mission, Berkeley, CA: Heyday Books, 1989). This also appeared to be la Perouse’s preferred strategy, as he talks about the “advantages of society founded on the rights of the people; to establish among them the possession of property...and by this new order of things to engage everyone to cultivate his field” (Margolin, p. 71).
3. This was to be a monopolistic government controlled export enterprise utilizing the productive resources of missions and presidios for the Chinese “sea otter” market in particular. Noted by de la Perouse (Margolin, p. 100).
8. A mathematical proof is provided in N. Gennaioli & I. Rainer (Ibid.).
can see the impact of technology adoption in the evolution of indigenous buffalo hunting strategies from the 17th to 19th century. During the pre-contact period, indigenous buffalo hunts were large communal efforts often involving stampeding buffalo herds over cliffs or into prepared traps. After the adoption of the Spanish horse, indigenous buffalo hunts were still communal actions, but smaller mounted hunting parties since multiple arrow hits were generally required to bring down a single animal. With the later adoption of the European rifle, indigenous hunts became individual affairs since a single hunter with a rifle could easily kill an animal. See B. Benson, “Property rights and the buffalo economy of the Great Plains” in R. Anderson, B. Benson & T. Flanagan (eds.), Self-Determination: The Other Path for Native Americans (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2006), 29-67.


19. In San Diego, trade with the indigenous population during the first couple of years after contact was additionally hampered by low crop production, chronic illnesses, and lack of supply ships.

20. Fages (1769) Ibid.

21. An example of the low technology in the region is that although San Diego indigenous populations used bows and arrows for both hunting and warfare, they had not yet developed the “composite” bow, something that European, Chinese, and North African cultures had developed several thousand years earlier. The composite bow offered substantially greater penetrating power, distance, and accuracy than the simple wood and sinew bow.

22. For example, forensic analysis of pre-contact indigenous burial sites in the San Joaquin Valley in central California indicates that approximately 10% of the males had projectile (arrow or spear) injuries. For all of California, the osteological evidence points to an increase in violence during the period AD 1200-1500. This level of intertribal violence is well supported by recorded observations of early Spanish observers in California (and French explorer de la Perouse). As expected in fragmented static societies, large-scale warfare in California was rare, while small group raiding and revenge killings were both common and deadly. In addition, while many pre-contact North American indigenous populations participated in cannibalism, scalping, ritualistic killings,


25. The earliest contact letters (circa 1769 and 1770) indicated that hurt or wounded natives would be immediately brought to the Spanish camp for treatment.

26. Duggan is one of the few researchers that have specifically examined the inherent dilemma of Scholastic economic theology, Franciscan attitudes toward poverty, and their management of the California missions, essentially as entrepreneurs, manufacturers, and exporters. See M. Duggan “Laws of the Market vs. Laws of God: Scholastic Doctrine and the early California economy,” History of Political Economy, 37, No. 2 (2005), 343-370.

27. Letter, 12/22/1827. As Duggan notes, there was some minor disagreement as some Franciscan writers argued for the concept of communal land, that is mission land should be managed more like monastic lands, communally owned and worked by all, rather than as a trust for future private ownership by the natives. This attitude is actually more in line with the Benedictine community model of productivity and land tenure.

28. As codified in the Recopilacion de leyes de los Reynos de las Indias, 1680.

29. There is a commonly repeated myth that the California Mission friars attempted to employ inappropriate European agricultural techniques, however, there is simply no evidence for this conclusion. For the San Diego Mission, the first year's harvest proved very difficult, but this was due primarily to the poor location of the first mission, the poor health of the Spaniards, and the extremely poor land of the region. In fact, the evidence clearly points to a program to transfer highly appropriate technologies to the native population. The Franciscans had over 100 years of experience in Mexican mission management, all the friars had university educations, the Apostolic Missionary College of San Fernando in Mexico City, in particular, had an excellent education program of local environments, plus most of the friars, including Father Serra, had decades of professional experience in managing mission agricultural activities in various regions of Mexico.


31. The mission friars constantly had problems with misbehaving presidio soldiers, often complaining about this problem to superiors. Unfortunately, although the Franciscans gained the right to demand recall of such soldiers in 1773, this was rarely enforced by the Spanish authorities in Monterey or Mexico. Abusive Spanish soldiers from the presidios remained a problem throughout the history of the California missions, and certainly undermined the progress of the missions.

32. Letters from the San Diego Presidio commanders in 1774 anticipated violence, and requested more military supplies and arms.

33. The term “elites” as we use it within an economic framework refers to both political and religious leaders.

34. An account of the attack is described in a letter by Fr. Palou approximately 2 weeks after the attack.

35. Richard Henry Dana's famous novel, Two Years Before the Mast, describes the exporting of hides from the missions and surrounding ranches in both San Diego and San Juan Capistrano, between 1834 and 1836, at the final period of decline and decay of the California missions.

36. The crumbling remains of the San Diego Mission was sold in 1845. It did not return to the Catholic Church's control (along with a few acres) until 1865.

38. 1797 to 1815 seemed to be the peak economic period for the San Diego Mission.


40. In fact, the San Diego Mission Indians had a much lower mortality, with a death rate of 56 per 1,000 versus the 78 per 1,000 for all the California missions (Carrico, 1997). This death rate is similar to the estimated death rates of pre-colonial societies under similar stratified conditions as pre-colonial contact California indigenous cultures. See for example, A. Robson & H. Kaplan, “The evolution of human life expectancy and intelligence in hunter-gather economics,” *American Economic Review*, 93, No. 1 (2003), 150-169.

41. As a comparison, historical demographic research suggests that life-expectancy in pre-colonial Africa was between 20 and 22 years. For example, see G. Campbell, “The state and pre-colonial demographic history: The case of nineteenth-century Madagascar,” *Journal of African History*, 32 (1991), 415-445. It should be noted, however, that these African populations were more technologically advanced, had better food sources and more centralized government than the pre-colonial Alta California populations. Studies of isolated modern day hunter-gatherers and forager-horticulturists groups, including the Tsimane people in north-central Bolivia, indicate that 50 percent never make it to age 15. Empirical research, such as D. Jones, “The persistence of American Indian health disparities,” *American Journal of Public Health*, 96, No. 12 (2004), 2122-2134, also report that the average life-expectancy in pre-colonial indigenous rural societies was much less than 25 years, significantly lower than equivalent European societies during the same time. For example, in 17th century England life-expectancy is estimated around 40 years; see E. Wrigley & R. Schofield, *The Population History of England 1541-1871: A Reconstruction* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), while the life-expectancy was even higher among early 17th century New England colonists; see T. Tate & D. Ammerman, *The Chesapeake in the Seventeenth Century* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979, p. 158). Pre-contact California and other southwestern natives typically lived under harsher conditions than other pre-contact North American populations, and thus probably had much lower life-expectancies than other native groups. In addition, mathematical population models indicate that the Central Mexican population decline of 90% in the century immediately after the Spanish conquest was most certainly caused by introduced multiple “virgin field” pathogens (similar mathematical population decline functions as seen in the single “virgin field” pathogen responsible for the European Black Plague), and indicates no conquest induced homicide or native extinction components in the depopulation statistics; see T. Witmore, “A simulation of the sixteenth-century population collapse in the basin of Mexico,” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 81, No. 3 (1991) 464-487. Given that multiple pathogens were probably introduced by the Spanish into the Southern California environment, one would have expected a much higher death rate, given the Central Mexico experience, than actually seen under the mission system. All of this points to the conclusion that the Mission system might have substantially reduced the expected death rate given the experience of other North American and South American regions that did not have dominant mission framework associated with Spanish colonial efforts.

42. As previously mentioned, death rates of about 54 per 1,000 reported by the San Diego Mission statistics are within the range typically seen in poor forger-horticultural pre-colonial indigenous societies.

43. There is also some evidence that the main period of epidemic disease and population decrease among the native population in California was not during the mission period, but after secularization of the missions and increased interaction with the general Mexican and later U.S. populations. For example, the 1872 document, *The Case of the Mission Indians in Southern California, and the Action of the Indian Rights Association in supporting the Defense of their Legal Rights*, states that “Suffering, hunger, disease and vice have cut down more than half of their numbers in the last thirty years” – implying from the early 1840s.

44. The California mission period under the Franciscans was clearly influenced by the ideals of the humanist oriented Catholic “reformation” of the 16th and 17th centuries in Europe.

45. The basic concept of revealed preferences in understanding economic behavior was pioneered by economist Paul Samuelson, see P. Samuelson “A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumers’ Behaviour,” *Economica* 5, (1938), 61-71.
In Memoriam
Mary Hollis Clark 1921-2010

Mary Clark, a most gracious and beloved member of the San Diego Historical Society/History Center for over 40 years, suffered a heart attack at her Mission Hills home and died on December 18, 2010. She was 89. At the time of her death she was working on a book featuring the many verses that chronicled her family’s activities through the year for her annual Christmas card. The project will go forward with the support of her family.

Mary Clark was a generous supporter of The Journal of San Diego History and various activities of the History Center. She loved history and although she was a native of Columbus, Georgia—her accent gave her away—she became a true San Diegan, arriving here in 1946 as the bride of Army Captain James Dallas Clark, son of Lena Sefton Clark. Mary carried on the tradition of the Charity Ball, started by her mother-in-law, and recently attended its 100th anniversary celebration.

Because of her love of nature, Mary Clark soon became involved in the San Diego Natural History Museum, which has named a wing for her and her family. She was on the board beginning in 1964 and became emeritus trustee in 1994. Mary and Dallas supported countless other civic and community projects and in 1998 the couple received the medal for Distinguished Philanthropy from the American Association of Museums.

Mary Clark was an active supporter of the new Central Library, the Balboa Park Cultural Partnership, the Committee of 100, the Timken Museum, the Old Globe, the San Diego Zoo and the Wednesday Club, to which she belonged for 50 years. Mary helped establish Art Alive, an annual event at the San Diego Museum of Art, to which she was also very committed. Mary was born November 2, 1921, in Columbus, Georgia, to Howell and Aylmer Illges Hollis. She received a bachelor’s degree in business administration from the University of Georgia in 1942. She is survived by two daughters, Nita Clark van der Werff of Taos, New Mexico, and Dale Clark of Bend, Oregon, two granddaughters Leigh and Tessa with great-granddaughter Edie.

Arthur Gilbert Peinado 1947-2010

Arthur Peinado, a member of the Board of Trustees of the San Diego History Center since 2006, died on August 12, 2010. He was a valued member of the board who supported and participated in all of its activities. A longtime Point Loma resident, Art passed away from complications of a prolonged struggle with congestive heart failure. Born in El Paso, Texas, the son of Arnulfo and Themis (Molina) Peinado, he was student body president at El Paso
High and first string All City in football, attending Johns Hopkins University, the University of Texas at El Paso and Harvard Law School, where he received a J.D. degree in 1972. Art practiced law in San Diego for 38 years and was working with Kolodny & Pressman at the time of his death. He previously had served as President of the Collectors Club at the San Diego Museum of Man.

Art will be remembered by his friends and business associates as “beyond smart,” “a dignified and humble man,” “a great lawyer and a consummate gentleman;” by his children as a father who always stood by them and by his wife as her best friend. Art is survived by his wife of 39 years, Susan; daughter Susana Peinado, son Philip Peinado; five older brothers, Arnold, Robert, Charles, Raul and George. Art was an avid collector of Pre-Columbian, American Southwest, and Meso-American pottery. He also collected American Indian paintings. As a result of these interests, Art was very involved in the San Diego History Center’s Art Council.

The esteem in which he was held by his fellow board members of the History Center was reflected by the fact that he was serving as Vice President of the organization when he passed away.

David J. Weber 1940-2010

On August 29, 2010, David J. Weber, founder and long-time member of the board of editors of the The Journal of San Diego History, died in Gallup, N.M., at the age of 69 after a three-year battle with multiple myeloma. Dr. Weber, Professor of History at Southern Methodist University, was a preeminent scholar of the American South-west and colonial Latin America. Joining the San Diego Historical Society shortly after becoming a member of the history faculty at San Diego State University in 1970, Dr. Weber was instrumental in helping then Executive Director/Journal Editor James Moss modernize the Journal's format, form a Board of Editorial Consultants, and become the first book review editor.

During this time, Dr. Weber began a successful and productive publishing career including more than two-dozen books on Spanish and Mexican America, and becoming an expert in the field of borderlands scholarship. His doctoral dissertation, published as The Taos Trappers: The Fur Trade in the Far Southwest, 1540-1846 (1971), was followed by The Mexican Frontier, 1821-1846 (1982), both of which placed the Southwest in a larger continental narrative of United States and Mexican history.

During a career spanning 40 years, Weber won numerous book prizes and other awards. A past president of the Western History Association, he was inducted into the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2007. But David Weber was more than an internationally-recognized scholar. He was mentor and friend to countless undergraduates and graduate students at San Diego State and Southern Methodist University, and to all historians engaged in the study of Latin America and the American Southwest. He was kind and helpful to everyone. A native of Buffalo, New York, Weber attended SUNY Fredonia before earning an M.A. and Ph.D. at the University of New Mexico. Professor Weber is survived by his wife Carol, and two children Scott and Amy.
BOOK REVIEWS


Reviewed by James O. Gump, Professor of History, University of San Diego.

Between 1790 and 1900, the United States Army conducted over 1100 combat operations against Indians. Waged ostensibly to provide security to the western borderlands, these conflicts often paved the way for the nation’s commercial and agricultural development, typically at the expense of Native American communities. Robert Wooster’s well-documented and compelling account of these encounters captures the nuances, contradictions, successes, and atrocities that accompanied the Army’s mission to “pacify” the western frontier. As Wooster acknowledges, the Army was often placed in a precarious position. From the late eighteenth century onward Americans came to expect that their government should provide military assistance to western settlement, but some, especially eastern humanitarians, insisted that the Army act as neutral brokers in defending the interests of Indians and U.S. citizens alike. In Wooster’s words, the “public expected the army to help secure the nation’s imperial designs, but its role in implementing the government’s controversial Indian policy, its composition, and embarrassing behavior by some officers and enlisted men buttressed the case of its critics. Indeed, the inconsistencies between public expectations of and attitudes toward the army would continue to haunt the frontier regulars for decades to come” (p. 57).

Throughout his book, Wooster chronicles the major encounters between the Army and Indians between the late eighteenth and late nineteenth centuries, including the worst Army defeat (or greatest Indian victory) during this period. On November 4, 1791, the Miami war leader Little Turtle led a coalition of Indian forces against frontier regulars at the Wabash River in Ohio. In this defeat, the Army lost over 870 men killed or wounded, including 64 officers. By the early nineteenth century, the violence that had beset the nation’s western borderlands convinced President Andrew Jackson that the only way to expand white civilization was through the forced removal of Indians living east of the Mississippi. The Army was tasked with carrying out Indian removal, assisted by a new federal bureaucracy, the Office of Indian Affairs. As ethnic cleansing progressed, the Army’s task after mid-century was to stabilize the trans-Mississippi West, where plains tribes resisted the growing flood of farmers, miners, adventurers, and entrepreneurs. The Army’s military campaigns against Comanches, Cheyennes, and Lakotas exacted a terrible toll on these Indian societies, culminating in the horrific massacre of Lakota Ghost Dancers at Wounded Knee in December, 1890.

Summing up the Army’s attitude toward these combat operations, General Phil Sheridan shunned sentimentality. Believing that it was his principal duty to protect settlers, Sheridan reckoned that he had “nothing to do with Indians but in this connection. There is scarcely a day in which I do not receive the most heart rendering [sic] appeals to save settlers . . . and I am forced to the alternative of choosing whether I shall regard their appeals or allow them to be butchered in order to save myself from the hue and cry of the people who know not the Indians
and whose families have not the fear . . . of being ravished and scalped by them” (p. 273). Sheridan’s views were not shared by everyone in the Army. Other officers expressed considerable ambivalence about their role in the ethnic cleansing of the West, and directed their ire at those they were ordered to protect. The words of Captain Thomas Sweeney capture this sentiment: “[all of the Indian wars] with very few exceptions, are brought on either by our frontier settlers or the traders in Indian Country, who as a class, are an unmitigated set of scoundrels” (p. 122). The strength of Wooster’s book lies in its ability to reveal both the aggressively racist attitudes of figures like Sheridan and the complex realities of Indian warfare embodied in Sweeney’s assessment.


Reviewed by Robert M. Senkewicz, Professor of History, Santa Clara University.

George Clinton Gardner was a member of the U.S. Boundary Commission and served on that body for approximately five years. Through most of that time, was an assistant to Major William H. Emory, the commission’s highest ranking military officer. Gardner proved to be a fairly prolific correspondent and many of his letters to family and friends on the East Coast have been preserved. In this volume, the late David J. Weber and Jane Lenz Elder of Southern Methodist University brought together and published 185 letters from their university’s DeGolyer Library (the home of most of Gardner’s correspondence) and a number of other repositories. These documents offer a unique first-hand account of the work of the Boundary Commission. The correspondence is arranged chronologically. It begins with Emory’s February 13, 1849 letter of appointment to Gardner, and it then recounts Gardner’s journeys through New Orleans and Panama before he reached San Diego. The correspondence details the commission’s work in California between San Diego Bay and the Gila River, and then from Frontera, Texas down the Rio Grande to its mouth, where Gardner constructed an observatory designed to contain a “Zenith Telescope and a large transit instrument” (p. 267). We also learn, for instance, that “Camp Riley” on the southern end of San Diego Bay actually consisted of three separate camps which formed a triangle about a mile distant from each other.

Gardner’s letters offer a view of the commission’s work from the ground up. During the early days of his work, when the commission was chronically short of funds, he spent some time clerking for an army officer in San Diego. He offered a rich description of the social life in the Mexican pueblo as it was becoming an American town. These letters are some of the most interesting in the collection. Gardner reacted to the area and its Mexican population in the contradictory ways in which many young American arrivals did. He was enchanted by the scenery and some of the local people – especially the Mexican women – and their customs. But he was also rather disdainful of the larger culture in which those people and their customs were embedded.
Gardner was less enthralled by the Texas frontier. He stated that the Río Grande was little more than a “creek” and that Eagle Pass was “the dullest place.” But overall, his letters offer many details about life in the Southwest. They demonstrate how difficult it was for a Protestant Yankee to understand the land and the people who had just been added to his country.

This volume is wonderfully edited and presented. Weber and Elder divide the correspondence into nine sections, and they begin each section with an introduction that enables the reader to understand the larger context in which Gardner was working. The hundreds of footnotes which accompany the letters themselves are marvels of erudition. They contain imaginative and concise essays on a variety of topics, such as how the mail was delivered from the East Coast to El Paso in the 1850s. This volume is a model of how primary sources ought to be published, and it belongs in the library of anyone interested in the history of the American Southwest.

This book was one of David Weber’s final scholarly projects. It is fitting that it dealt with the border between the United States and Mexico, for Weber was the prime agent in the revival of borderland studies over the past four decades. It is also fitting that the borderlands journey which this correspondence recounts began at San Diego, for, as many readers of this journal no doubt remember, Weber taught for many years at San Diego State University before moving to SMU. This superb volume reminds us all how much we have lost with his passing.


Reviewed by Kevin Allen Leonard, Professor of History, Western Washington University.

The growth of the Mexican community in Los Angeles before World War II attracted the attention of many settlement house workers, educators, and public officials. Several historians have analyzed the words and actions of these reformers. Most notable among these studies are George J. Sánchez, Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture, and Identity in Chicano Los Angeles, 1900-1945 (1993), William Deverell, Whitewashed Adobe: The Rise of Los Angeles and the Remaking of Its Mexican Past (2004), and Natalia Molina, Fit to Be Citizens? Public Health and Race in Los Angeles, 1879-1939 (2006). In her fascinating book, Stephanie Lewthwaite asks readers to reconsider some of what they have learned from these scholars.

Lewthwaite challenges previous interpretations in two ways. She argues that the reform movement in Los Angeles was transnational. Many reformers traveled in Mexico, and their perceptions of Mexican immigrants reflected their experiences in Mexican cities and villages. In addition, Mexican intellectuals and political leaders were engaged in efforts to remake their nation and its people, and some of their ideas and actions influenced the beliefs of educators, social workers, and officials in Southern California. Lewthwaite also insists that scholars need to look beyond central city and East Los Angeles neighborhoods to understand how the “urban-suburban-rural nexus of Greater Los Angeles shaped reform” (p. 6).
Much of the book focuses on reformers’ concerns about the housing in which Mexican immigrants lived. The first slum eradication campaign focused on the “house court,” which reformers depicted as uniquely Mexican. Lewthwaite argues that the demolition of substandard housing encouraged segregation, because replacement housing was built on the city’s suburban fringe.

Lewthwaite directly engages the work of Deverell and Molina in her examination of the plague outbreak of 1924-1925. She points out that these scholars did not notice that officials’ response to the plague focused as much on suburban areas as on the central city. She contrasts earlier reformers’ photographs of Mexican districts with California State Board of Health photographs from the plague outbreak. Unlike the earlier photographs, which depicted reformers and Mexicans, the Board of Health photographs pictured vacant homes and the burning of the “Mexican Village” in Vernon. Lewthwaite argues that these photographs and a “transnational discourse on public hygiene” justified the “exclusion of the poor, the rural, and the racialized in 1920s Los Angeles” (p. 129).

After World War I, reformers’ concern about the state of the housing in which Mexicans lived shifted from the “house court” to “the typical Mexican shack” (p. 139). Some employers, such as the Pacific Electric Railway, responded to the worries of reformers by building “model colonies.” The cooperation between reformers and employers, however, disintegrated as the campaign for immigration restriction intensified in the 1920s. Many reformers sided with restrictionists, while employers sought to preserve access to low-wage laborers. Reformers in the 1930s worked to replace “slums” with public housing. In analyzing photographs from the public housing campaign, Lewthwaite shows that many of these pictures contradicted the statements of housing reformers. Instead of showing dilapidated houses and squalor, many photographs captured scenes of orderly rooms and cohesive families.

Other chapters explore different dimensions of a broad “Americanization” campaign. Lewthwaite argues that this contradictory campaign was influenced by intellectual currents in revolutionary Mexico, especially efforts to incorporate rural Indians into the modern nation by emphasizing the country’s indigenous heritage. Educational reformers in Los Angeles insisted that Mexicans’ Indian heritage made them inherently artistic and that their artistic abilities needed to be developed in schools that specialized in “manual arts” or vocational training. These beliefs reinforced school segregation. As late as the 1940s, reformers associated with the Good Neighbor Policy stated that they wanted to preserve “Mexican traditions, culture, habits and modes of life, and the particular abilities of Mexicans” (p. 221). In the 1930s and 1940s, reformers’ actions fueled activism among Mexican Americans, many of whom expressed pride in their heritage and fought against discrimination by joining the Mexican American Movement (MAM) and El Congreso del Pueblo de Habla Español, the Congress of Spanish-Speaking Peoples Congress.

Lewthwaite’s interpretation is generally persuasive. However, the book occasionally loses sight of the “transnational perspective,” most notably in the discussion of public housing and of the “urban-suburban-rural nexus of Greater Los Angeles.” The use of Spanish-language sources might have strengthened Lewthwaite’s arguments about transnationalism and Mexican Americans’ responses to the reform campaigns. Still, this book represents a significant contribution to the historical literature dealing with race and reform in the early twentieth century.
Reviewed by Charles W. Hughes, Public Historian/Archivist, Oceanside, CA.

Performing original research and writing about the history of the California-Mexico border region is a challenging task. Historical resources are widely scattered in numerous public institutions and private collections across the United States and Mexico. Paul Vanderwood has met this challenge and produced a groundbreaking history of Tijuana’s Agua Caliente resort and casino based on research conducted in more than thirty institutions and collections between the two countries. Satan’s Playground: Mobsters and Movie Stars at America’s Greatest Gaming Resort is destined to become the standard history for generations to come of this world-renowned gaming resort of the Prohibition Era.

As the author explains in the acknowledgement, none of the business records for the Agua Caliente resort, casino, or race track have survived. The major participants, Wirt Bowman, James Crofton, Baron Long, and Governor Abelardo Rodriguez – known collectively as the Border Barons – had no intention of preserving records of their business affairs. The author had “to stitch” the history of the resort together using newspaper and magazine articles, local and national government archives, and manuscript collections held by universities and local historical societies. Vanderwood combined these materials with the reminiscences and private papers of individuals who experienced the events first-hand or learned about them from others.

The narrative begins with the robbery at the dike in May 1929: two small-time bootleggers robbed the money car transporting the week-end receipts from Agua Caliente to the bank in San Diego. During the attack the two occupants of the car were killed in a gun fight with the assailants. It was the first known incident where the Thompson sub-machine gun was used in the commission of a crime in San Diego, and many in the community feared that the mob violence so prevalent in eastern cities had finally reached the West Coast.

The resort and casino had opened the previous June, attracting thousands of guests, including Hollywood starlets, movie moguls, mobsters, sports personalities, politicians, and other wealthy patrons. But mostly it drew ordinary folks looking to mingle with the rich and famous, enjoy a drink, and try their luck at the gaming tables and slot machines.

Since the turn-of-the-century Tijuana had prospered as a destination for vice tourism after California reformers succeeded in outlawing games of chance, horse racing, prize fights, and prostitution. Many of the Americans involved in these activities simply migrated south across the border and re-opened for business. The beginning of national prohibition in 1920 only enhanced the prosperity of the Tijuana community.

The Border Barons, having the right political connections and willingness to pay the necessary licenses, taxes, and fees (bribes/Mordidas), came to dominate the business affairs of the community. The Barons achieved their greatest success with the construction of the Agua Caliente resort, casino, and race track. During their first year of operation their income was estimated at over five million dollars.
Annual visitors at the border totaled over eleven million people crossing at Tijuana and Calexico, or about 30,000 tourists a day passing through customs (pp. 222-3).

Vanderwood does a laudable job chronicling the events and issues associated with the seven tumultuous years the Agua Caliente gaming resort was allowed to operate. His lively writing style presents an engaging account of the San Diego/Tijuana region in the years leading up to the Great Depression. He offers ample evidence of widespread public corruption on both sides of the border caused by the excesses of prohibition reforms, and he traces the impact of local and national politics on the ultimate decline of the resort. Moral reforms and presidential politics in Mexico led to the downfall of the Border Barons in 1935, causing the closure of Agua Caliente resort and casino. After a brief hiatus, the race track continued to operate into the 1970s but never matched the success of its early years.

Finally, Vanderwood skillfully interweaves throughout his text short historical sketches and facts involving Agua Caliente to enhance the narrative and create a most enjoyable book. For example, he includes stories about innovations introduced to horseracing at the Agua Caliente track and about the tragedy that befell the great Australian racehorse Phar Lap. There are accounts of the Hollywood actress Rita Hayworth starting her career as a twelve year old dancer and being discovered in Tijuana, and how an Italian World War I flying ace and Tijuana restaurant owner first created the recipe for Caesar salad and named it after his brother. Vanderwood has written an informative and highly readable history that will appeal to a range of audiences, from scholars to those interested in our colorful local border history.

Making a Non-White America: Californians Coloring outside Ethnic Lines, 1925-1955

Reviewed by Richard A. Garcia, Professor, History Department, California State University, East Bay.

Allison Varzally’s text is an innovative work of imagination and historical memory. The underlying guiding template for her text is Ernesto Galarza’s autobiography, Barrio Boy. Varzally draws on Galarza’s themes of “differences” and “similarities” in his stages of a consciousness of self, multiple acculturations, and the multi-ethnic “crossings” in the community in Sacramento, California where he had to mix, communicate, and be aware of other ethnics’ cultures and cross boundaries with other ethno-racial groups. This established familiarity, not cultural tensions. Galarza drew a strong sense of self, family, and community as he underwent the almost inevitable process of acculturation/Americanization, while still retaining his consciousness of self and culture of descent. Ethno-racial is a concept used by Varzally which is rooted in the work of intellectual historian David A. Hollinger’s Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism. Hollinger argues that ethno-racial groups move to a consciousness of cosmopolitanism which leads to a postethnics conscious that maintains a sensibility of ethnic descent, but, at the same time, is more of an ethos of humanism, not tribalism.
Varzally uses the concept but rejects the postethnic consciousness of humanism. Instead, she maintains that an ethnic-racial consciousness remains central to the “self” and to maintaining a separate sensibility of “tribalism” while acculturation, citizenship, and a form of patriotism become part of ethno-racialism. Varzally argues that in the historical period of her study, 1925-1955, there was a short period of cultural fluidity, economic shifts, technological explosions, industrialization, immigration, and political remapping given urbanization and modernity. Varzally argues that these factors were the basis of the White “color line,” especially when the existing White elite assimilated and incorporated White immigrants from western and northern Europe. “Indeed,” Varzally writes, “California provided an ideal vantage point from which to observe the making and meaning of ethnoracial categories” as “Mexican, Asian, Native American, European, and Black migrants in search of better lives joined established residents there” (p.12). She links ethnicity to race and uses Hollinger’s concept of “pan-ethnicity” which is a consciousness of solidarity among ethnic groups: ethno-racial mixing, developing interrelations, establishing common communal activities, discovering similar cultural sensibilities, and possibly intermarrying were the processes for “pan-ethnic” interrelations.

Varzally suggests that the “separations and connections among California’s diverse peoples in the first decades of the twentieth century were imprinted upon the physical landscape. Although the early ethno-racial thinking of these varied migrants predisposed them to keep apart, their paths [however] intersected within California, thanks to formal and informal restrictions” (p.12). She also notes that “In other regions of the nation, living on the other side of the tracks often meant living in monotonic ghettos. But in California those districts most segregated from Whites were often those most integrated with multiple minorities. This physical reality made possible, if not inevitable, the interethnic mixings and mingling that ultimately broadened the system of difference upon which migrants had first settled. The expansion and accumulation of affiliations were essential to the integration of California’s newcomers” (p.31). Varzally further argues that after becoming American ethnics, these newcomers would become American pan-ethnics. They multiplied their ethnic-racial attachments as they confronted White racism and discovered cultural commonalities or opportunities with other groups. Varzally suggests that “This pushing out of self and group boundaries took place in spaces of remarkable diversity” (p.30). Despite their Americanization into “Non White America” they still retained, she believes, their own separate “worlds of ethnic descent” – differences in values, communities, and consumer desires, but still they remained “brothers in arms,” “together in crisis,” and part of “Pan-ethnic Politics” (pp.158,119,183). The three historical events that functioned as magnets to establishing a consciousness of pan-ethnicity were the Zoot Suit riots, the Second World War, and the Japanese American internment.

In the conclusion Varzally is vehement when she writes, “This book has focused on a multiethnic past not conjured up out of imagination or exotic longings but grounded in the intimate experiences of specific spaces. At its heart it argues that minorities have drawn and redrawn ethno-racial borders to create more capacious affiliations in the past” (p. 229). This statement is the central paradox of the text: Galarza prefaced his book Barrio Boy with a statement from The Education of Henry Adams. The epigram was, “This was the journey he remembered. The actual jour-
ney may have been quite different. … The memory was all that mattered.” While Varzally is clearly guided by the memory and imagination of the subjects whose interviews form a significant portion of her research, the book adeptly utilizes other sources to substantiate its argument that minorities in California did in fact create a “non-white America.”


Reviewed by Victor W. Geraci, PhD, Associate Director of the University of California, Berkeley, Regional Oral History Office.

In a concise and well documented manner Robert M. Carriker presents a compelling narrative of a lesser known New Deal program designed to resuffle industrial and rural living during the Great Depression. In a short seven chapters Carriker unfolds the story of thirty-four Division of Subsistence Homesteads (DSH) in seventeen states while devoting the lion’s share of his narrative to western homestead communities in Phoenix, Arizona, El Monte and San Fernando in California, and Longview, Washington (Chapters 3-6).

Franklin Roosevelt called this small $25 million experimental project (it was the Section 208 Title II rider of the $3.3 billion National Industrial Recovery Act [NIRA]) one of his “pet children,” and it was designed to merge agricultural and industrial lifestyles. These subsistence farmsteads were to provide sustenance, companionship, and security by bringing underemployed urban industrial workers to rural areas referred to as “rurban” farmlets. Never intended to be an extension of the dole, this land and human-use experiment was to serve as a safety valve for city dwellers to enjoy life as part-time farmers. In short order back-to-the-land enthusiasts helped design four types of projects. Some emerged as workingmen’s garden homes for employed city workers, many as colonies for industrial workers from closed factories, several as colonies for part-time industrial workers, and lastly some as experimental farm communities for relocating displaced agricultural workers.

From the start the DSH faced problems similar to those of most New Deal programs. On the political right social and fiscal conservatives criticized the agency’s authority and legality, and many on the left complained that the project was racially exclusive as some local projects favored “100 percent Americans” who were keepers of rugged individualism. Confusion over the mission, loss of local autonomy to federal bureaucracy, the difficulty of selecting participants, leadership problems, pork-barrel politics, and even naming of the project seemed to doom the venture from the start. The final blow to the project came through organizational neglect that first transferred the program in 1935 from DSH to Rexford Tugwell’s Resettlement Administration (RA) and its 1936 absorption by the Farm Security Administration (FSA). By 1942 the program was transferred one last time to the federal Public Housing Authority (FPHA) and in 1948 bureaucrats dismantled the program. The federal attempt to build a utopian rurban community had failed on the national level.
Carriker’s thesis is that the DSH program has traditionally received a “misunderstood, misrepresented, or minimalized” narrative by historians (p. 3). He believes that DSH was not a complete failure if judged by its successes in the West; thus the bulk of his story is embedded in the western DSH communities. Utilizing these locations he builds a strong case that the model industrial homestead in the West worked as a lesson in land-use planning, community building, and home ownership. Part of the success can also be credited to the millions of dollars poured into the West by the Works Progress Administration (WPA), Public Works Administration (PWA), the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), and to a lesser extent the DSH. In turn, these programs changed the West by creating a bonanza in big-time federal contracts that stimulated local economies and effectively provided homesteaders with financial stability and a sense of community. In the conclusion Carriker reminds his readers that the overall national failure of DSH sprang from New Deal agencies that were “hastily organized and never given a full opportunity” to prove themselves (p. 166).

For students of the New Deal and its progressive planning efforts this book is worth the read and provides a well researched manuscript with an excellent bibliography consisting of oral histories, newspapers, archival collections, and a vast array of secondary literature. My only concern is that more of the conclusion should have been woven into the introduction so as to help contextualize the primary research on the western homesteads. The book would fit well in courses in modern American history, the history of the West, and political history and is written in a manner that is approachable for general audiences interested in how local history is valuable when placed in the context of national politics and policies.


Reviewed by Peter La Chapelle, Associate Professor of History, Nevada State College.

The first edition of this book had a profound impact on me as a young scholar in 1998. Emblazoned with bright pink lettering somewhat reminiscent of early punk’s “ransom-style” typography, it was among the first of a second sustained wave of books to chronicle the history of California popular music. And as its cover promised, it shook things up a bit. Before Land of a Thousand Dances, we had promising books, good books, in fact, that attempted to put a face on the music of Southern California by analyzing the connections between urban spaces and music and by packing together performer biographies. Published some five years before Land, Steven Loza’s Barrio Rhythm: Mexican American Music in Los Angeles provided something of a blueprint for Reyes and Waldman, especially in its first three history-oriented chapters which made the case for linking specific geographic locales to particular developments in Mexican American music making. So did
George Lipsitz in the mid-1980s with his excellent theoretical essay about Mexican American musical tastes and memory, “Cruising Around the Historical Bloc.”

Reyes and Waldman’s work, however, was the first to probe consistently the deep connections between urban geography and popular music styles throughout the entirety of a book-length narrative in a way that was accessible and thought provoking. It was Land of a Thousand Dances that gave me, a relative newcomer to Los Angeles, a sense of the meaning of Whittier Boulevard as a cultural landscape. It was Land that introduced me to El Monte Legion Stadium as a pivot meeting place of musical and ethnic cultures, important not just for Chicano music but for a larger multi-ethnic teenage culture that was coming to stake its claim on popular music. It provided dead-on snapshots of longtime DJ’s Art Laboe and Huggy Boy and explained the significance of Lalo Guerrero, Richie Valens, and Thee Midniters. It was Land that took us on a trip through the era of El Chicano, Tierra, and the Chicano Moratorium, and examined the often untapped potential of Chicano punk bands such Los Illegals and The Brat, before landing us squarely with a portrait of hit-makers Los Lobos. I remember reading it and then being able to impress my graduate student friends with my knowledge of various Los Angeles area landmarks, especially those on the East Side.

Reyes and Waldman’s first edition ultimately proved an important contribution to both Chicano studies and to the wider cultural history of the greater Los Angeles area (although this journal’s readers, in particular, may quibble with a book whose subtitle includes the phrase “Southern California” but generally neglects developments in San Diego). Its attempt to define its central topic, Chicano rock ’n roll, broadly and inclusively, its exploration of both audience reactions and the business side of recording and promotion, and its attention to geographic detail were in many ways ahead of their time, especially for a non-scholarly book. At the time, I only wished it included a map so I didn’t have to look all of those places up. Reyes and Waldman, a composer and a political journalist respectively, influenced not just my own writing, but also seems to have triggered the historical imaginations of numerous other recent academic chroniclers of California music including Anthony Macias, the historian of Mexican American music and dance, Mina Yang, the music historian who writes brilliantly about the larger ethnic quilt of California music, and, I would even venture, Catherine Parsons Smith, the late and much respected musicologist of Los Angeles concert and classical music.

The new revised edition, complete with a snazzy Dia de los Muertos-themed cover illustration by George Yepes, promises to introduce a new generation to Reyes and Waldman’s work, something I would highly applaud. For those who already own a copy, however, I might advise a bit of caution. The new edition is not much different than the first edition. It sports a new introduction and additional photographs, but its internal design, layout, and typography appear to be identical to the first edition to the point that pages remain identically numbered. The new eighteen-page introduction offers an update on several of the performers and bands profiled in the first edition, most notably punk band The Brat. It also provides a quick portrait of Quetzal, a punk band from the 1980s that continues to work today, and examines how historical circumstances have shaped the career of Lysa Flores, a Chicano performer who lists herself as an Emo/Ghettotech/Hardcore artist on her MySpace page. Perhaps most compelling is the new introduction’s assessment of the changing epicenter of Chicano rock: “El Monte Legion
Stadium in the 1950s, and early 1960s; Salesian High School in the mid-1960s; East Los Angeles College at the end of the 1960s and early 1970s, and so forth. Each change in locale represented a change in the look and sound of Chicano rock” (p. xxv). In summary, I would recommend the new edition to anyone not familiar with the original, but remain somewhat skeptical whether owners of the first edition really need to go out and purchase a copy of the revised edition. And yes, I still wish that the book had come with a map.

**DOCUMENTARY**


Reviewed by Jesse Mills, Assistant Professor, Department of Ethnic Studies, University of San Diego.

Most readers of a historical association journal are familiar with the dangers of urban renewal. The renewal wrecking ball reaps publicly-subsidized windfall profits for developers and absentee landowners while cutting through meaning-filled places of memory most often occupied by “the little guy.” Consider the added complications of barriers to civic participation that new immigrants, refugees, and working class residents face, and you have the fundamental issue addressed in Paul Espinoza’s *The Price of Renewal.*

Part of the PBS series *California and the American Dream*, *The Price of Renewal* documents contemporary urban renewal in the “Ellis Island” of San Diego, City Heights. Espinoza shows that “revitalization,” or rehabilitating run-down neighborhoods, precedes “gentrification,” or the rising rents and land values that displace the residents and small businesses that need the most help, in favor of wealthier tenants and national franchises. Narrator Linda Hunt challenges the viewer, “How do you change a community, especially a poor one? What roles can government, the private sector, and philanthropy play in a process which inevitably has winners and losers?”

*The Price of Renewal* details the dynamic leadership of Price Club/Costco founder Sol Price and how his vision of a new Urban Village for City Heights has reshaped the landscape. The documentary is particularly strong on the views, plans, efforts, and results of political and economic leaders like Price, former city manager (1991-97) Jack McGrory, and business owner William Jones. With attractive multicolor charts, graphs, and animated GIS maps the Price-McGrory-Jones view on neighborhood improvement comes to life in its expansive scope.

Equally impressive is the documentary’s treatment of City Heights, a unique community of San Diego. Incorporated and annexed early on by the fast growing city (1912 and 1923 respectively), City Heights provided new suburban housing and commercial opportunities for some residents while laws, leaders, and lenders segregated other groups to the south and east. When after World War II Caltrans slated the I-15 corridor to run directly through the neighborhood, City Heights began a 50-year process of white flight and disinvestment, followed by densification by landlords desperate to preserve profitability. The availability of affordable
housing combined with official neglect gave City Heights its unique identity as
diverse and dilapidated.

The Price of Renewal lays out the comprehensive Sol Price plan to improve infra-
structure, goods and services, and quality of life. Espinoza shows each aspect of
the plan – schools, housing, retail, and health – to be a struggle between fast-track
developers, entrenched homeowners, and the advocates of poor and minority
residents. For example, in one climactic scene, La Maestra CEO Zara Marselian
verbally spars with Project Area Committee (PAC) bullies and secures a spot for
her low-income health services clinic in the new village.

Two related things are missing from this overall fantastic and balanced docu-
mentary. First, though The Price of Renewal introduces the complexities of defining
community, and thus of deciding from whose perspective we can consider Price's
Urban Village project successful, the documentary makes the unfortunate omis-
sion of the very same marginalized voices left out of the planning and negotiating
processes in real life. While the stunning ethnic and cultural diversity of City
Heights residents is depicted repeatedly on screen, the narrator, university profes-
sors, and advocates do the lion's share of speaking for the diverse community. The
second related issue is that the 80% of City Heights residents who are not busi-
ness owners, not representatives working for Price projects, or not homeowners
are the demographic majority, and comprise the rich perspectives and textures
that make City Heights reflect the world more than any other neighborhood in the
city. Without listening more intently to these stories, the civil and human rights
concerns triggered by gentrification become too easily leveled and subordinated to
the profit-investment quotients of landlords and developers. While the vast expanse
of these diverse stories is clearly beyond the scope of the documentary, The Price of
Renewal leaves us without any alternative vision to urban renewal when big-money,
elite-led projects and their discontents are considered the only games in town.

The DVD lives up to its billing as a contemporary exploration of California and
the American Dream and includes extras like trailers for three other films in the
series and for the dozen films in director Paul Espinoza's impressive filmography.
The Price of Renewal is a must watch and must own documentary for residents and
enthusiasts of America's finest city.
**BOOK NOTES**

*Dead Pool: Lake Powell, Global Warming, and the Future of Water in the West.* By James Lawrence Powell. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008. xiii + 283 pp. Illustrations, map, charts, table, notes, and index. $27.50 cloth. This volume examines the history of Colorado River water use and investigates the prospects of the network of reservoirs, dams, and aqueducts that sustain much of the human population of the American Southwest. Powell contends that demographic and environmental realities could lead to a collapse of this water delivery system within several decades.


*Murder of a Landscape: The California Farmer-Smelter War, 1897–1916.* By Khaled J. Bloom. Norman: Arthur H. Clark, 2010. 233 pp. Illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography, and index. $34.95 cloth. Bloom’s book investigates the conflict between copper mining interests in Shasta County and Sacramento Valley farmers whose crops were devastated by toxins released by smelters. The courts allowed the smelting to continue, although for the copper industry this turned out to be a pyrrhic victory, as collapsing prices for the metal at the conclusion of the First World War effectively ended the boom years for Shasta County copper mining.

*No Place for a Puritan: The Literature of California’s Deserts.* Edited by Ruth Nolan. Berkeley, CA: Heyday Books, 2009. xv + 345 pp. Map and author index. $21.95 paper. This anthology brings together fiction and non-fiction on California’s deserts. Included are obscure writers as well as celebrated chroniclers such as John Steinbeck, Aldous Huxley, and Sylvia Plath.


*The Yuma Reclamation Project: Irrigation, Indian Allotment, and Settlement Along the Lower Colorado River.* By Robert A. Sauder. Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2009. xix + 274 pp. Illustrations, table, notes, bibliography, and index. $44.95 cloth. Sauder, a historical geographer, tells the story of the Yuma project, one of the first federal irrigation projects undertaken after the passage of the Newlands Act in 1902. The construction of the Laguna Dam and the distribution of the water it impounded was a complicated affair that involved the sometimes competing interests of Quechan Indians, white settlers in the Yuma Valley, and representatives of the newly formed Reclamation Service.
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