Publication of *The Journal of San Diego History* is underwritten by a major grant from the Quest for Truth Foundation, established by the late James G. Scripps. Additional support is provided by “The Journal of San Diego History Fund” of the San Diego Foundation and private donors.

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Articles appearing in *The Journal of San Diego History* are abstracted and indexed in *Historical Abstracts* and *America: History and Life*.


**Front Cover:** Tuna fishing with bamboo poles using squid lures (jigs). Courtesy of the San Diego History Center ©SDHC #84:14821-7.

**Back Cover:** Collage of Balboa Park postcards from Panama-California Exposition 1915-1916. San Diego History Center collection.

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The Origins of California’s High-Seas Tuna Fleet

By August Felando and Harold Medina

The Early Years

The canning of tuna, according to most sources, was first introduced to the world by French fish canners in 1850. The tunas harvested and canned in Europe during the early years were bluefin and albacore due to their availability in the temperate waters of the North Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. Canning of tuna, however, did not become an industry in the United States until 1903. Because of the uncertainty of the sardine supply as a result of the sardine shortage of 1902, Southern California fishermen searched for new types of fish to can. Albert P. Halfhill, cofounder of the San Pedro-based canning firm, the California Fish Company, was one of the first developers of tuna canning in California. Although Halfhill’s canned albacore was unpopular at first in the Los Angeles area, his shipments to New York were successful enough to create an “instantaneous” demand.

August Felando, attorney at law, grew up in a tuna fishing family in San Pedro. He managed the affairs of the American Tunaboat Association of San Diego from 1960 to 1991. Captain Harold Medina, a member of the well-known Portuguese fishing family, has worked to protect dolphins and co-authored The Tuna Porpoise Controversy with Felando in 2011. The above article has been condensed by Maxwell Lane from their forthcoming full-length book on the Origin of the High-Seas Tuna Industry.
The East Coast demand for canned albacore fostered new growth in the tuna industry of Southern California. Five new canneries opened from 1911-1912. As a result, the fishing industry in Southern California grew rapidly, particularly in the ports of San Pedro, Long Beach, Wilmington, and San Diego. In fact, San Diego’s first cannery, the Pacific Tuna Canning Company, became the second operational tuna cannery in Southern California after Halfhill’s California Fish Company. The San Diego-based cannery obtained its albacore supply from small fishing boats manned by Japanese and Portuguese immigrants who caught the tuna by trolling with artificial lures, fishing with baited hand-line gear, and utilizing the bamboo pole method. Since albacore tuna occurred off the Southern California coast only from roughly September to June, the Pacific Tuna Canning Company, along with the other canneries, operated on a seasonal basis.

The spectacular growth of the Southern California tuna industry would continue in the following years. According to N.B. Scofield, a fishery biologist employed by the California Fish and Game Commission, there were at least
eleven canneries operating in Southern California as of July 1914. In his article, Scofield also stated that the most knowledgeable expert on albacore migration was a former Japanese professor at the Imperial Fisheries Institute in Tokyo, Masaharu Kondo. In 1912, Kondo founded the M.K. Fisheries Company, based out of San Diego with the purpose of harvesting and processing marine fishery resources off the Pacific Coast of Baja California. Along with his Mexican associate, Aurelio Sandoval, Kondo employed experienced Japanese lobster and abalone fishermen to operate from Magdalena Bay to Turtle Bay. As discussed later, Kondo was able to make substantial contributions to the development of the tuna fisheries in Baja California, Southern California, and his native Japan.

It is worth mentioning that bluefin tuna also occurred off Southern California during the summer months, but fishermen were unable to develop fishing gear and methods to catch them efficiently. More importantly, however, bluefin were highly prized by influential sport-fishermen in California and those involved in the young tuna industry recognized that it would be a grave political mistake to upset these powerful men. Furthermore, cooked bluefin was not as “chicken white” as cooked albacore, and since the albacore was still reliable in the nascent years, it was unnecessary to experiment with bluefin.

In October 1914, the Southern California tuna industry encountered its first major obstacle in the form of an unexpected albacore “disappearance.” This shortage strained canneries’ inventories and caused the young industry’s
struggles to become the subject of extensive media attention resulting from the increased demand for canned albacore and the large scale marketing campaign of 1913. Consequently, tensions rose as the more established canneries accused the newer canneries of discrediting the industry and ruining the market with massive advertising campaigns that were based on an uncertain supply of albacore.9 These same established canneries noted the need for reliable scientific information about the albacore resource, and initiated political efforts to influence the U.S. Bureau of Fisheries and the U.S. Congress to investigate migration and spawning habits.10

Despite the established canneries’ concerns, the tuna industry underwent another wave of growth in the summer of 1914 as the Italian tuna industry dwindled with the outbreak of World War I. During this period, six new canners were organized, some of which were contracted with aggressive and experienced food brokers in San Francisco who created new markets for Southern California
canned tuna throughout the United States.\textsuperscript{11} Still, it seemed the concerns surrounding the supply of albacore would not cease. Russell Palmer of the \textit{Pacific Fisherman} noted in January 1915 that the future of the canned tuna industry relied more heavily on the “existence of a sufficient supply” of albacore, “rather than on the limitations of the market.” Moreover, Palmer warned that without scientific data regarding “the source of raw material,” the “financial confidence” in the canned tuna industry could not be established.\textsuperscript{12} The disappointing albacore season of 1915, coupled with the expansion of even more canneries, seemed to support the warnings of Palmer and the established canneries before him. Without proper scientific information, price wars emerged forcing two canneries into bankruptcy.\textsuperscript{13} Clearly, the industry could not continue to burgeon without extensive scientific investigation into the migration and spawning habits of the albacore off Southern California.

\textbf{The Japanese Influence}

As the seasonal albacore tuna fishery developed off Southern California, it became dominated by Japanese immigrant fishermen. They were the most numerous in the established fresh fish market industries of San Diego and San Pedro—the places to find commercial fishermen willing to try their skills at catching albacore for canners.\textsuperscript{14} At its peak, the canners estimated that 80 to 90 percent of the albacore catch was landed by “the Japanese Monopoly.”

Japanese tuna fishermen entered into Southern California at the turn of the century, “when a group of former railroad workers from Los Angeles discovered the rich abalone grounds off White Point in San Pedro.”\textsuperscript{15} Soon thereafter, these fishermen moved from an area on the San Pedro side of the Channel to East San Pedro (Terminal Island) near where a sardine cannery had been established in 1892 by the California Fish Company. By 1914, 150 Japanese tuna fishermen were operating 50 out of the 131 total vessels based in San Pedro.\textsuperscript{16} In the same year, the Coast Fishing Company, organized and successfully operated by Japanese...
immigrants, was based in Terminal Island. In fact, Terminal Island would become so well known as the home for most Japanese tuna fishermen in Southern California that it earned the nickname “Little Nippon.”

Terminal Island, however, was not the only Southern California location where Japanese tuna fishermen settled. During July 1899, Japanese fishermen, sailing in two vessels from their home base in San Pedro, entered San Diego Bay for the purpose of fishing for abalone. Local Japanese salt flat workers quit their jobs in the South Bay to join in the abalone fishing venture, creating the first Japanese fishing community of San Diego. By 1911, the newly established fish canneries of San Diego contracted with these Japanese fishermen. Two years later, in 1913, the Japanese immigrant fishermen incorporated themselves into the Japanese Fishermen’s Association of San Diego. The Japanese influence in San Diego kept growing so that by 1918, Japanese immigrants owned or operated more than 45...
fishing vessels in San Diego, while more than 200 fishermen were members of the Japanese Fishermen’s Association.

Before the opening of the 1914 season, the controversial question over the use of nets was brought to the forefront. The Japanese fishermen were upset because some canners were financing local fresh fish market fishermen to fish for albacore with nets. As such, the San Pedro and San Diego chapters of the Japanese Fishermen’s Association negotiated with the canners to seek exclusive rights to supply albacore and to ban the use of nets. Both proposals were rejected by the canners, and the dispute over the use of nets intensified.

One canner specifically, Frank Van Camp, believed the bamboo poles or live-bait fishing method was not efficient enough to catch all the albacore available during the regular fishing season (June to December). Consequently, Van Camp’s company financed the use of an experimental net to be used by the summer of 1915 with the belief that “tuna can be caught with nets” and that these nets can catch tuna even “in the winter when they will not bite a hook.” Earlier in 1914, nets were used, albeit unsuccessfully, to catch tuna by an Austrian-Dalmatian immigrant named Andrew Petrich. Furthermore, many Japanese fishermen
claimed the net experiment had already been thoroughly attempted in Japan many years before. Nevertheless, these warnings did not stop the efforts of at least six different outfits and their financiers who attempted to catch tuna with experimental nets during the spring of 1914 and break the Japanese monopoly.23

Similarly, the creation of a “Tuna Exchange” was used to lessen the power of the Japanese monopoly. In preparation for the 1915 season, tuna canners organized the Tuna Exchange to create an albacore-buying agency that would apportion the contracted catch based on the needs of the member canners in the Los Angeles and San Diego Counties.24 The Exchange’s first public action, however, was an effort to employ white fishermen from ports in Northern California to fish for albacore and break the Japanese monopoly.25 Nevertheless, like the purse seine attempts, the introduction of white fishermen failed, and the Japanese continued to catch more fish than their white counterparts. As an issue of the Pacific Fisherman claimed, “what the Japanese lack in strength and ability seems to be more than made up in patience and unique methods of luring the fish to take the hook.”26

White fishermen even tried to move the production of tuna out on the water by experimenting with tenders and cold-storage barges. Still, in 1915 the technology was not advanced enough for these large vessels to have a major impact, let alone usurp the Japanese output.
By the end of 1915, tuna canners commenced stronger efforts to seek federal aid in conducting scientific research on albacore.27 After a dismal 1916 season, the results of preliminary at-sea investigations conducted by scientists aboard the *Albatross* were troubling. Canners wanted solid answers about albacore availability and sustainability.28 In response to these concerns, the California Fish and Game Commission hired the noted fishery scientist, Will F. Thompson, to investigate the level of fishing the tuna could stand without jeopardizing the industry. With this great uncertainty surrounding the albacore supply, the existence of a Southern California tuna industry based solely on the production of canned albacore was being threatened.

**World War I**

With the outbreak of World War I in Europe, West Coast canners were given a unique opportunity to develop a seafood product as an alternative to canned
albacore at a time when the uncertainty of albacore supply was causing tough bargaining with the fishermen. As the war in Europe began, and continued to intensify, new markets for California canned sardines and tuna were developed domestically and internationally. Consequently, landings of sardines prior to and after the albacore tuna season increased in the Los Angeles and San Diego harbor regions during 1917.29

Around the same time, purse seiners began conducting successful experiments in catching bluefin tuna as an alternative to albacore.30 On August 19, 1917, “the largest catch ever recorded in southern California waters” of bluefin was made by four purse-seine boats off Point Dume. Most of the 75 tons of bluefin caught were canned by Van Camp Sea Food Company for the domestic Italian market.31 The success of these purse seiners to catch bluefin surprised most of the industry in light of the failure of the same method to catch albacore. The Pacific Fisherman reported in September 1918 that between June 25 and July 18, ten purse seiners landed about 1,000 tons of bluefin tuna. The fish sold for $90 a ton and went mainly to South Coast Canning Company of Long Beach for a pack of some 18,000 cases (48 lbs per case). The catch of 1,000 tons of bluefin was significant in
its impact by influencing Northwest Salmon seiners to come to California. “Taken altogether, this was the greatest catch of fish ever known in Southern California waters,” wrote the author of an article in the Pacific Fisherman. Unfortunately, the fortunes experienced by the tuna industry through the new sardine markets, as well as the bluefin supply, would be short lived, as peace in Europe was reached in fall of 1918.

The Dark Years

This newly expanded sardine-canning industry, a product of the World War I, was adversely shaken almost immediately by the changes that occurred in the domestic and foreign markets after the armistice was announced in November 1918. Subsequently, the tuna industry endured three years of economic troubles, causing many tuna canners in 1922 to permanently close their doors, merge, or be acquired by other companies.

In addition to losing sardine markets, low albacore production worsened the economic effects. The 1920 albacore season was disappointing, causing eight canneries to close in San Pedro along with another two in San Diego. This low season also led to the disbanding of the Southern California Fish Canners Association in October 1921 as business conditions worsened and participation decreased. However, 1921 was not the end of the suffering. In 1922, the albacore supply was again disappointing. As one tuna cannery manager claimed, it was the worst season he had ever experienced in his twelve-year career. Also in

1922, the bluefin supply, which had previously flourished using the purse-seine technique, was a failure.34

**Japanese and American Ventures in Baja California**

To combat the economic downturn, the four largest tuna canning firms merged during 1922. Van Camp Sea Food Company, International Packing Corporation, Nielsen & Kittle Canning Co., Ltd., and White Star Canning Company merged under the name of Van Camp Sea Food Company Inc.35 This new company would control about 75 percent of the fishing vessels operating in Southern California, and remain open year round to combat overhead costs.36 This consolidation affected commercial fishermen since there were new incentives to fish for tuna canners year round, rather than continuing to fish for the fresh fish market during part of the year.37 Tuna fishing by the use of purse seiners also continued despite objections coming mainly from the Mexican port of Ensenada. The U.S. Consul there reported concerns of the fresh fish market fishermen about the competition from the seiners.
As mentioned previously, a large portion of the history of Japanese involvement in the tuna industry, especially in Baja California, revolved around Kondo Masaharu. After discovering that insufficient fresh water drainage had placed limits on the sustainability of the abalone resource that his San Diego company, M.K. Fisheries Company, had relied on heavily, Kondo looked to expand his ventures. Subsequently, in 1918, Kondo entered the tuna market by creating a new San Diego firm, Mexican Industrial Development Company.

With financial backing from Japanese investors and fishing concessions acquired from the Mexican government, Kondo’s new company employed 70 Japanese tuna fishermen to operate four fishing vessels. Turtle Bay was selected as a base of operation because its natural harbor catered to tenders from San Diego and because the site had tuna fishing grounds that were productive after the end of the albacore/ bluefin seasons of Southern California. Additionally, the Van Camp Sea Food Company had proven that Cape San Lucas had a sufficient yellowfin supply prior to the opening of the Southern California season. These
two developments showed the potential for establishing a year-round tuna fishery off Baja California.

Kondo was not the only fisherman interested in Baja California, as American fishermen began investing in Baja California exploration in 1919 when a San Diego canner agreed to guarantee payment of trip expenses if exploratory trips
were failures, and to pay a high price for all yellowfin tuna delivered in good condition to the cannery.\textsuperscript{40} By 1922, more California canniers invested in vessels to fish off Cape San Lucas as a result of the successes off the Baja California coast. These canneries viewed the waters to the south as an opportunity to keep the canneries open year round.\textsuperscript{41} In 1923, these investments expanded as disappointing albacore and bluefin seasons increased the desire to fish for yellowfin and skipjack, which were abundant in the Mexican waters.\textsuperscript{42} These investments manifested themselves in the form of refrigerator schooners such as the \textit{Oceania Vance} of the Halfhill Tuna Packing Company and the \textit{Monfalcone} of the Curtis Corporation.\textsuperscript{43}

Unfortunately for the canniers, the profits from the tuna supply off Baja California would take a blow as the coffers of the Mexican government looked to capitalize on these ventures. Effective March 1, 1924, Mexican officials announced that the export duty on tuna and albacore would be increased from $10 to $18.60 per ton. Shortly thereafter, a fisherman for the Westgate Packing Company of San Diego learned, upon arriving at Cape San Lucas, that the tax had been doubled to $37.20 per ton and that the governor of Baja California Sur wanted payment in gold.

The confusion about the increased export fish tax and other related problems with the Mexican government caused all but two of the California tuna canniers to refrain from conducting tuna fishing operations off Turtle Bay during the last

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quarter of 1924. Fortunately for the California tuna canners, the record-breaking 1924 albacore season for the 700-vessel fleet operating from San Pedro and the 400-vessel fleet operating from San Diego mitigated whatever problems were created by their decision not to operate off Mexico. Although the 1924 season was shortened by price disputes, the 7,700 tons of landed albacore exceeded the amounts of all other previous years except 1919.

“Tuna Clipper” Revolution

The opportunity to fish for tunas off Baja California encouraged California fishermen operating from San Diego to gamble on the building of larger, faster, and more efficient vessels as a way of increasing their profits. In addition to the obvious advantages of a larger vessel (greater speed, ability to operate in rougher weather, etc.), the owner could choose, as circumstances warranted, to deliver the catch to a cannery at higher prices or to a tender at lower prices. Consequently, during early 1924, at a cost of $15,000, Manuel O. Medina (“M.O.”) and Joe V. Soares built the Tuna clipper baitboat Challenger, built in 1940 at San Diego Marine Construction; U.S. Navy YP 239, was destroyed in 1946. Captain Joe S. Rogers. Union Tribune Collection ©SDHC #8241-1353.
contracted with Campbell Machine Company of San Diego for the building of the *Oceana*. The success of this vessel during the tuna season in waters south of San Diego influenced the building of 10 additional vessels by other aggressive San Diego tuna fishermen during 1924-1925.45

As the *Oceana* was being constructed, Japanese tuna fishermen in San Pedro had completed work in designing a “new style” tuna baitboat. This new design had the capacity to carry enough bait, fuel, and food for lengthy fishing trips on the high seas (beyond the 3-mile territorial sea limit recognized by the United States as Mexican territory) to legally avoid the
Mexican export duty. Although these new tuna clippers were successful from the outset in San Pedro with the *Patricia I* and *Patricia II*, they would not be fully appreciated in San Diego until a few years later.

In 1926, Manuel O. Medina and the Campbell Machine Company of San Diego built the largest documented U.S. flag tuna clipper, the *Atlantic*, to begin fishing off Turtle Bay in the final quarter of that year. Shortly after, San Diego’s second tuna clipper, the *Lusitania*, was built in March 1927. The *Lusitania*, built by a successful Portuguese fisherman, Manuel G. Rosa, was designed by Al Larson Boatyard of San Pedro. By June 1927, San Diego would have its third tuna clipper, as the Campbell Machine Company launched the *Olympia*, owned and commanded by Captain Joe C. Monise of San Diego. During July 1927, the *Del Monte*, another tuna clipper built by Campbell Machine Company for a group of Portuguese tuna fishermen, took her successful maiden voyage under the command of her co-owner Captain Manuel H. Freitas. All four of these new tuna clippers were designed specifically for operation off the Mexican coast.

Although the 1926-1927 albacore season was disappointing, the yellowfin and skipjack landings increased dramatically. The successes of the *Atlantic, Lusitania, Olympia*, and *Del Monte* were responsible for the large yellowfin and skipjack landings, making it the first time in history that over 50 percent of the tuna processed in California ports was caught south of the border. These successes led to increased confidence in tuna clippers, as Portuguese, Japanese, and Italian fishermen invested in the building of new vessels in San Diego.
among diesel engine companies and shipyards in San Pedro and San Diego alike to build or convert boats into tuna clippers further accelerated the building of these vessels.\textsuperscript{51}

The March 1928 issue of Pacific Fisherman summarizes the appeal of the tuna clippers by explaining that these new “vessels are able to bring in their own fish, making them independent of tenders, and the vastly increased radius of operation has been found of great advantage in developing new and productive grounds at great distances from the canneries.”\textsuperscript{52} Clearly, the “Tuna Clipper Revolution” had a drastic impact on the Southern California tuna industry.

**Failed Agreement with Mexico**

Although the tuna clippers rejuvenated interest in the fishing potential off Mexican shores, the political issues surrounding international fishing ventures still persisted. To combat such issues, a treaty was signed on December 23, 1925, that attempted to define international boundaries in relation to the enforcement of duties, as well as creating an International Fisheries Commission to monitor fishing relations between the United States and Mexico.\textsuperscript{53} Although many fishermen had hoped the creation of the Commission would foster a lowering of the Mexican tax, their optimism waned as several U.S. flag tuna vessels endured seizures, arrests of their crews, and enforcement of fines.\textsuperscript{54} Even a visit from Secretary of Pete Asaro (left) with shipmates in 1938. ©SDHC #95:19359-2.
Commerce Herbert Hoover could not bolster the efforts to decrease the tax.55 In March 1927, as tensions continued, the Treaty was terminated.

Still, despite these political setbacks, the building of new tuna clippers to fish in waters south of the border continued. From 1928-1931, 35 new tuna clippers were launched and 7 other ocean service vessels were converted and documented as fishing vessels.56 An additional ten undocumented tuna clippers were built by Japanese aliens to bolster the California fleet. Of the 52 new tuna clippers, 37 operated out of San Diego. These new clippers pushed the wave of expansion, operating in waters as far south as Ecuador, increasing the area of operation to a size greater than that of the continental United States.
In 1930, the United States government finally made some genuine strides towards addressing the issue of sustainability of the tuna industry. Geraldine Conner of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, California Division of Fish and Game, expressed her vision of international stewardship on the future of the tunas, calling for the California tuna industry and the governments of Mexico, Costa Rica, and the United States to participate in a scientific effort to conserve and manage
the tunas in the eastern Pacific. Conner justified such an agreement by stating that it “will naturally work to the good of the industry as well as to the preservation of the fish.”\textsuperscript{57} Although Mexico would not participate initially, the United States and Costa Rica created the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) in 1949—the world’s first international effort to undertake the conservation and management of the tunas.\textsuperscript{58} Since 1950, the headquarters of the IATTC have been located in San Diego County, and remain there today. Presently, the IATTC has Commissioners from Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Spain, France, Guatemala, Japan, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, the Republic of Korea, the United States, Vanuatu, and Venezuela.\textsuperscript{59}

**Disadvantages and Innovations**

As the tuna clipper revolution manifested itself, “regular” purse seiners discovered that they could not compete with bait boats on the high seas off Mexico.\textsuperscript{60} Some of the most formidable disadvantages these purse-seiners faced were that their nets were still pulled in by hand, and that the purse-seine method required favorable weather and sea conditions.
most often found close to shore, among rocks. Furthermore, their proximity to shore meant their catches were legally under the jurisdiction of the Mexican tax.

Consequently, the survival of tuna purse-seiners as competitive fishermen in the tuna industry relied upon their ability to adapt and evolve. By the summer of 1929 tuna nets made of cotton twine grew substantially and steel purse lines were introduced via Norwegian fishermen. Additional power hoisting by rope “strap” (slings) and boom replaced turntable power rollers. This change from hand pulling over a turning roller to power “strapping in” of a net with a boom and the seine winch came about in the early 1930s, dramatically reducing the amount of physical labor required to pull in the nets. By 1935, innovations had led to “power pulling” technology that aided purse-seine crews even further.

As a result of these innovations, two large purse-seiners, the Paramount and the Falcon, joined the California fleet as year-round operational vessels. These vessels were not consistently successful, however, and were converted to baitboats before being lost in military service in World War II. A handful of other vessels built just prior to, during, or immediately after the war operated as seiners at least on
a part-time basis. Nevertheless, like the *Paramount* and *Falcon* before them, almost all converted back to pure bait boats.63

A few years after the end of the World War II, three new steel-hulled vessels entered the tuna fleet as year-round tuna fishing seiners: *Santa Helena, Defiance*, and *Southern Queen*. In addition, the wood-hull USN YP-632 was converted to a purse-seiner in 1947 and renamed the *Yankee Mariner*. These and other larger regular seiners were operating successfully on tropical tuna fishing grounds once dominated by tuna clippers. Unfortunately, despite these successes, the three steel-hulled seiners were converted to tuna clippers and the *Yankee Mariner* was lost at sea off Point Argüello in 1949.64 Moreover, scientists of the IATTC concluded that there was no substantial evidence to justify the opinion that tuna clippers should convert to purse seiners in an attempt to increase production.65 The future of the purse-seine method in the tuna industry was seemingly hanging in balance.

Although the future of California purse seiners looked bleak, further advancements revived its potential. The two gear innovations that helped pave the way for a world revolution in tuna purse seining were the nylon net and the Puretic Power Block. Nylon nets are superior to cotton nets because they are stronger and lighter and because they do not rot—a vital advantage while fishing in tropical conditions. The power block, invented by a San Pedro fisherman named Mario Puretic, is essentially a hydraulically-powered pulley attached to the end of the boom. The net is pulled upward through the power block with hydraulic power, and then it goes downward to the stern of the boat, where it is stacked by fishermen standing there.66 By reducing arduous manual labor, the power block made the retrieval of the tuna net faster, easier, and safer.
These two innovations were so pivotal that Captain Anton Misetich of the *Anthony M* declared them as the “salvation of the tuna purse seine industry.”

Yet, more had to be done to solidify the purse-seiners’ place in the tuna industry. In May 1957, Larry Zuanich and Star-Kist Foods purchased the *Sun King* and had it converted into a tuna seiner by Campbell Shipyard of San Diego. Making the decision to go through with such a financially dangerous conversion, however, was not so easy. Zuanich was warned several times by multiple people that the project would not work. Still, Zuanich was certain that large seiners could succeed, especially off the coast of Peru. As such, upon completion Zuanich sailed the *Sun King* to Coischo, Peru, where it operated from Star-Kist’s Peruvian facilities. A year later in 1958, co-author August Felando visited Peru to discuss the conversion with Zuanich and to inspect the *Sun King*. During the visit, Zuanich and another seasoned fisherman named Jack Borcich convinced Felando that fish in Peruvian waters were available to the purse-seine, and that vessels like the *Sun King* would succeed.

Zuanich’s impression on Felando was strong, as Felando returned to San Pedro to discuss with his father and others the prospect of converting the *Challenger* to a purse-seiner. Unfortunately, they were not as enthusiastic as Felando and were not persuaded to do it. Subsequently, Felando decided it was in the best interests of the many co-owners of the *Challenger* to sell the vessel to Star-Kist in the fall of 1958.

In February 1958, two successful captains of San Diego tuna clippers, Lou Brito and Joe Madruga, were discussing how live bait fishing was proving inefficient. During the conversation, Brito told Madruga that he had decided to convert his vessel, the *Southern Pacific*, into a tuna seiner. Madruga agreed that it was a good idea, and admitted that he too was interested at that time in
# California Tuna Boats

## San Pedro

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<td>Foss Launch &amp; Tugboat Co.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ubuyu Maru</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>R. Hashimoto</td>
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<tr>
<td>Venus</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>Coast Fishing Co.</td>
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<tr>
<td>West Enterprise</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>Y. Nakasuki</td>
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<tr>
<td>White Star</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>Van Camp</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heston</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>Van Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invader</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>Joe &amp; Matt Monise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lois S.</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Van Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lusitania</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>M. G. Rosa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Magellan</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>S. &amp; C. O. Co.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mayflower</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>J. O. Medina &amp; Co.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>L. Sanfilippo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigator</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>M. Freitas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwestern</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>Northwestern Tuna Co.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oceana</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Harry Madruga</td>
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<tr>
<td>Olympia</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>Matt Ghio</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peerless</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Westgate Sea Prod. Co.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Patria</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>Joe Medina</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rajo</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>V. Goularte &amp; Co.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacramento</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>M. Sousa &amp; J. Santos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Joaquin</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>Van Camp Sea Food Co.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Rafael</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>H. J. Johnson et al.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Salvador</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>M. Medina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>San Diego Pkg. Co.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Santa Margarita</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>Galapagos Fish &amp; Transport Co.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sao Joao</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>Frank Mitchell &amp; Co.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shasta</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>C. A. Landers &amp; L. Oliver</td>
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<tr>
<td>St. Therese</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>Frank Silva</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stella Di Genova</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>Fred Canepa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supreme</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>E. Van Leuen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taiyo</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>K. Sakamoto &amp; G. Imahashi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trojan</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>Ocean Industries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uncle Sam</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Anton Johansen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vasco D. Gama</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>Van Camp</td>
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<td><strong>San Diego</strong></td>
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<td>Alert</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>Ocean Industries Co.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amor De Patria</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>B. Danielson</td>
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<tr>
<td>Atlantic</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>M. O. Medina</td>
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<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>Ralph Silveira</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicken of the Sea</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>Morgan Bros.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of San Francisco</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>Cola &amp; Cresci</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conte Verde</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>J. Bregante</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defender</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>Tony &amp; M. S. Monise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Del Monte</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>D. Moore</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emma R. S.</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>Guy Silva</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enterprise</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>R. Chiba</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europa</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>M. Crivello</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flying Cloud</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>T. Abe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funchal</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>M. F. &amp; M. S. Correia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glenn Mayne</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>H. Caldwell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glory of the Seas</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>M. S. Correia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvard</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>F. Nakamura</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**California Tuna Boats Lost During 1932**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Owner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adventurer</td>
<td>A. Feland &amp; P. Bogdanovich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allfeld</td>
<td>55. Chas. Wick &amp; Van Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eagle</td>
<td>105. Southwest Food Co.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Point Loma</td>
<td>95. M. M. Perry &amp; Son</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Veronica</td>
<td>114. J. G. Cardoza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yolanda</td>
<td>50. Van Camp Sea Food Co.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pacific Fisherman Annual Statistical Number January 25, 1933.
converting his vessel, the Paramount, into a seiner. After this conversation, the race was on.

Unfortunately, Captain Madruga did not receive the reaction he must have anticipated. After giving his proposal to Star-Kist officials, who owned the vessel, the response was so negative that one member of the company told Madruga that he would “starve to death” if the Paramount was converted to a tuna seiner. Essentially, Star-Kist was not interested in financing another costly conversion of a tuna clipper in addition to the previously converted Sun King. Accordingly, Madruga decided that he could not carry out his desired conversion.71

Captain Brito, like Felando, was influenced by learning about the success of Zuanich and his two seiners in Peru, the Sun King and the Stranger. After evaluating the Southern Pacific, Zuanich assured Brito that his vessel would have equal, if not greater, success than the Sun King.72 In contrast to Madruga, the managing owner of Brito’s vessel, Joseph S. Martinac Jr.,73 and another owner, Nick Bogdanovich, gave Brito their support and approval.74

With the support of the owners, Brito completed the conversion of the Southern Pacific in 1958. His maiden voyage as captain of the new tuna seiner was a successful 30-day trip that yielded 231 tons of yellowfin tuna. After hiring new personnel in 1959 when a few of his initial employees quit, Brito had returned to San Diego with 235 tons of yellowfin.75 The enormous success achieved in such a short amount of time brought Brito instant recognition as the salvation of the San Diego tuna fleet. Following Brito’s success, 94 tuna clippers were converted into purse-seiners from 1958 to 1969.76 The estimated total cost for these conversions was $14.4 million.77 From 1961 to 2000, over 160 new tuna seiners were built in the United States or acquired from foreign citizens for entry into the U.S.-flag tuna seiner fleet at an estimated cost of over $500 million. These statistics reflect the enormous impact Captain Brito and his Southern Pacific seiner made on not only the Southern California tuna industry, but also the United States tuna industry at large.

Conclusion

During the two decades following 1959, the tuna fishermen of other major tuna fishing countries of the world, such as Japan, Spain, France, Taiwan, South Korea, Mexico, Ecuador, and Venezuela, adopted the vessel design and gear technology developed for and by American tuna seiner fishermen. From 1990 to 2000, the average annual tuna catch was about 3.4 million metric tons, a massive increase from previous decades.78 The California tuna industry and, in particular, the San Diego tuna fishermen, were instrumental in developing the fishing gear and tactics for this new class of commercial fishing vessels. By 2003, over 500 “super”
tuna seiners operated in tropical seas all over the world, solidifying the claim that the Southern California tuna industry was responsible for developing tuna fishing into an international venture.

The prediction by Dr. Tage Skogsberg in 1923 about the impact of tuna purse seiners, the warning by Ms. Geraldine Conner in 1929 about the need for regional organizations to conserve and manage the tunas, and the prediction by George Roger Chute in 1930 about the development of a worldwide tuna fleet all came to fruition during the second half of the twentieth century. In pursuing the writings of these visionaries, we have also discovered the origins of the California high-seas tuna clipper fleet.
The Origins of California’s High-Seas Tuna Fleet

NOTES

1. David K. Sabock, “The French Tuna Industry,” Commercial Fisheries Review 32, no. 3 (March 1970), 57-60, Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, United States Department of the Interior. “By 1869, the island of Croix had become the tuna center, but it wasn’t until 1891 that the first major tuna fishing campaign was organized in Concarneau.” Canning may have been introduced in the United States in 1819 when oysters and other sea foods were packed in New York. Salmon probably canned first in Aberdeen, Scotland, in 1824 and the first Pacific salmon packed at Sacramento, California in 1864 while sardines were first packed at Nantes, France, in 1834. The first successful Pacific Coast sardine cannery was established at San Pedro in 1896. “Historical Outline of the Canning of Fishery Products,” U.S. Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, Fishery Leaflet No. 78, 1; Norman D. Jarvis, “Canning Tuna,” Fishery Leaflet No. 20 (June 1943), 1.

2. The plant established in 1892 at San Pedro by a firm organized by seven individuals, including A.P. Halfhill, R.D. Wade, and J. H. Lapman. “Here Tuna Canning Began,” Pacific Fisherman (December 1953), 15. It is reported that A.P. Halfhill’s partner in the ownership and management of the San Pedro plant was “a Maine sardine canner named Spencer.” Earl Chapin May, The Canning Clan (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937), 190. “The first season (1903) the company packed 1500 cases of rock cod, 500 cases of halibut, and 700 cases of albacore…the first case (canned albacore) went on the shelves of (a store owned by H. Jevne, pioneer Los Angeles grocer)…two years later (Mr. Halfhill) found some of the original order yet on the shelves.” Mr. Halfhill died on May 7, 1924, at his home in Los Angeles, at the age of 76. “Pioneer Tuna Packer Dead,” Pacific Fisherman (June 1924), 19. At a time when sardines were scarce, a vessel operated by Japanese immigrant fishermen fishing for the California Fish Company of San Pedro arrived with a catch of 600 pounds of albacore. “The price for the fish was one and a half cent per pound. There being no demand for this fish and the catch being rather large and too good to throw away, the cannery officials decided to experiment by canning the fish.” Katsumi Yoshizumi, “Little Nippon A Japanese Island in California,” Fishermen’s Almanac (San Pedro, CA: Fishermen’s Almanac Co., 1935), 23-24.

3. “New Sea Food Given World,” Los Angeles Sunday Times, July 26, 1914, II:3. See “Fishing Is Growing Business In San Diego. Looks and Tastes Like Chicken But Isn't. Tuna Packing Bids Fair to Become Important Industry in San Diego-Two Plants in Operation—Government Asked to Make Study of Metamorphosis of the Delicate Fish,” San Diego Union, January 1, 1914, 24. The article incorrectly states that there “are only two places in the world where tunas are to be found—off the coast of Southern California and the Mediterranean.” After noting the existence of two cannery plants in San Diego, two in Long Beach, three in San Pedro and one in Monterey, the article notes: “San Diego enjoys the distinction of having the newest, largest [sic] most modern plant in the one recently completed to replace the one which was burned to the ground last July at the foot of F street.”

4. “The Pacific Tuna Canning Company, which recently erected a canning plant on the waterfront near the foot of F Street, yesterday received a carload of 120,000 specially molded cans comprising 2500 cases. When in full operations the company will can about 200 cases a day. The plant will employ about 26 hands and for the present will devote its canning operations to tuna. Later sardines will be handled. The company, of which James McKinney is superintendent, will give employment to about 25 fishing boats. Operations will be commenced about June 15.” “Fish Canning Firm Now Ready For Operation, Receives Large Consignment Of Tins For Preparing Product For Market Tuna To Be Specialty,” San Diego Union, June 4, 1911, 24. “San Diego has a fully equipped fish cannery running full blast at the foot of F street, which employs 25 girls and about ten men, besides the fishermen. So quietly was the business organized and started that only persons living in the immediate neighborhood knew of the new enterprise. The cannery has already made two shipments to Boston and other eastern points and is rapidly making contracts for all of the product that it can handle. Its capacity is 6000 one pound cans a day. Sometime ago it was announced that the Pacific Tuna Canning Company of San
Pedro would come to San Diego, but nothing more was said or heard about the company. E. E. Merritt of San Pedro is managing the concern, and with him is Paul Echus [sic], also of San Pedro. There are several other partners in the enterprise. . . . A new fishing fleet will run for the cannery, leaving port at 3 a.m. every morning and returning about noon time. Just how many boats can be used is not determined yet, as the company has made only two shipments to the eastern trade. Another 3000 pounds was prepared for shipping yesterday. “The San Diego Union, July 25, 1911, 6; “Big Catch Is Made For New Tuna Cannery—More Than 5000 Pounds Landed Yesterday; 8000 in Two Days.” The San Diego Union, July 26, 1911, 12: “One of the biggest and most successful tuna catches made off the San Diego coast was brought into the harbor yesterday for the new tuna cannery company. The catch amounted to more than 5000 pounds. Monday’s catch was 3000 pounds. A fleet of six fishing boats left the harbor this morning after tuna.” The San Diego Union, August 3, 1911, 19: “The supply of tuna for the new cannery that was started a few weeks ago continues as plentiful that the establishment has been easily able to run at full capacity. Indications are that the catch will be sufficient to supply a larger plant.”

“In 1911, Paul Echus, of San Pedro, came to San Diego and persuaded Louis J. Rice, a bank cashier, to enter the tuna cannery business. The plant was built at the foot of “F” Street. Fire destroyed the cannery in 1912 [sic]. During 1913, a new plant became operational at the foot of 26th Street.” Wiley V. Ambrose, “History of the Fish Canning Industry in San Diego County,” History of San Diego County (The San Diego Press Club, 1936), 203; Pacific Fisherman 12, no. 1 (January 1914), 77, reported that the plant “was totally destroyed by fire July 18, 1913.” See also: “$30,000 Worth of Fish Destroyed in Early Morning Fire,” The San Diego Union, July 18, 1913: “Apparently ignited by an explosion of gasoline or some other oils in storage there, caused by defective wires, the warehouses of the American Union Fish Company, at the foot of F street, and the Pacific Tuna Canning Company, at the foot of E street, were practically destroyed by fire about 1:30 o’clock this morning... It was a two-story warehouse, well packed with canned fish.”

5. For photos of the new plant and information that the cannery plans to have a “fleet of eight to ten fishing boats manned by Japanese and Portuguese fishermen (to) supply the fish.” “A Model Pacific Tuna Cannery,” Pacific Fisherman (January 1914), 77-79.

6. N.B. Scofield (fishery expert), “The Tuna Canning Industry of Southern California,” State of California Fish and Game Commission, 23rd Biennial Report 1912-1914 (1914), 122. Based upon information provided to him in 1914 by two Japanese professors who had made fishery investigations off Lower (Baja) California during the previous two years, Mr. Scofield expressed faulty opinions about the migratory patterns and spawning habits of albacore off the coast of Mexico. He thought that albacore spawned off Baja California, near Cape San Lucas.

7. For example, in 1918, he organized the Mexican Industrial Development Company of California to participate in the growing canned tuna fisheries of Japan and California. By early 1920, his firm worked with Mexican government officials to permit skilled Japanese tuna fishermen establish tuna fishing, processing, and transshipment operations in Turtle Bay. Shortly, thereafter, Mr. Kondo worked with a Japanese shipping firm and two California tuna canneries in establishing tuna fishing and transshipment operations located at Cape San Lucas, Baja California. Don Estes, “Kondo Masaharu And the Best of All Fishermen,” The Journal of San Diego History 23, no. 3 (Summer 1977): 1-19. Mr. Estes lists 13 locations on the Pacific coast of Baja California that were used in Mr. Kondo’s fishing operations. “There is no question that Kondo Masaharu is the man recognized as being the first to understand the fishery potential of Baja California, and then to do something about it. It was his early success and initiative which induced Japanese capital to invest in the future of Baja California. This same early success was also in part responsible for drawing increasingly larger numbers of Japanese into the fishing fleets of San Diego and San Pedro.” Ibid, 17.

8. “In connection with the rumored mis-impression that the canners were utilizing the Leaping (Bluefin) and Yellowfin tuna as well as the Long Fin (Albacore) the packers point out that the meat of these latter fish in no way resembles that of the former. They state that it would be impossible to successfully substitute one for the other and that to introduce a number of grades of a new product simultaneously would result only in unprofitable confusion and suspicion among the
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buyers. Another potent reason is that they have no desire to antagonize the game fishing element of the state which is well organized and powerful in legislative matters.” Russell Palmer, “California Tuna Canning Industry,” Pacific Fisherman Yearbook, (January 1915), 76-77 (emphasis added). “The Thunnus thunnus (Bluefin or Leaping Tuna) is the larger of the two, weighing from 40 to 100 pounds and more in local waters and as high as 600 and 700 pounds in the Mediterranean. It is this variety which is commonly known as the tuna and which furnishes so much sport to the enthusiastic fishermen. The thunnus albiros, usually called the albacore, weighs from 15 to 75 pounds and it, too, is a game fish. It is this variety that is used in the canning industry because its flesh is not so coarse and the meat is so white that it closely resembles the breast of chicken…The regular tuna (Bluefin) is so large that the grain of the fish is too coarse for use and what is worse is the fact that the flesh retains so much of the blood that the meat is dark when cooked.” “Looks and Tastes Like Chicken But Isn’t,” San Diego Union, January 1, 1914, 24

10. A convention was held in San Francisco during January 1914, by the California Tuna Packers Association. As a “memorial to Congress,” the canners adopted a resolution asking for an appropriation “for a thorough scientific study of the habits and early environments of the fish (Albacore).” “Canned Tuna,” Pacific Fisherman (February 1914), 17. “The winter habitat of the tuna, or albacore, is as yet an unknown quantity…Mr. Barnhart was left on dry land until the Associated tuna packers came to his rescue, assigning themselves for $100 per month with which a boat was secured…but was unable to do much except tag some thousands of them and ask fishermen to report.” “Tuna Problems Still Unsolved,” Pacific Fisherman (January 1915), 21. For a reference to a letter by the Bureau explaining why Congress did not appropriate funds ($5,000) for the Albatross to conduct at-sea tuna surveys, see “Tuna Problems and the U.S. Bureau of Fisheries,” Pacific Fisherman (February 1915), 25.
11. “Canned Tuna,” Pacific Fisherman (January, 1913), 86. For articles concerning the fish brokers who introduced canned tuna to the trade: “Popularizing Canned Tuna,” Pacific Fisherman (September 1912), 27; “Tuna Notes,” Pacific Fisherman (August 1913), 32; “Miscellaneous Canned Fish Notes,” Pacific Fisherman (September 1913), 66; Pacific Fisherman (October 1913), 24, and “Canned Tuna A Success” Pacific Fisherman (July 1912), 21. For articles about food broker C. E. Pierce of San Francisco, who was recognized as “one of the most active and progressive factors in the upbuilding of the canned fish industry…it was largely through his publicity methods and energetic work that the canned tuna industry attained its present prominence.” “Noted Tuna Man Passes Away,” Pacific Fisherman (August 1915), 20. See also: “The Tunny Man,” Pacific Fisherman (March 1914), 20, and “Canned Fish Notes,” Pacific Fisherman (October 1913), 24.
14. By 1911, the fresh fish market industry in San Diego was “one of the most important.” An article reported that during 1910, San Diego’s Fish Industry had produced more than 4.6 million pounds of fresh food, fish, salt fish, picked fish, lobsters, and turtles, valued at $225, 216. “San Diego Supplies States in Entire Southwest with Fish,” San Diego Union, January 2, 1911. “The fishing fleet, whose anchorage is off the foot of A, B, C, D, E and F streets, is composed of about thirty boats, all owned by fishermen, who sell direct to the wholesalers, of which there are four
concerns—the National, San Diego, Union, and American Fish companies.” “Fresh food fish are marketed in huge quantities in San Diego...Nevada, Arizona, and New Mexico are supplied to a great extent from San Diego. The average daily export the past year was about ten tons...San Diego is also the distributing point for fish caught off the coasts of Lower California and Mexico...Not only is the fishing for market gaining in importance, but rod and reel sport is attracting additional thousands every year to San Diego, which sportsmen recognize as a wonderful fishing ground.” “Fisheries Enjoy Prosperous Year,” San Diego Union, January 1, 1912. For accounts of the fresh fish market trade in San Diego during the early years, see: Lawrence Oliver, Never Backward: The Autobiography of Lawrence Oliver, A Portuguese-American, ed. Rita Larkin Wolin (San Diego: Neyenesch Printers Inc., 1972).

15. Yamashita, Terminal Island Ethnography, 82. “The seed of “Little Nippon” was first planted around the year 1906, when three young men—Hayashi, Tanaka, and Yama, established themselves at Point Fermin [near San Pedro] and engaged in the modest enterprise of abalone diving and drying. Those men were the first Japanese to be seen in and about San Pedro. The enterprise did not fair so well but during the next few years, we find the added faces of Messrs. J. Suzuhi, Tatsumi, T. Hişashi, Iskigaki, and several others.” Yoshizumi, “Little Nippon: A Japanese Island in California,” 23-24. For information about Japanese immigrant activities in the San Pedro area, see: Oliver Vickery, Harbor Heritage: Tales of the Harbor Area of Los Angeles, California (Mountain View, CA: Morgan Press/Farag Associates, 1979), 145-146.

16. “Number Fishermen at San Pedro,” Pacific Fisherman (February 1914), 20. During 1906, my grandfather Augustine Felando and two of his sons traveled from the island of Vis, Province of Dalmatia, country of Austria, to San Diego via Ellis Island, New York. (Prior to the end of World War I, the Austro-Hungarian Empire occupied much of central Europe and the Balkans, and people from there were frequently called “Austrians.”) His oldest son had previously emigrated and was working as a fisherman in San Diego. For unknown reasons, my grandfather and his three sons, Joseph, George, and Tony, moved to San Pedro. My father, August, his mother, and two sisters came to San Pedro in November 1906, when he was seven years old. During 1907, my grandfather acquired a gasoline-powered fishing vessel and named it the Oceana, because this was the name of the ship that brought him to America. He later acquired two other vessels for operation by his sons George and Tony, the Annie, named after my paternal grandmother, and the Nightingale. My father told me that as a young boy he helped the family by going fishing with his father and that, on arrival in port, many times he had to rush to elementary school without changing his fishy-smelling work clothes. In recalling his fishing with his father on Tanner Bank, southwest of San Clemente Island, California, he described with a drawing how they would catch rock cod for the fresh fish market trade with baited hooks attached to a line secured to a float. He also told me how he and his father would catch albacore with a gill net, and of the disputes his father had in price and weight dealings with canny employees.

17. “Japanese Tuna Cannery Had Successful Season,” Pacific Fisherman (December 1914), 22. The success of the North American Tuna Packing Company during 1915 was attributed to “the fact that the company virtually owns its own boats and that the men who operate them are among the most skilled in the business. While the firm is composed of Japanese, the women employed are all Americans, dressed in white uniforms, and the sanitary conditions in the plant are among the very best.” “Japanese Cannery Meeting With Success,” Pacific Fisherman (August 1915), 19.

18. For an excellent descriptions of the Japanese communities in the San Pedro area, particularly of East San Pedro and Fish Harbor, see: Kanshi Stanley Yamashita, Terminal Island: Ethnography of an Ethnic Community, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California Irvine, 1985, p. 71. At its peak, the total Japanese population living in the San Pedro area was close to 3,000. Based upon the issuance of California commercial fishing licenses in the San Pedro area during 1931-1932, of total 1,842 licensed fishermen, the Japanese share was 603, Americans 459, Yugoslavs or Dalmatians or Austrians, 363, Italians 134, and 23 Portuguese.

20. “There is hardly ever a time when tuna cannot be found in the channel during the season and favorable weather but much of the time they will not take the hook or bait cannot be secured. The tuna must be ravenously hungry to take dead sardines off a hook. Often that is the very time when the fishermen cannot get bait. At the other times when bait is plenty there is also plenty of feed for the fish and they will eat nothing but live fish. It is more aggravating to the fishermen to throw out live sardines and see the tuna chase them and then when they are put on the hook to have the big fish show a most exasperating contempt for the bait. With the nets it is proposed to use live bait to get the fish to the surface and then surround them drawing in the purse when the net is full. By this method it is believed that the problem of fish shortage which has compelled canneries to run only a part of the time this summer will be solved and that next season there will be plenty of fish to keep them running continuously.” “Will Try Out New Tuna Net Next Week-Purse Net 400 X 35 Fathoms Arrives and is Being Made Ready,” San Pedro Daily Pilot, October 17, 1914, front page. Gilbert C. Van Camp, President of Van Camp Sea Food Company, Inc., recalled that the Albacore purse seine experiment” was conducted in the darkest secrecy. The reason: fishermen feared that if the company developed a workable system for seining tuna, all the fish would soon be taken from the sea. So the huge net was assembled on the roof of the Van Camp plant and guarded day and night to prevent the fishermen from destroying it. San Pedro News Pilot, September 21, 1951.

21. “I have learned that tuna weighing 250 pounds are caught in Japan and the Mediterranean Sea by nets and I am going to get the nets to catch them here,” said Mr. Van Camp, “A friend of mine in the Pathe service recently learned that I was in the business here and wrote me that they had a film showing the tuna industry in the Mediterranean from the fish in the nets to the cans...he will send this film as soon as he can get it to Paris, so we shall see how it is done.” “Successful Tuna Catch With Nets-Fisherman Says They Can Be Caught Easily With Strong Enough Net-Van Camp Wires For Heavy Netting-Hopes to Demonstrate That Nets Can Be Used Here Successfully,” San Pedro Daily Pilot, September 29, 1914, front page.


25. For the 1915 albacore season, it was estimated that 85 to 90 regular Japanese boats would be engaged, plus an additional 50 fresh fish boats. It was expected that about 75 vessels would be coming from Northern California, and that some of these vessels would use purse-seine gear. Further, it was estimated that 7 vessels operated by local Austrian fishermen would also use purse-seine gear to catch albacore. It was also reported that about 50 new vessels have been built in Los Angeles Harbor since the winter of 1914. “Tuna Fishing Fleet,” Pacific Fisherman (May 1915), 24. Purse-seine catches of yellowtail, barracuda, and sea bass, but no tuna, by Austrian fishermen were reported during the 1915 season. “Big Increase in Tuna Fleet,” Pacific Fisherman (June 1915), 25, and “Purse Seining For Tuna,” Pacific Fisherman (July 1915), 29.


27. “Meeting of California Tuna Packers Association,” Pacific Fisherman (February 1914), 17. “Tuna Problems and the U.S. Bureau of Fisheries,” Pacific Fisherman (February 1915), 25. “Through the efforts of Mr. Halfhill, the U.S. Bureau of Fisheries steamer Albatross will visit here in July and the habits of the tuna will be carefully studied and as much as possible learned as to its habitat during the dull season. The theory prevails that this fish seeks the warmer waters of the Gulf of California during the winter season, as they can nearly always be found there in large quantities.” Pacific Fisherman (May 1914), 24; “Seeking Habitat of Tuna,” Pacific Fisherman (September 1914), 29; “Tuna Disappear,” Pacific Fisherman (October 1914), 24. Investigators noted that “they (Albacore) rarely stay in water colder than 62 degrees Fahrenheit. They also believe that the schools extend clear across the Pacific.” “Scientists Studying the Tuna,” Pacific Fisherman (December 1914), 22.
28. “What the Albatross Found Out About Tuna; Albatross reports on Movements of Albacore,” Pacific Fisherman (November 1916), 16. “Tuna Research Work to Be Continued,” Pacific Fisherman (December 1916), 17. While the Albatross was off the coast of Baja California, N.B. Scofield of the California Department of Fish and Game reported that bluefin or “leaping tuna” and albacore, along with swordfish and barracuda, were found “in considerable quantities” off the coast between Monterey and San Francisco. “Tuna Off San Francisco,” Pacific Fisherman (June 1916), 31. In his 1914 report to the California Fish and Game Commission, Mr. Scofield reported: “As far as we know the albacore does not run in numbers north of the Santa Barbara Islands. Occasional individuals are taken far north of that point. One is recorded 250 miles north of San Francisco, taken on a “jig” made of a hook and seagull feathers, late in the fall of the year, by returning Alaska salmon fishermen.” Ibid., 114.

29. “Tuna Popular in England,” Pacific Fisherman (April 1918), 56. “The sardine industry in California is, as it now exists, essentially a product of the great war...With the practical cessation of sardine imports into the United States in 1915, and the later great foreign demand, the pack of California sardines rose to great heights. Now with the coming of peace and the gradual return to normal conditions still so far removed, it remains to be seen how our new industry will meet competition.” Will F. Thompson, “Historical Review of California Sardine Industry,” California Fish and Game 7, no. 4 (October 1921), 195-206.

30. For the 1919 season, canners insisted upon lower prices to the fishermen for tuna other than albacore, bluefin, skipjack, and yellowfin. They explained that the new canned product made from these other tunas could not be labeled as albacore or “white meat”; therefore, they argued that these new canned tuna products had to be sold to wholesalers for a lower case price than albacore. The canners were offering $110 per ton for albacore, and $90 per ton for the other tunas. “Uncertain Outlook For Tuna,” Pacific Fisherman (June 1919), 46; “Agreement Reached On Tuna Prices,” Pacific Fisherman (July 1919), 67; “Tuna Price Question Difficult,” Pacific Fisherman (June 1920), 63.

31. “Van Camp Packs Blue Fin Tuna,” Pacific Fisherman (October 1917), 40. It was reported that the catch was valued at $6,000, and that the canner had taken most of the catch at a price of $80 per ton. A report stated, “about 600,000 pounds of Bluefin was landed by purse seiners in 1917.” This report also stated that, prior to 1915, there was no large scale purse seining of fish, and that purse seining during the 1915-17 period was primarily on schools of barracuda, white sea bass, yellowtail, and mackerel, with some experimentation on tuna schools. Further, it states that after the success of fishing for bluefin in 1917, eight purse seiners were built in 1918 for operations from San Pedro, and that about 6,240,971 pounds of tuna was landed by this fleet. In 1919, it states that more purse seiners arrived from the Northwest and that about 17 seiners were built in the Los Angeles area and one in San Diego. During the summer season, the purse-seine fleet landed about 14,990,860 pounds of bluefin. Tage Skogsberg, “Preliminary Investigation of the Purse Seine Industry of Southern California,” Fish Bulletin No. 9, State of California Fish and Game Commission (1925), 9.

32. Pacific Fisherman (September 1918).

33. “Season A Failure, Says Buerkle,” Pacific Fisherman (October 1922), 47.

34. “Tuna Catch Short,” Pacific Fisherman (September 1922), 44. See also: “Tuna Season Disappointing,” Pacific Fisherman (October 1922), 44. Japanese fishermen claimed that their poor fishing season was caused by U.S. Navy battleships conducting target practice with their 14- and 16-inch guns off San Pedro. They also complained that their bait boat operations were adversely affected by the fishing tactics of the Monterey Bay fleet of “jig fishermen or trollers” in that this type of fishing scattered the schools of albacore. “Move Target Practice Off Shore,” Pacific Fisherman (December 1922), 54, 58; “Trollers Go After Tuna,” Pacific Fisherman (August 1922), 32. A combination of high albacore prices guaranteed by a tuna canner and the poor salmon run off Monterey caused a fleet of about 75 trollers from the Monterey Bay area to compete with the “Japanese Monopoly” off Southern California.
The Origins of California’s High-Seas Tuna Fleet

35. For information on the other mergers and acquisitions of tuna firms during 1922, see: “San Diego Canneries Consolidate,” Pacific Fisherman (July 1922), 34. Included in this merger was the plant and assets of Sun Harbor Packing Corporation under the name of the Normandy Sea Food Company. The San Diego plant and business of Steele Packing Company was purchased. “Steel [sic] Packing Plant Sold,” Pacific Fisherman (September 1922), 44. The Southern California Fish Company of Terminal Island was acquired by the newly-organized firm “Southern California Fish Corporation of Los Angeles.” “Southern Calif. Co. Reorganized,” Pacific Fisherman (October 1922), 44. The West Coast Sea Food Company of Los Angeles was organized to take over the assets of the West Coast Fish Company of San Pedro. “Buys West Coast Plant,” Pacific Fisherman (May 1922), 40. “Consolidation of Tuna Packing Interests,” Pacific Fisherman (July 1922), 14. The four firms merged were: Van Camp Sea Food Company, International Packing Corporation, Nielsen & Kittle Canning Co., Ltd., and White Star Canning Company. Frank Van Camp was elected President by the eleven members of the new Board of Directors.

36. Ibid.

37. The following comment by W.L. Scofield in 1936 is relevant in understanding the early commercial fishing policy of the State of California: “The fish catch depends upon large numbers of people to eat the fish. The western half of the United States is not densely populated so that no great quantity of sea food can be sold in fresh fish markets, nor can the marine products be frozen or salted for shipment in great quantities. The great centers of population are far away so that both time and distance intervene between the source of the fish supply and the ultimate consumer. This is the reason why we have adopted canning of fish as a solution to the problem of shipping sea foods to distant markets. Canning, then, is the key to an understanding of the fish catch of this state and as canning goes, so goes the catch.” California Department of Fish and Game, Fish Bulletin 49 (1936), 9 (emphasis added).


39. “A shortage in the supply of fresh water available along the coast of Lower [Baja] California has resulted in the abandonment of plans for the building of two large fishing canning establishments along the Mexican coast... The party visited Ensenada, Turtle Bay, Cedros Islands, and other places seeking possible sites for canneries. Harbors were found to be unprotected and the only water obtainable had to be carried on pack mules from inland,” “Mexican Plan Abandoned,” Pacific Fisherman (January 1920), 65. Don Estes, “Kondo Masaharu And The Best Of All Fishermen,” Journal of San Diego History 23, no. 3 (Summer 1977): 3-19. The author describes the fishermen’s 35-day trip from Japan to Ensenada, Mexico, and the failure experienced by the fishermen in using long-line gear to catch tuna because of shark interference.

40. Following his service in the U.S. Army during 1917-1919, Manuel O. Medina (M.O.) returned to San Diego and his profession of commercial fishing. During the summer of 1919, M.O. recalled that a Mr. Steele, a co-owner of the Steele Packing Company, offered him a fishing opportunity that “he could not refuse.” He and his crew of four left aboard the 44.8-foot Pacific on August 15; they returned two weeks later with a catch of 11 tons of yellowfin from waters off San Benito Island, Baja California. He made three more tuna fishing trips for Mr. Steele during the remaining months of 1919. “An Industry Portrait: Audacious M.O. Medina Pioneered Big Clippers, Parlayed His Hunches Into Successful Tuna Career,” The Magazine Tuna Fisherman 1, no. 3, (1947), 17-18. 22. Joe McCain, “Medina Found Sea Worthy,” San Diego Evening Tribune, April 16, 1968, B-1, B-3. In 1920, “M.O.” operated a larger vessel, the 60-foot Peerless, and on its maiden voyage of 14 days, a catch of 32 tons of yellowfin was landed in San Diego. The trip was successful primarily because M.O. and crew used a new type of barbless hook developed
in Japan. The latter described the hook’s effectiveness as “beautiful.” The hooks or “squids” were obtained by Joe Rogers, Chief Engineer, reportedly without permission, from Japanese fishermen operating in San Diego. Don Estes reported that Taniguchi Takezo of San Diego is “generally credited with the introduction in 1920 of a Japanese-produced lure known as a squid.” Estes “Kondo Masaharu and The Best Of All Fishermen,” 17. M.O. became convinced that he needed a new, larger, and faster fishing vessel. He reasoned that with a larger vessel, he could fish tuna grounds located further south, believing that Yellowfin tuna were more abundant in tropical waters. For more background information on M.O., see August Felando, “The Fishing Industry in San Diego From 1800 to the Present, An Overview,” They Came From the Sea, A Maritime History of San Diego, Seventh Annual Cabrillo Festival Historic Seminar, 1, no. 7, (1979), 34-37; M.O. Medina, interviewed by author, September 1979.

41. “Follow Yellowfin Southward,” Pacific Fisherman (December 1922), 52.
44. In January 1924, the long-awaited report on the albacore fishery from Will F. Thompson, fishery expert of the California Fish and Game Commission, was made public. He stated that it was not yet possible to make judgments on the question regarding the “presence or absence of overfishing for the albacore.” The report did not contain hints or predictions about the 1924 albacore season. Mr. Thompson called for the collection of more data, and hoped that there would be “available the unhampered use of a sea-going vessel to follow up the present investigations.” Finally, he noted that “the albacore problem has come to take second place in the program of the State Fisheries Laboratory to that of the sardine,” and that there presently exists a “very serious question as to its permanence.” W. F. Thompson, “Investigation of Albacore Fishery,” Pacific Fisherman (January 1924), 10-11.
45. “New Diesel-Powered Tuna Boat,” Pacific Fisherman (July 1924), 34. The article includes a photograph of the Oceana.
46. “Yellowfin Operations Curtailed,” Pacific Fisherman (April 1924), 33. Curtis Corporation of Long Beach explained why this tuna canner purchased the steamer Bergen to take tuna on the high seas from other vessels off Mexico, stating in part: “Levying of export taxes on fish taken outside the three-mile limit by Mexican officials will, of course, be illegal, and it is proposed at least to give the project a trial…The tender Angel has been leased by the corporation to work in conjunction with the Bergen.” No report on this proposed venture was published by Pacific Fisherman.
47. To view a photo of the Lusitania underway, see: “An Interesting Tuna Boat,” Pacific Fisherman (April 1927), 39. This article provides information on the maritime experience of Captain Manuel G. Rosa that explains, in part, why Captain Rosa became a legendary success as a tuna captain.
49. Geraldine Conner, “Comparison of the Catches North and South of the International Boundary,” Division of Fish and Game of California, Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, Fish Bulletin no. 15 (1929), 51. Information on the decline in albacore and bluefin catches during 1926-1927, see Figure 48, 53-54, 59. Part of this increase in tropical tuna catches during the fall months of 1927 was attributed to the return of Puget Sound purse seiners to the California tuna fisheries. “Largest Alaska Herring Seiner Goes South for Tuna Fishing,” Pacific Fisherman (November 1927), 8-9; “California Tuna and Sardine Boat Built on Puget Sound,” Pacific Fisherman (December 1927), 31-32; “More Seiners Go South,” Pacific Fisherman (December 1927), 32; “Interesting Diesel Installation in New Tuna Boat,” Pacific Fisherman (January 1928), 18-19; “Alaska Seiners Go South,” Pacific Fisherman (November 1928), 39. For a photo of a powered three-masted schooner, Golden Gate, under charter during 1927 for Captain Heston’s operation in the transport of tropical tunas
to California canners, see: “Codfish Schooner in Tuna Trade,” *Pacific Fisherman* (July 1927), 40. For information about the use of small purse seiners in the Heston operation, see: “New Developments in Tuna Fishery,” *Pacific Fisherman* (January 1928), 32; “Mexican Tuna Season Over,” *Pacific Fisherman* (June 1928), 38.


54. In August 1927, the San Diego-based tuna clipper *Del Monte* was rammed and shot at in waters near San Benito Island by a Mexican patrol vessel, believed to be the former California tuna canner tender *Curtisso*. “Mexicans Fire on American Fishing Boat,” *Pacific Fisherman* (September 1927), 20. The San Diego tuna bait boat *Amor da Patria* and the tuna canner tender *Superior* were seized, the fish confiscated, and fines collected before release of the crews and vessels. Lawrence Oliver, the managing owner of the *Amor da Patria*, reported that the vessel was anchored when seized, that it never fished within Mexican waters, and that after a detention of three months, he paid a fine of $3,500 for the vessel’s release. Oliver, *Never Backward*, 99-100.


56. In San Diego, captains who were successful in operating smaller tuna clippers moved quickly to invest in the building of larger ones. For example, Captain Manuel Freitas left the *Del Monte* of 103 gross tons for ownership of the *Navigator* of 175 gross tons. Captain Joe Monise sold the *Olympia* of 101 gross tons for the *Mariner* of 175 gross tons and then later for the *Invader* of 196
Prior to World War II, only one vessel, the “revolutionary” welded steel hull 110.1-foot trumpet, left the “Luisa” of 44 gross tons for the Emma R. S. of 148 gross tons. Captain Manuel M. Perry left the De Lite of 14 gross tons for the Point Loma of 133 gross tons. Captain Manuel Correia left the Supreme of 27 gross tons for the Glory of the Seas of 239 gross tons. Captain Frank Silva left the Uncle Sam of 40 gross tons for the St. Therese of 164 gross tons. Captain Mariano Crivello left the Oceana of 29 gross tons to the G. Marconi of 106 gross tons. Captain Guy Silva left the Lois S. of 44 gross tons for the Emma R. S. of 148 gross tons.


59. During 2009, the Director of the IATTC has regularly sent copies of his reports to the Commissioners to the following countries: Belize, Canada, China, Cook Islands, European Union, Chinese Taipei, and Kiribati.


61. Pacific Fisherman (July 1929), 37.

62. California DFG Fish Bulletin No. 81, 54.

63. Prior to World War II, only one vessel, the “revolutionary” welded steel hull 110.1-foot Paramount (O/N 236731), entered the U.S. tuna fleet as a year-around tuna purse seiner to compete with tuna clippers. It was built by French Sardine Co., Captain Bernard Carr, Chief Engineer Frank Mosich and other Associates of San Pedro. Pacific Fisherman (March 1937), 26; Pacific Fisherman (May 1937), 14; Pacific Fisherman (November 1937), 38-42 (photographs); Pacific Fisherman (January 1938), 15; Pacific Fisherman (June 1938), 32; Pacific Fisherman Annual Statistical Number (January 25, 1938), 173, 181-182. It was later converted by new owners in 1940 to a tuna clipper. In January 1937, plans were announced by San Pedro fisherman Nick Dragich to build a 157-foot twin-screw tuna purse seiner. Pacific Fisherman (January 1937), 19. Captain Dragich dropped these plans and converted a former 156-foot Navy tug built in 1919 as a tuna purse seiner, the 148.3-foot Falcon O/N (239057). Pacific Fisherman (October 1939), 59; Pacific Fisherman Annual Statistical Number (January 25, 1942), 201. In 1942, the new owner of the Falcon converted the seiner to a tuna clipper. Pacific Fisherman (September 1940), 17; Pacific Fisherman (February 1942), 17. Both of these vessels were lost in military service during World War II. On the loss of the Paramount (Y/P-USN-289), see: Pacific Fisherman (November 1945), 73. The Falcon (Y/P 515-USN) was destroyed on April 10, 1946. Prior to World War II, seven vessels were built as “combination tuna clippers and seiners. Four of these fished primarily as regular seiners and the others fished primarily as tuna clippers. Six vessels built as purse seiners prior to or during World War II were converted to tuna clippers during the 1943-46 period. Three purse seiners built after World War II and before 1960 were converted to tuna clippers. The 91.8-foot California (O/N 252332), a vessel built as a combination clipper/trawler/seiner for the Pacific Exploration Co., was converted in 1950 from a tuna clipper to a purse seiner for the California sardine, mackerel, and tuna fisheries. Pacific Fisherman (July 1949), 1; Pacific Fisherman (October 1949), 39.

64. Pacific Fisherman (May 1948), 30; Pacific Fisherman (February 1949), 29; Pacific Fisherman (November 1949), 35. All other USN-YP vessels built by the US Navy during World War II and sold by public auction were converted to tuna clippers. The Yankee Mariner under the command of managing owner Jack Kasoroff, was lost at sea off Point Arguello, California, on October 19, 1949. Merchant Vessels of the United States, 1951, 149.


1955, working models were used aboard the 73.5-foot Star of San Pedro (O/N 233869; Captain Nick Trutanich), Anthony M. (Captain Anton Misetich), and Courageous (Captain Andrew Kuljis). During 1955, the Puretic power block was successfully introduced to salmon purse-seine fleets of Washington and Alaska. Mary Ann Petrich and Barbara Roje, The Yugoslav in Washington State: Among the Early Settlers (Tacoma, WA: Washington State Historical Society, 1984).

67. Captain Anton Misetich “highlights the fact that the lightness of the net and its quick handling by the power block make even a skunk set pardonable, since the time of hauling in the net is cut in more-than-half, giving the crew time to find a more productive fishing ground” (emphasis added). Pacific Fisherman (April 1956), 40.

68. Pacific Fisherman (June 1957), 16. Photographs of the Sun King as tuna clipper can be found in, Pacific Fisherman (September 1947), 61, and as a converted tuna seiner, cover of Pacific Fisherman (June 1959), 20.

69. Initially, Larry Zuanich fished the regular seiner Stranger from San Pedro. During 1954-55, he temporarily fished from Panama and Costa Rica, making numerous deliveries to a Costa Rican cannery and to freezer ships for transshipment to U.S. canners. During 1955-56, Larry and the owners of 14 San Pedro regular tuna seiners became involved in a major jurisdictional dispute between two unions representing commercial tuna fishermen, the Fisherman’s Union, Local 33, ILWU, and the Seine and Line Fishermen’s Union, SIUNA-AFL. Pacific Fisherman (March 1956), 29. This labor dispute was a factor in the decision of Larry to operate the Stranger for Star-Kist from Coiscoho, Peru, rather than from San Pedro. In March 1956, prior to its departure to Peru, the Stranger was equipped with a Puretic power block, but its net was made of cotton, rather than nylon.

70. In 1953, Star-Kist Foods initiated a 5-month exploratory trip off the Pacific coast of South America, using the 78.7-foot regular seiner Fearless (O/N 234372), renamed Starkist. A result of this trip was an investment in vessels and shore facilities in Chile, including the conversion of the Starkist to a tuna clipper. Pacific Fisherman (April 1954), 18; Pacific Fisherman (May 1954): 1. The regular seiners Oakland, Excellent (O/N 228250, 68.1 foot), and Virginia II (O/N 236468, 72.2 foot) were sent to Chile. Pacific Fisherman (June 1954), 14, 18; Pacific Fisherman (July 1954), 30, 43; Pacific Fisherman (July 1955), 36. In early 1957, Star-Kist closed its operations in Chile Pacific Fisherman (June 1957), 7. For a description of the Star-Kist operations at Coiscoho, Peru, which included a 2000-ton capacity freezer, see Pacific Fisherman-The Fisheries of Peru (November 1957), 77. The authors of this special issue did not anticipate the future operations of tuna seiners like the Sun King. A subsidiary of San Diego’s Westgate-California, Frigorifico Paita, S.A., operated a 1500-ton capacity freezing facility in Paita, Peru, dedicated primarily to freezing whole tuna and tuna loins for transshipment to the United States. Its supply of tuna came mainly from tuna clippers. Pacific Fisherman-The Fisheries of Peru (November 1957), 91-92.

71. In early 1959, Captain Anton Misetich purchased an ownership interest in the Paramount, and Captain Joe Madruga purchased an ownership interest in the Saratoga (O/N 261638). Both captains commenced the maiden voyages of these two converted tuna seiners in July 1959.


74. Co-author Fernald first met Captain Lou Brito in 1957 during a visit to Nick Bogdanovich’s home in San Pedro. At the time, Nick was a co-owner of the tuna clippers Challenger and Southern Pacific, and the general manager of Star-Kist Plant 4, Terminal Island. Nick introduced Lou to me as one of the best young captains in the tuna fleet. Nick was familiar with the recently established Star-Kist operations in Peru and was very informed on the successful operation of the Anthony M. and other regular tuna seiners since their installations of the combination nylon net/power block in 1956 and 1957. Whenever the Southern Pacific delivered its catch in 1957 to Star-Kist at Plant 4, Nick urged Captain Brito to consider converting the Southern Pacific. During the mid-1950s, Captain Brito operated vessels built and managed by the Martinac family. Joseph M. Martinac, founder of J.M. Martinac Shipbuilding Corporation, Tacoma, Washington, treated Lou
Brito as a son. Mrs. Lou Brito, interviewed by author, July 7, 2003. Lou Brito’s life was tragically cut short in 1983, when he was only 61 years old. For information on the Martinac shipyard, see: “J.M. Martinac Celebrates 75 years,” Pacific Maritime Magazine (September 1999), M1-M8.

75. Yoshio Iwanmae, interviewed by author, August 27, 2003. Yosh explained that initially he thought that Pete Lipanovich and his fellow crewmembers had quit because the trip’s share was less than experienced when fishing aboard the regular seiner Marsha Ann ($12 per ton versus $9 per ton). During a later conversation, Pete Lipanovich told Yosh that his original intention had been to make the maiden trip his only trip aboard the Southern Pacific. The crewmembers hired by Yosh included Joe Villicich (mastman) and Roy Katnich.

76. On January 1, 1960, there were 132 tuna clippers, 15 converted tuna seiners, and 42 regular seiners afloat, with a total fish-carrying capacity of 36,414 tons. Prior to that date, no surplus military hulls had been converted to tuna seiners and no tuna seiners built.

77. The average estimated conversion cost for each of the 96 tuna clippers was about $150,000. During 1961, the first newly-constructed tuna seiner, the 130.7-foot Royal Pacific (O/N 286263), was built at J.M. Martinac Shipbuilding Corporation, Tacoma, Washington. Its maiden voyage commenced on September 6, 1961, with co-owner Lou Brito in command. During 1961-69, 34 new tuna seiners departed on their maiden fishing trips. In 1957, there were 57 regular seiners with a total frozen tuna-carrying capacity of 7,125 tons. By 1968, this fleet was reduced to nine seiners with a total fish-carrying capacity of 1,385 tons. Keilman and Allen, California Fisheries, 1969 (Division of Statistics and Market News, Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Department of the Interior), iv. This reduction was caused largely by competition from converted and newly-built U.S.-flag tuna seiners.


79. Dr. Skogsberg noted that the development of California ocean fisheries would follow the European model, that is, a future dependent on developing distant fishing grounds. Therefore, a need for “vessels, large, speedy, and economical enough to operate with profit as far away as the Gulf of California, and along the west coast of Central America,” in “Preliminary Investigation of the Purse Seine Industry of Southern California,” Fish Bulletin No. 9, State of California Fish and Game Commission (1925), 9.

Tuna: San Diego’s Famous Fishing Industry

Compiled by
Amy Brandt, Karen Dooley, Matthew Schiff, and Iris Engstrand

In this pictorial essay, we honor both the tuna fish and those of the tuna industry whose history goes back to ancient times. Tuna have been important in the life of man from the beginning of recorded history—and probably even before. The earliest peoples of the Mediterranean harvested bluefin tuna from the Strait of Gibraltar in the West to the Black Sea in the East. Ancient scholars, delighted with the taste and abundance of tuna, wrote about tuna in poetry and plays, drew pictures of tuna on pottery and coins, and inscribed images of tuna into niches and over doorways.

Two areas well known for tuna fishing were the ancient Phoenician city of Gades—today’s Cádiz on the Atlantic coast of southern Spain—and the city-state of Cyzicus on the Sea of Marmara, which featured the tuna fish on its highly circulated coins. Aristotle in the fourth century BCE wrote about “tunnies” and other fish moving in and out of the Black Sea. One of the earliest accounts of the exotic flavor of tuna comes from the poet Hipponax of Ephesus [Turkey] in the sixth century BCE who wrote a poem about a man who spent his life dining every day on tuna and spicy cheesecake.

The journal of Antonio Pigafetta, the Italian diarist on the Pacific voyage of Ferdinand Magellan (Fernando Magallanes), a Portuguese navigator sailing under the flag of Spain, wrote in his diary in December 1520 that:

There are, three sorts of fish in this ocean a cubit or more in length, which are named Dorades [mahi mahi or dolphin], Albacores and

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Child posing with tuna catch at Westgate Cannery. Sensor ©SDHC #6-119.
Bonita. These follow and hunt another kind of fish that flies and which we call Colondriny [sea swallows—from Golondrina], a foot in length and very good to eat. And when the three kinds of fish find the Colondriny in the water they chase them and make them fly—and they fly for as long as their wings are wet, about the distance a man can fire a crossbolt. And while the Colondriny fly, the other fish swim after them, seeing and following their shadow; so that as soon as they enter the water, they attempt to seize and devour them—a merry and marvelous thing to see!

The Portuguese and Italians, and all those living on the coasts of the Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas, as well as the peoples of Japan, China, Korea and other regions of Asia and the Pacific Rim knew the value of fishing for tuna. Their descendants participated in founding the tuna industry in San Diego and are featured in the following photographs. Although the purse seiners of the tuna fleet are no longer docked along San Diego’s embarcadero, the headquarters of Bumble Bee Foods and Chicken of the Sea are located in the City of San Diego while StarKist is based in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. These companies, along with the American Tuna Boat Association, have generously underwritten the tuna exhibition featured in the 2012 Makers of History celebration.


In 1951, the tuna clipper baitboat Conte Bianco was built at National Steel Shipbuilding of San Diego. In 1959, the vessel was converted from a baitboat to a seiner under Captain Louis Castagnola. The seiner is docked at the Grape Street Pier in San Diego, awaiting orders to unload its catch of tuna. Photo Courtesy American Tunaboat Association Zolezzi Photographic Collection, Maritime Museum of San Diego.

Tuna fishermen landing a big one. ©SDHC #84: 14821-11.
Woman handpacking tuna at Sun Harbor Packing Company, 1948. ©SDHC #89: 17118-419.
Crew members removing a tuna purse seine (net) from unidentified tuna clipper seiner at the Embarcadero for inspection, repair and replacement. ©SDHC #92: 18835-2120.
In 1961, the newly built tuna clipper seiner Royal Pacific in San Diego. Commanded by Captain Lou Brito, this is one of first tuna clipper seiners to be built as a seiner and not converted from a military hull or tuna clipper baitboat. ©SDHC #UT85-B8707.

*Italian families mending nets, 1917. ©SDHC #1998-032.60.*
Tuna clipper baitboat Pacific Queen, built in 1938 by Harbor Boat Works and Peter Rask of San Diego. Managing Owner and Captain Tom Carniglia. ©SDHC #85-15342.

Dominic Ghio holding up fish. ©SDHC #2009-10.126.

Anthony Bregante, 1958. ©SDHC #UT 85-8640.
Tuna: San Diego’s Famous Fishing Industry

Monterey style fishing fleet at dock in San Diego Harbor, 1920s. ©SDHC #S-234.

Tuna clipper purse seiner Sun Europa belonging to Sam Crivello. Painting by Joe Miller. Courtesy of A. Crivello.
Cohn Hopkins Inc. packers, 1931. ©SDHC Sensor #6-212.

Tuna clipper baitboat Lusitania, Captain Manuel G. Rosa, after rebuilding in 1940s. Compare with picture of the vessel taken during the early 1930s on page 14. ©SDHC #89-17618.
Charlie - people don’t want tunas with good taste, they want good tasting tuna.

Advertisement from Bumble Bee tuna ca. 1950.

Chicken of the Sea Advertisement 1949.

Advertisement from Bumble Bee tuna ca. 1950.
The California Tunas

Yellowfin Tuna (Thunnus albacares or Thunnus macracanthus), the Principal Item in the Present Tuna Pack.

Striped Tuna or Skipjack (Katsuwonus pelamis or Thunnus pelamis), Smallest of the Tuna—An Important Factor in the Pack.

Bluefin or Leaping Tuna (Thunnus thynnus or Thunnus thynnus), Taken Off the Southern California Coast and Canned in Considerable Quantities as Light Meat Tuna.

Illustrations published by courtesy State Fisheries Laboratory, Terminal Island, Calif.
Inspired by Mexico: 
Architect Bertram Goodhue Introduces Spanish Colonial Revival into Balboa Park

By Iris H.W. Engstrand

G. Aubrey Davidson’s laudatory address to an excited crowd attending the opening of the Panama-California Exposition on January 1, 1915, gave no inkling that the Spanish Colonial architectural legacy that is so familiar to San Diegans today was ever in doubt.

The buildings of this exposition have not been thrown up with the careless unconcern that characterizes a transient pleasure resort. They are part of the surroundings, with the aspect of permanence and far-seeing design...Here is pictured this happy combination of splendid temples, the story of the friars, the thrilling tale of the pioneers, the orderly conquest of commerce, coupled with the hopes of an El Dorado where life can expand in this fragrant land of opportunity.1

As early as 1909, Davidson, then president of the Chamber of Commerce, had suggested that San Diego hold an exposition in 1915 to celebrate the opening of the Panama Canal. When City Park was selected as the site in 1910, it seemed appropriate to rename the park for Spanish explorer Vasco Nuñez de Balboa, who had discovered the Pacific Ocean and claimed the

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entire west coast of the Americas for Spain on September 29, 1513. Besides tying the park to Panama, the celebration could also be combined with Juan Rodriguez Cabrillo’s arrival on September 28, 1542 by naming the bridge at the west entrance in his honor. The hiring of project architect Bertram Grosvenor Goodhue would bring rich decoration, exotic architecture and multiple uses to the park. Goodhue’s proposed central complex of Spanish colonial buildings would forever set aside the plan developed by Samuel T. Parsons for a natural picturesque park free of man-made obstructions.

Nevertheless, the appointment of Goodhue was not a given. It was first necessary to appoint a team to construct and organize the Exposition and, second, to raise funds for its construction. The Panama California Exposition Corporation, formed on September 4, 1909, was headed by Ulysses S. Grant, Jr., as president, and D.C. Collier as director general. George W. Marston directed the Building and Grounds Committee and saw to the appointment of John Charles Olmsted, of the Olmsted Brothers Firm of New York, as the landscape architect for the exposition. It was expected that Olmsted’s stepbrother Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr. would be a part of the decisions being made. This also led to the appointment of Frank P. Allen, Jr. as Director of Works, since John Olmsted had worked with Allen in Seattle and knew his capabilities.

Members of the Building and Grounds Committee wanted to appoint local architect Irving Gill, well respected for his Mission Revival Style, as the consulting architect for the Exposition. Others, however, favored Bertram Goodhue, an East Coast architect who had traveled through Mexico in 1892 to study its architecture. He had recently used the style to design La Santísima Trinidad, a
procathedral in Havana, Cuba, and a hotel in Colon, Panama. The hotel commission had come through the recommendation of Goodhue’s friend Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr. Although Olmsted first suggested Goodhue for the Balboa Park project, his choice was not initially accepted. It was left to Pasadena architect Elmer Grey to successfully support Goodhue’s application.

Bertram Goodhue, born in Pomfret, Connecticut, on April 28, 1869, completed his formal education in 1884 at the age of fifteen. In that year he traveled to New York to study drafting for six years under James Renwick, architect of Grace Church and St. Patrick’s Cathedral. Perhaps the most significant aspect of his education, however, was his extended journey to Mexico in 1890 during which time he, like many a “yankee” before and after him, fell in love with the landscape, lifestyle, and architecture of a very different neighboring country to the south. Goodhue’s small book entitled Mexican Memories: The Record of a Slight Sojourn below the Yellow Rio Grande published in New York in 1892, “with illustrations by the author,” is a remarkable tale of a young American becoming acquainted with a totally different way of life. To give one example, he begins as follows:

El Paso is, as I have said, the quintessence of everything hateful and modern. Paso del Norte is one of the sleepiest of the delightfully dormant Mexican towns… I suppose they have churches in El Paso, but there is nothing to remind one of the delightful old cathedral, so little and so tumble-down across the river.

While crossing the expansive countryside as far as Mexico City and Puebla, Goodhue became intrigued with the use of domes, towers, ornate facades and plain walls. He came to believe in three principles, as did his contemporary Frank Lloyd Wright, that first “architecture must be organically united with its landscape or setting,” that, second, one should rely “on unpretentious vernacular forms, often geometrically simple, for the primary inspiration of designs” and, third, that the tower, “which has served for centuries as a dramatic marker to enhance the structure that lies at its base” should be incorporated into compositions.
Again, a few paragraphs show Goodhue’s deep appreciation for what might be called the Mexican lifestyle:

Now every little peon village has its “parroquia,” and a true church it is, too, in every sense of the word—none of your modern abominations with tawdry chromos and similar commercial articles of decoration as in the North.

As soon as you enter from the blazing sunlight through the western doorway into the cool half-light within, you see, in a large majority of cases, a Churrigueresque splendor in the sanctuary opposite you, “black with tarnished gold,” the subdued magnificence of which is broken in places by dark pictures, as old as those of the great masters, and many times of a degree of excellence which approaches them very nearly.

Goodhue’s travels brought him into contact with a number of people in Mexico from all walks of life. Even though he was studying the architecture, Goodhue was charmed by the women, the farmers, the priests, and generally all the people he met along the way. His arrival in Mexico City brought forth the following comment:

The Cathedral in the Capital surpasses all others...in grandeur and extent. It is generally considered the finest church of the land, and it is not for me to take exception to the opinion of my betters, although admitting that the interior of the one in Puebla de Los Angeles—the most charming city in Mexico—pleases me more.15

After his return to the United States, Goodhue went into partnership, at age twenty-two, with the firm of Cram and Wentworth in Boston. A few years later,
upon the death of Charles Wentworth, he became a partner in the firm of Cram, Goodhue and Ferguson, where he remained for the next fifteen years. The firm specialized in designing churches, homes and colleges in eclectic English and French Gothic Revival styles. Goodhue, inspired by Mexican architecture, preferred Spanish Colonial revival and used this style on the pro-cathedral in Havana and the hotel in Panama. Goodhue had extended his knowledge of Spanish Colonial architecture by a return trip to Mexico in 1899 and had become known as a major proponent of the popular “Spanish” style.

From the time that John Olmsted was first asked by Marston’s committee to design the exposition in Balboa Park in 1911, he had wanted Goodhue to be a part of the team. When that position became a reality, Goodhue, in turn, hired...
Carleton M. Winslow, Sr., a partner in the firm of Cram, Goodhue and Ferguson, as Architect-in-Residence, Winslow then designed many of the temporary buildings and supervised the construction of those permanent buildings that Goodhue had designed.17

Born in Damariscotta, Maine, in 1876, Winslow grew up in a working-class family.18 Having left school at an early age, he was sent to Chicago and was apprenticed to a stonecutter for six months rendering drawings. After a bout with typhoid fever, young Winslow left for New York and took a job in the office of Daniel Wade, architect for the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. While there, he borrowed $500 from Wade to take a trip through Italy, during which time he was hired to help remodel a villa near the town of Capri. After three months in southern Italy, Winslow became committed to Mediterranean architecture—especially its domes, arches and towers. Upon returning to New York, he sought work with Bertram Goodhue, whose designs were exactly what had impressed Winslow during his travels.

An article in the San Diego Union on January 28, 1911, introduced Goodhue to San Diegans:

Proceeding in harmony with the plan of the directors of the Panama-California Exposition to follow as nearly as possible the Spanish-Mission type of architecture in the buildings to be erected...the Grounds Committee...employed Bertram G. Goodhue of New York and Santa Barbara19 to make the comprehensive plan for the various structures.

Mr. Goodhue is not only one of the most noted architects in the United States, but he is perhaps the only one who has made a worldwide study of Mission type of architecture. He has traveled to all parts of the globe where this type of architecture prevails, and spent years of time studying it in all its details.20
The article also pointed out that Goodhue, one of the leading exponents of Gothic architecture in the United States, had created the design for the United States Military Academy at West Point, St. Thomas Church on Fifth Avenue in New York, and great cathedrals from Havana to Detroit. Even though much of his firm’s work in the early twentieth century drew on English precedents, Goodhue, drew upon Spanish antecedents as he skillfully integrated landscape and architecture. Goodhue’s independence of mind is revealed by his readiness to abandon Beaux-Arts formalism...for a scheme based on a more variegated and natural order. His design was so successful that it launched a revival of Spanish Colonial style that spread throughout California and eventually eastward to many other parts of the United States.

In fact, Goodhue displayed such a tendency toward innovation that he parted ways with the more conservative Cram and Ferguson in 1914 and searched for a new, more personal expression. After the exposition in Balboa Park, Goodhue designed the Rockefeller Chapel at the University of Chicago (1918-28), the National Academy of Sciences in Washington, DC (1919-24) and the Nebraska State Capitol (1918-28)—all of which demonstrated “his ongoing effort to integrate purposeful ornamentation with traditional styles.”

It is easy to discern from Goodhue’s writing about San Diego that his Mexican travels had given him a deep admiration and appreciation of Hispanic traditions. He compared Southern California with the most beautiful regions of Europe and the New World, and believed that in San Diego could be found “the tenderest of skies, the bluest of seas, mountains of perfect outline,” reminding him “of the soft speech and unfailing courtesy” that he had found in Mexico. In San Diego he had endeavored, as far as possible, to reflect in its fair, “something of the effect of the old Spanish and Mission days and thus to link the spirit of the old seekers of the fabled Eldorado with that of the twentieth century.” Goodhue, proud of his overall exposition design, wrote at its completion that within the confines of this perfect park, “was built a city in miniature wherein everything that met the

Nebraska State Capitol, Lincoln, Nebraska.
The Shrine of Our Lady of Guadalupe, Mexico from Mexican Memories, New York 1892.

eye and ear of the visitor was meant to recall to mind the glamour and mystery and poetry of the old Spanish days.”

The buildings that Bertram Goodhue personally designed, and destined to be permanent, were found within the California Quadrangle. The south wing of the Fine Arts Building contained a chapel with a “Carmelite belfry containing a century-old Spanish bell brought from Gibraltar. The sturdy buttresses of the south façade recall those of the Mission San Gabriel.”

The richly ornamented frontispiece of the California State Building reflected “the principal architectural element of Spanish and Mexican buildings.” The corridor running along the

Introductory

San Diego 1915 Panama-California Exposition Souvenir Book.
south side of the Plaza de California was “wistfully reminiscent of the passing charm of San Fernando Mission.”

How much credit does Bertram Goodhue deserve for promoting the idea of a Spanish Colonial Revival? Certainly he stepped into a situation already receptive to his ideas. Nevertheless the movement had not really taken hold in 1910 even though certain architects, including Irving Gill, were influenced by mission architecture. An article in the San Diego Union entitled, “Architectural Gems of Old Spain Revived,” explains that

The Exposition might have gone ahead and erected buildings of Greek or Roman type, or other conventional types which have appeared at all world’s fairs of the past. Beyond a doubt the result would have been beautiful...[but]...the Exposition adopted a different plan, and now offers to the world something which is not only wondrously beautiful, but also is creative in that it has brought about a genuine renaissance of the glories of Spanish art and architecture.

Another writer points out that many people who had never been to California imagined it to be a land “dominated by the old Spanish Mission style of architecture,” but this, of course, was not the case since much of California exhibited various types of bungalows, several variations of Victorian architecture, or the Arts and Crafts style in many residences.
But for the people from all parts of the land who go to see San Diego’s Exposition, it is their ideal visualized. There the fairy Spanish city is a reality, old courts and patios abound. Stately towers reach into the restful blue of California skies. A carefully trained wilderness of tropical plants delights the eyes. It is a sweet and restful land where “castles in Spain” seem realities; a land in which you “loaf and invite your soul.”

And today in San Diego, we have the lasting influence of Bertram Grosvenor Goodhue and his fellow designers who can truly be said to have been “inspired by Mexico” in bringing a Spanish Colonial Revival not only to Balboa Park but to Southern California and beyond. Although Goodhue refined his architectural style, his work continued to express his Mexican “roots.” His designs for the Balboa Park Exposition led to a number of commissions including the Union Railway Station in Riverside and the California Institute of Technology. For this latter work, he was personally chosen by Trustee George Hale who wrote:

I discovered Bertram Goodhue when I first looked across the great causeway that leads to the San Diego Exposition. This superb creation, so Spanish in feeling—yet so rarely equaled in Spain—with its stately approach, its walls springing from the hillside, its welcoming gateway, its soaring tower, and its resplendent dome, foretelling all the southern privacy and charm of the courts that lie beyond reveal much of its author.

After the fair opened, Goodhue received other commissions. In 1917 he traveled to New York City to redesign St. Bartholomew’s Church complete with dome. He returned to San Diego in 1918 as chief architect of the
Marine Corps Recruit Depot, and in 1921 lent his talent to design the Los Angeles Public Library, where he was joined by his Exposition associate Carleton Winslow then working in California. The writer of the January 1, 1915, article in evaluating the work of Bertram Goodhue and his team may have said it best:

The impression of the architects who have seen the Exposition in the city...is that there has been revived an art which should have been revived decades ago, but which, now re-created, is destined to take on new life and strength and to last for many years to come.

And, indeed, six years later Katherine Elspeth Oliver penned an article entitled “Balboa, Dream Place of the Southwest” that recalled:

Six years back when this dream place, the incomparable setting of the Panama-California Exposition, sprang from the chaparral with...
the audacity and wonder of a flower bouquet in a conjurer’s hat, men lacked words adequate for its praise. It captivated them—it enthralled them—this peerless replica of old Castile—this marvelous classic of a dead age made to live again, materialized in the heart of the so new West . . . the genesis chapter of the West coast—a chapter of high deeds and mighty accomplishments—of romance and story memorialized in forms of beauty that lifted the heart with delight and filled it with reverence.36

The exposition buildings were not without their critics, but the fact remains that these structures created and designed one hundred years ago by the architectural team of Bertram Goodhue have stood the test of time. Today they give testimony to the permanence of their architectural influence and the lasting power of institutional memory. Sadly, Bertram Goodhue died suddenly from a heart attack in 1924 at age fifty-five, just three years after the article by Oliver was written. Although buried in New York City at the Chapel of the Intercession, his memory lives on in San Diego as plans are made for the centennial of the Panama-California Exposition. Goodhue’s structures were built “to last not only throughout 1915, but as many years thereafter as stone and staunch timber will hold together.”37 San Diego’s “Fairy Spanish City” is indeed today’s reality in Balboa Park.
NOTES


2. Nuñez de Balboa, born in Jerez de los Caballeros in Extremadura, Spain, c. 1457, was a descendant of the lord mason of the castle of Balboa, which is located in northwestern Spain. Balboa led a group of Spaniards overland across the Isthmus of Panama to become the first European to discover the Pacific Ocean. See Nancy Carol Carter, “Renaming Balboa Park: Correcting the Record,” *The Journal of San Diego History* (hereafter *JSDH*) 56 nos. 1-2 (Winter/Spring 2010): 31-42.

3. Juan Rodríguez Cabrillo, sailing for Spain from the port of Navidad in Mexico on June 17, 1542, was the first European explorer to land on the shores of what was later named San Diego de Alcalá by Sebastián Vizcaíno on November 12, 1602.

4. Building upon the work of Kate Sessions who had begun planting trees in the park in 1892, landscape architect Samuel Parsons, former superintendent of New York’s Central Park, offered a design for the gardens. Parsons wanted to preserve the park’s “great natural picture” and keep it relatively free from any buildings. From 1904-1906, some 14,000 more trees and shrubs were planted in an effort to create a “natural” setting. Heartily supported by civic leaders, the park exemplified the City Beautiful movement begun in Chicago in 1893.


6. Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., was the son of the famous landscape designer of New York’s Central Park and the grounds for the 1893 World Columbian Exposition in Chicago.

7. Frank P. Allen served as Architect and Director of Works for the Alaska-Yukon Pacific Exposition in Seattle and had worked with John Olmsted on the project. Allen designed the Roman-aqueduct style Cabrillo Bridge, the Italian-Renaissance Sacramento Valley Building, the rococo-style Commerce and Industries Building, the Mexican-Churrigueresque San Joaquin Valley Building, and the Mission-style Montana Building. See Richard Amero, Balboa Park Expositions, Chapter 8: Sources and Attributions, at http://www.balboaparkhistory.net/amero.htm (accessed December 26, 2011).


10. Wyllie, *Bertram Goodhue*, 74-75. Grey, designer of the Huntington Library, did not like Gill and “considered his work to be too modern and devoid of beauty, telling Goodhue that Gill ‘hasn’t a broad enough outlook for such a position as the Exhibition one.’” Goodhue, when he heard about the commission, indicated his interest in a letter to Elmer Grey, who in turn wrote to the San Diego committee. See also Esther McCoy, *Five California Architects* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1975), 87-90, for details.

11. His parents, Charles Wells Goodhue and Helen Eldredge Grosvenor Goodhue, were of modest means and unable to send their son to Yale, the college of some of his more prosperous ancestors. For a complete biography of Goodhue, see Wyllie, *Bertram Goodhue*.


16. As mentioned above, Goodhue’s entrance on the scene has always been controversial. Irving Gill, whose reputation was well established in San Diego, was the logical local choice.

17. Inspired by a trip to Italy, Winslow’s earliest visions for the park included a lake with Venetian gondolas floating about.

18. Winslow’s mother died when he was a child and his father worked as a boot and shoe salesman. Young Carleton left school after the eighth grade but continued his interest in drawing. Sent to live with an uncle in Chicago, he worked for a stonemason rendering shop drawings. Winslow, Jr., *Architecture of the Panama-California Exposition*, 24.

19. Goodhue designed the Spanish-style Gillespie house in Montecito in 1903-1905.

20. *San Diego Union*, January 28, 1911, 10:3-4. Mission Style and Spanish Colonial Style are often confused. Mission Style or Mission Revival consists of simple, clean lines representing the austerity of mission life in the early settlement of California. Spanish Colonial Style, which Goodhue observed through his travels in Mexico, had more decorative baroque features with elaborate interiors made possible by funds from the silver mines discovered during the sixteenth century.

21. Ibid.

22. Sawyers, “The Architectural Vision of Bertram Goodhue,” 24-25. Most world fairs up until that time had been organized on the basis of a Beaux-Arts formalism.

23. Ibid. 25.


25. Ibid., 6.


27. Ibid., 32.

28. Ibid., 52.

29. For example buildings in the 1880s in St. Augustine, Florida; the Main Quad at Stanford University, and examples at the 1893 Chicago Exposition.


32. Goodhue was committed to the idea that the temporary buildings should not “be other than temporary, for it must be remembered that Exposition Architecture differs from that of our everyday world in being essentially of the fabric of a dream—not to endure but to produce a merely temporary effect. It should provide, after the fashion that stage scenery provides—illusion rather than reality.” Goodhue believed that the Cabrillo Bridge, the California Quadrangle with the California State Building and the Fine Arts Building would remain while “the rest was to be swept away entirely.” Goodhue, “The Architecture and the Gardens,” 7.

33. George Ellery Hale as quoted by Wyllie in *Bertram Goodhue*, 118.

34. The second location of St. Bartholomew’s Church on the southwest corner of Madison Avenue and East 44th Street was designed by James Renwick in whose office Goodhue had first served as an apprentice. The present church, designed by Goodhue in a simplified Byzantine style, preserved the old church portal but included a new tile-patterned dome and was built in 1916-1917.


Adventurers, Bandits, Soldiers of Fortune, Spies and Revolutionaries:
Recalling the Baja California Insurrection of 1911
One Hundred Years Later

By James Bartoli

“That’s all I wanted. I just wanted to be in on the fun.” Former revolutionary fighter James Carson responded thus at eighty two years old, when asked in an interview in 1972 if he shared the filibustering goal he said was common among others of the rebel foreign legion, or if he just wanted to get away from the San-Diego Arizona Railroad camp and the gravel pit in which he had been working as an operator of a fresno scraper.¹ When an insurrecto scout preceding the main body had entered his camp “to chat,” Carson said “I threwed my lines down and left my team standing

Rebels boarding commandeered train, June 1911. ©SDHC #80: 6181.

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right there” to join up. Twenty-one years old in 1911 and not fighting for any ideal, Carson was an adventure seeker who had been reared in Texas. He told the scout he would like to join up if they were going to Ensenada and the scout said “Fine,” handed over the reins to a horse he had been leading, and then said “Climb on.” The scout introduced him to the general when they rode over to meet the army and Carson shook hands with him. “[T]hat’s all there was to enlisting as far as the rebel army of Baja California was concerned,” he explained. James Carson became a member of the rebel army with little fanfare, and would later be among the men briefly interned by the United States Army at Fort Rosecrans, San Diego, only to be released three days later.

The army Carson joined was affiliated with the Los Angeles based Partido Liberal Mexicano (PLM) movement, members of which fought under the banner “Tierra y Libertad” and sought a social and economic revolution in Mexico rather than another political one. It seems unusual that Carson was recruited so unceremoniously, and that no questions were asked about his political ideas and attitudes before he was allowed to join them. Describing the army’s composition, Carson recalled, “They was just a hodge-podge of working people. That’s what they was…I don’t remember of any Indians. Our army was about a third Mexicans and two-thirds white...of course, there was all kinds of foreign blood among us.”

Many of the whites, or “Anglos,” were labor radicals of different shades from north of the border who identified with the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), also often called “wobblies.” The wobblies were sympathetic to the PLM’s cause, and they shared a similar ideological outlook with the PLM. This outlook, both rural and urban, was shaped by the combined experiences of migratory labor
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on both sides of the border. It was influenced by anarchism and revolutionary syndicalism, and also included a belief in internationalism, worker solidarity, and direct action, as well as the belief that Mexico’s Revolution might ignite a world social revolution against capitalism.\textsuperscript{6} Other \textit{gringo insurrectos}\textsuperscript{7} did not share that vision, however, including some soldiers of fortune and adventurers like Carson, who simply “thought they might do just like Texas done.”\textsuperscript{8} They wanted to be close to the action and nearby for any potential distribution of rewards—not to effect a fundamental social transformation.\textsuperscript{9}

The Baja California Revolution provoked instructive hostility from the Mexican governments of Porfirio Díaz and Francisco Madero, as well as the United States, demonstrating they shared a common perception that the social revolutionary character of the PLM-IWW campaign was a threat to the nascent economic order then being established on both sides of the border that was dominated by incorporated finance capital and an increased dependence on transnational migratory labor. This article will look at the Baja California Revolution of 1911 and examine how the clash between PLM-IWW revolutionary internationalism, transnational capital, and governments affected popular understanding of this part of the Mexican Revolution on both sides of the border. A brief synopsis of the campaign, and a look at the more controversial aspects of the Baja California Revolution, will set the stage. The intersections between transnational capital, migratory labor, and the region’s physical geography are vital parts of the cultural and temporal analysis. These regional and international intersections of capital and labor flows shaped the spatial context of local developments and explain the greater hostility by the governments of Mexico and the United States toward the PLM-IWW forces, as compared to the Maderistas. They underscore why, despite the small numbers involved in the Baja California Revolution, it had a significant impact on the Mexican Revolution at large and why it was ruthlessly suppressed.

The PLM-IWW Baja California Revolution: Strained Solidarity

The Dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz is about to fall; but the revolution will not end by this act alone. Upon the tomb of this infamous dictatorship there will stand, face to face, with arms in the hand, two social classes: that of the well-fed and that of the hungry, the first upholding the interests of its caste and the second the abolition of those privileges by means of the installation of a system which guarantees to every human being Bread, Land, and Liberty.¹⁰

The Baja California Revolution was not a minor footnote to the Mexican Revolution at large. It was a part of a movement active throughout Mexico that had set the tone of resistance before and during the early days of the revolution. The followers of the revolutionary junta of the PLM based in Los Angeles and led by Ricardo Flores Magón, often called Magonistas, desired a revolution in the economic and social order that would redistribute the land and factories to the rural and urban workers. This placed them far to the left of the politically moderate Anti-Reelectionist movement led by Francisco Madero, who sought a more limited political change.¹² While both were in revolt against Porfirio Díaz, Madero and Magón had opposing visions and goals for Mexico and its people, especially respecting foreign investment and private property. Magón was a persecuted political radical opposed to capitalism. He struggled as a journalist and intellectual to improve conditions for Mexican urban and rural working classes on both sides of the border, and he agitated strongly against abuses of foreign owned properties in Mexico. Madero, in contrast, was the leading son of a clan of border elites with extensive industrial and landed interests that had suffered during the end of the Porfiriato. Among the richest men in Mexico, and with a large personal interest in maintaining the socioeconomic status quo, he had little in common with Magón’s revolutionary ends.
Recalling the Baja California Insurrection of 1911

Madero sought to expand foreign investment from the United States to advance Mexico’s nascent industrialization, relying on cheap and plentiful labor as a draw for capital and the spur for economic development, while the PLM encouraged campesinos and industrial workers to appropriate foreign capital viewed as illegitimate by directly seizing control of the land and factories and beginning immediate worker self-management. Prior to 1911, the PLM made other abortive attempts at fomenting revolution in 1906 and 1908, while Madero continued to seek a political solution without revolution until his own suppression during the 1910 election campaign. Between August 1907 and August 1910, Magón and several associates were tried and imprisoned for their efforts, with the United States government’s questionable legal maneuvers spurring much popularity and political support among the American left for Magón and his cohorts.

While the Anti-Reelectionist forces of Francisco Madero initiated the Mexican Revolution on November 20, 1910, the PLM and the IWW hastily prepared their own popular uprising in Baja California in January 1911. The PLM’s organizing junta was formed in late September 1905 in St. Louis and led by Ricardo Flores Magón, a revolutionary critic who had been active against the Porfirio Díaz regime since 1892. Born in San Antonio Eloxochitlán, Oaxaca on September 16, 1873, the anniversary of Mexican Independence, Ricardo was the middle child of three brothers. Jesús, the elder, was born in 1871, and Enrique, the youngest, in 1877. All three became student activists, journalists, and propagandists during the early struggle against Díaz, although Jesus eventually dropped away from activism in 1902. Enrique, on the other hand, became one of his brother’s most ardent supporters and carried the family’s radical legacy back to Mexico in the aftermath of the Revolution.

Ricardo was labeled an anarchist, persecuted by the Díaz regime, and jailed multiple times in Mexico before fleeing to the United States at the end of 1903. The newspaper Regeneración, his
primary weapon against Diaz, was launched in Mexico in 1900 and subsequently moved to the United States.\textsuperscript{23} Magón believed the Porfiriato (1876-1911) had been established by fraud and maintained by force and that the Mexican people were ripe for revolution. By 1906, Magón had fully adopted anarchist ideology and social revolutionary goals; yet, he dissembled this and publicized a “liberal” program in \textit{Regeneración} for the most part until the end of 1911 after the Baja California Revolution had already unraveled.\textsuperscript{24}

The PLM, however, did not make the revolution in Baja California alone; it did so in alliance with the Industrial Workers of the World. The formation and spread of the PLM coincided with that of the IWW, a radical syndicalist industrial union that also formed in 1905. Rank and file Mexican and Mexican American dual members who had been organized by the IWW’s major constituent union, the Western Federation of Miners, initially brought the IWW and PLM together. The two organizations shared more than an internationalist perspective and mutual stance against racial prejudice. They also found common ground through their similar political outlook and shared tactical commitment to direct action rather than parliamentary politics. Bonds of affinity grew between the two organizations as the leadership of the revolutionary junta languished in jail for having been discovered and arrested during an earlier attempt at revolution in 1906. The PLM and IWW eventually developed organizational linkages at the leadership level on the initiative of a Mexican IWW member from San Diego, Francisco Martinez.\textsuperscript{25}

Once Magón and his associates were released in August 1910 after spending three years in jail in the United States for violating neutrality laws, they quickly

These men did the fighting. Insurrectos before the Battle of Tijuana, June 20, 1911. ©SDHC #5220-1.
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returned to Los Angeles to restart Regeneración and organize PLM-led military action in Mexico. Madero’s Anti-Reelectionist forces had beat the PLM to the field, prompting the hasty organization of a PLM offensive by Magón in Los Angeles.

Parlaying on the growing ties between the PLM and IWW forged by several Mexican American revoltosos with dual membership, Anglos were recruited to help with manpower in the fight. Non-Mexican IWW members quickly became a significant part of the PLM armed forces. Yet, in addition to non-Mexican IWW members, many international soldiers of fortune unaffiliated with the IWW or PLM were also accepted into the ranks. Some would later facilitate the unraveling of the Baja California campaign and set the context for filibustering charges leveled against Magón and the gringo insurrectos by his Mexican critics.

The PLM alliance with the IWW as compañeros and “fellow workers” was strained by the decision to allow the non-radicalized adventurers and soldiers of fortune. Many of the sizeable Anglo component in the rebel army, especially among the adventurers and soldiers of fortune, frequently demonstrated racist attitudes. They were a disruptive element that helped discredit the PLM among many Mexicans and Indians and were a major inhibiting factor to the recruitment of Mexican and Mexican American insurrectos once the campaign was under way, leading many Mexican PLM members to defect to the Maderistas, contributing to the campaign’s failure. Private detectives, government spies, and international intrigue were also drawn to the radical character of the insurgency in Baja California, eliciting both overt and covert forms of transnational repression.

The PLM’s military activity was organized by the junta through the IWW’s
meeting hall in Holtville, near the border in California’s Imperial Valley. The first action was the seizure of Mexicali on January 29, 1911. Led at first by José María Leyva and Simon Berthold, the PLM army of fewer than twenty men was almost entirely Mexican and Indian during the initial action in Mexicali.\(^{32}\) IWW members and soldiers of fortune quickly expanded the ranks, however, later becoming a majority of the armed force. Leyva’s early death in battle, and Berthold’s military ineffectiveness, led to a factionalization of the Magonista forces. Tensions had grown between the Mexicans and non-Mexicans in the rebel army, sometimes resulting in violence within the rebel camp. An IWW member known as Stanley Williams or William Stanley, who had distinguished himself with bravery in action, gave voice to the growing lack of confidence among many non-Mexicans in the cautiousness of the dual leadership of Leyva and Berthold. Taking advantage of the rebels’ egalitarian principle that the commander should be elected, many gringo insurrectos supported men from their own ranks or among the experienced soldiers of fortune to lead the army. On March 4, Stanley proposed the replacement of Leyva and Berthold with his supporter, José Cardozo. While most of the Mexican insurrectos supported the current leadership, a large enough segment of the Mexicans joined the foreigners in voting for Cardozo. Yet, Berthold’s supporters confiscated the weapons of the opposition after the vote while they were eating, and put Stanley in irons before forcing him back across the border. This action prompted many desertions, including Cardozo and forty-five Mexicans who moved east to join the Maderistas.\(^{33}\) The schism resulted in a loss of numbers, and the split off of a “foreign legion” from the Mexican led insurrectos by the middle of March. Outside pressures from north of the border were also growing.

President Taft sent up to 20,000 soldiers to the area between February and March to contain the revolution south of the border, choke off PLM avenues of supply, and be ready in reserve should an intervention be ordered. New
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recruits, however, continued to cross the border unarmed to join the *insurrectos*, and small arms slipped across the border. Yet Magón, while a brilliant theorist and propagandist, proved inept as a revolutionary political and military leader. The expediency of using soldiers of fortune discredited the PLM cause. One in particular who damaged the revolutionary cause was Welsh soldier of fortune Caryl ap Rhys Pryce. Pryce was a veteran of British imperial forces in South Africa and the Boer War and was among those who crossed the border at this time. He appeared on the scene by late April 1911 and soon became *generalissimo* of the foreign legion. His role and purpose in joining the revolutionaries remains murky.

Pryce’s relationship with the promoter of San Diego’s Panama-California Exposition Groundbreaking event in 1911, Richard “Dick” Ferris, provides much of the basis of the filibustering claims leveled against the rebel forces. A new theory, implied by his biographer John Humphries, is that Pryce was a spy who infiltrated the rebel army. Unable to turn the insurrection into an attempt to seize Baja California, Pryce may have succeeded in a secondary goal of destroying the rebel forces by abandonment at a crucial time, as Ferris’ attempts to turn the *insurrectos* towards filibustering had proven a failure. Until a recent biography of Pryce appeared in Wales, little was known about him other than his former service for the British Empire. Humphries was able to uncover his later involvement with the British mandate constabulary in Palestine, and likely service as one of
the notorious Black and Tans in Ireland, during and after World War I. The true motivations of a lifelong soldier and policeman in the service of empire joining a revolutionary army is certainly an interesting question. Pryce’s development of a cozy relationship with Dick Ferris also gave much cause for suspicion.36

In The Desert Revolution, Lowell Blaisdell describes Richard “Daredevil Dick” Wells Ferris as an “archintriguer.”37 Ferris was a former political candidate skilled at publicity, and he had made a career for himself as a professional actor and promoter. In February 1911, he was appointed to manage the Panama-California Exhibition groundbreaking ceremony to be held that July in Balboa Park in San Diego. Ferris’ intrigues related to Baja California began immediately thereafter with an offer to the local Mexican consul in San Francisco to purchase Baja California coupled with a hardly veiled threat of a filibuster campaign if refused. This communication was amplified by the appearance of advertisements in the New York World and other newspapers to recruit one thousand men with military experience to serve “General Dick Ferris.”38 The U.S. Justice Department assigned Special Agent Clayton Herrington to investigate Ferris for having committed neutrality violations, though Herrington concluded in March that there was no incriminating evidence and that Ferris was only seeking notoriety. On March 12, the next publicity stunt featured the raising of a new flag and the reading of a proclamation near Agua Caliente, Baja California, by Miss Flora Russell, who had gained permission to ride her horse across the border and was a fan from Los Angeles of Ferris and his suffragette wife. Russell claimed Baja California “in the name of equal suffrage and of model government,” and christened it as

![Tijuana ablaze in the background after the battle, May 9, 1911. ©SDHC #80:1699.](image-url)
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the future “Republic of Diaz.” Ferris remained quiet regarding Baja California after the ensuing diplomatic row until he arrived in San Diego in early May 1911.

Ferris visited Tijuana shortly after the rebel takeover, and obtained an introduction to Pryce from a very supportive reporter from the San Diego Union. He quickly befriended Pryce, and they engaged in much intrigue together with some of the other soldiers of fortune, sharing a common belief in Baja California's...
destiny as a “white man’s land.”

When Pryce’s forces captured Tijuana in May, he had violated contrary orders from the Mexican junta and seemed to be playing his own game, though his victory was quickly embraced for publicity value by the junta and he was not punished for insubordination. Pryce’s subsequent dealings with Ferris, and friction with the junta, were followed by his abandonment of the insurrectos with their funds at the critical time just after the fall of Díaz at the end of May 1911. After Pryce’s departure, the intrigue by the soldiers of fortune, particularly a man from Pryce’s entourage named Louis James who claimed to be a West Point graduate, culminated in a half-hearted and failed attempt to put Ferris at the head of the insurrectos as the Provisional President of a Republic of Baja California. Fear of prosecution for violation of U.S. neutrality laws, and a stern repudiation from the radical PLM and IWW members, led Ferris to backtrack and reject the offer.

The majority of historians find little evidence to support the broad-brush assertion that the PLM junta and the Baja California insurrectos were all filibusters. Some of the actions of the soldiers of fortune in the foreign legion, however, and a fair amount of circumstantial evidence support the notion that Pryce and Ferris
had such aims that failed in execution. While interpreting the role of the Anglo adventurers and soldiers of fortune among the PLM army in Baja California remains contested ground for historical memory on both sides of the border, recruitment of men like James Carson by the rebel army was only one aspect of the farcical comedy of errors, or quixotic campaign, that became the Baja California Revolution of 1911. The intentions and motivations of the leadership and the rank and file PLM and IWW members who participated in the insurgency, also remain a subject of contention among historians, citizens on both sides of the border, and school children in Baja California.44

Soldiers of fortune, deserters from the United States military, and men who had spent much of their lives on cattle ranches were a large segment of the men who “thought they might do just like Texas done.”45 Some lacked the political consciousness and attitudes of their leaders and others had contrary—sometimes hidden—aims, all of which facilitated charges of filibusterism by Mexican nationalists and conservatives who may have been as equally or more concerned by the anti-capitalist radicalism of the PLM as by the potential it could become an annexationist movement. Many of the non-member adventurers were a disruptive influence among the PLM and IWW members and supporters and of their goals in Baja California, leading to internal dissention in both organizations and subsequent debate over responsibilities and tactics. A smaller number of adventurers also turned informant afterward and supported the United States government during the highly politicized 1912 neutrality violation trials that followed in Los Angeles. Some may have been working as spies to capture or disrupt the insurgency all along.46

Supporters of the PLM goals in Mexico have variously criticized the PLM leadership for tactical errors, failing to provide material support to the insurrectionists in the field, as
well as abdicating their leadership by not personally taking the field. The idealism and ideological inspiration of the PLM has been officially recognized in Mexico as being precursor to the revolution, thus temporarily limiting its official relevance to the beginning of the Mexican Revolution and soft-pedaling its increasingly anarchist inspired radicalism after the Baja California campaign ended. PLM-IWW critics, on the other hand, have brought several competing charges regarding the events of the Baja California campaign. Among mildly sympathetic critics who did not fully share their radicalism, they have been charged with being impractical idealists or being more inspired by self-interested banditry or egotism than any positive social revolutionary goals. Others, including conservative partisans and the governments of Mexico and the United States, charged them with being criminals, socialists, communists, and dangerous anarchists who must be vigilantly suppressed at all costs. Many in the IWW blamed shortcomings in the PLM leadership, including a stronger penchant for producing propaganda rather than military provisions, as the root cause of the failure of the revolution. Chicano historian Richard Griswold del Castillo’s list of causes for the PLM’s failure remain an excellent point of departure: (1) PLM ideology was too abstract, and did not have a broad enough appeal among Mexicans; (2) United States army policing of the border that limited mobility of people and supplies; (3) the small
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population of northern Baja California, many of whom became refugees, were an insufficient base of support; (4) most Mexicans living in the U.S. southwest were not from Baja California, lacked local identification, and were likely averse to military operations in the desert; and (5) many Mexicans in the United States may have believed rumors that Anglo capitalists were behind the PLM. As Jim Miller points out in Under the Perfect Sun, racial tensions, including the impact of the disruptive elements within the rebel forces—Anglo mercenaries and adventurers—that may have been working against the PLM, and Magón’s “choice to distribute more copies of Kropotkin than bullets,” were also serious impediments to success.

The Baja California Revolution has been frequently described as a ‘comic opera’ and ‘stranger than fiction’ due to the activities of Ferris and Pryce. The documentary evidence available on both Ferris and Pryce is limited, and relevant parts of the court records of the subsequent trials for violating neutrality laws are missing in the U.S. National Archives. Humphries’ interpretation that Pryce was a British agent seeking to either redirect or disrupt the PLM-IWW forces, and that Ferris and Pryce served the interests of U.S. and British capitalists who had obtained virtual principalities in Baja California during the Diaz regime, is convincing yet difficult to corroborate. General Harrison Gray Otis of the Los Angeles Times, John D. Spreckels of the San Diego Union and Evening Tribune, and the British shareholders of the London-based Mexican Land and Colonization Company—a virtual who’s who of Britain’s aristocracy and upper class—all shared an antipathy towards the PLM and IWW’s ideological outlook. They could be expected to attempt to protect their interests, and might have supported a covert action to do so. Even if Pryce and/or Ferris may have had filibustering aims in Baja California, however, they could not gain the support of the Mexican and IWW insurrectos, they did not have the support of the major landed interests, and they could only rely on the shaky loyalties of the soldiers of fortune lacking the political consciousness of the others.
The Contested Borderlands of Historical Memory

WILL UNCLE SAM MOVE HIS BORDER LINE?
Rumors that the Great Southwestern Maneuvers are a prelude to
Another Mexican Annexation. A Queer Corner is the Southwestern-
most One of the Nation.52

Due to a high sensitivity about the Mexican-American war, and failed
nineteenth century filibuster attempts in Baja California, some Mexicans (many
Baja Californians) still maintain the entire PLM-IWW insurgency was just another
filibuster attempt. The article headline quoted in full above is a poignant example
of the sentiment from north of the border that so deeply concerned those to the
south. A detailed examination of Felix Koch’s article from the June 1911 issue
of Overland Monthly, with its provocative title quoted above, suggests a few
reasons both for the permanence of the filibuster controversy to this historical
episode, as well as why the ambivalence towards annexation among United
States financial and border elites forestalled such action. Rumors of plans to
seize the Baja California peninsula proliferated in the first half of 1911 once the
United States army mobilized along the border with Mexico after the Madero and
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PLM-IWW led revolutions broke out. Inspired by fantasies about the future of Baja California after the opening of the Panama Canal, the rumors were further stoked by stories in the local press that often directly advocated annexation. Yet, there were also more literary, indirect pieces in popular magazines like Felix Koch’s article, expressive of a more reflective and ambivalent attitude toward the region held by many editors, opinion makers, and those from north of the border with a financial interest in Baja California’s development.

Unlike the title suggests, Koch’s article is a travel narrative of his reflections on a “trip made by vehicle out from San Diego, part way over the same route taken by winter tourists to Tia Juana…” Yet, an anxiety over the imperial issues potentially at stake is also readily apparent in the article. Koch demonstrates that anxiety through his initial framing, in his relation of visiting the boundary marker, and through his descriptions of the “dirty” people and “rather desolate” places “offering little except opportunity to gather shells on the beach, and requiring that one to take his noon meal along.” He shows the ambivalent and contradictory range of attitudes prevalent among many from the United States toward a potential annexation then often suggested of northern Mexico and Baja California. John Kenneth Turner asserted to the San Francisco Bulletin that “[i]ntervention consists in the threat to intervention.”

“Down in Mexico the mystery attaching to the sudden mobilization of an entire third of the American army on this continent into San Antonio, and the proximity of the Mexican line” was “no mystery at all” to Mexicans, begins Koch in his article. It was “but simply the first step in the advance of another crime
like the Mexican War.” That Mexican attitude makes it necessary to wonder, he reasons, “how long before Uncle Sam will push his barriers southward and have need to move his border monuments.” An Associated Press dispatch from March 11, 1911, voices the official attitude: “The situation in Lower California is said to have caused more concern to the United States than at any other point.”

Koch localizes his view to the “corner” region of Baja California, however, not once mentioning why the American army was mobilized or that there was a distinct insurgency in process including many allied Mexicans and Anglos with radically anti-capitalist views who were opposed to the much larger and now successful revolutionary forces of Madero. “Interesting, indeed, is the region where, on the west, this line of monuments begins,” Koch observes, before proceeding with an otherwise typical Progressive Era travel narrative. His anxieties about the emptiness and dirtiness of the land, hinting at its differing racial character and inhabitants, in the end “makes one wonder at the change that must come should this Mexican border be pushed considerably southward.”

Fascinated by the corner boundary monument from 1849 that was photographed for the article, Koch relates that a tablet on the paling on the American side reads: “The destruction or displacement of this monument is a misdemeanor, punishable by the United States or Mexico.” Interestingly, he also observes how “on both the American and the Mexican side of the grating, the iron tablet warning against mutilators has its advice in English, as if the greatest fear were to come from that side.” The phrasing of the last observation, using “as if” to
suggest an injustice in the implication, is rather ironic considering the historic American expansionist impulse towards Spanish and Mexican lands that was further consummated during the late nineteenth century through ownership rather than territorial control. Can it be a feigned innocence considering Koch was straddling the contested ground upon which were projected the annexationist sentiments he echoes in his title? Or could it be a reflection of imperial arrogance, summarily discounting any legitimate reason for Mexico to fear any disrespect from the United States toward Mexican sovereignty?

Historian Matthew Frye Jacobson has demonstrated how imperialist attitudes and stereotypes toward foreign peoples, at home and abroad, developed rapidly and crystallized during the years after 1876. Rising labor activism in the United States, heterogeneous immigration from areas of the world other than northwestern Europe, and a rising nativism were interrelated and destabilizing forces for the United States as a perceived “overproduction” crisis became endemic in the 1870s as mobile capital began to aggressively seek higher profits abroad. The boom times and periods of stagnant or declining domestic demand in the United States, resulting from the quest for profit maximization wherever it may be found, spurred global patterns of labor migration to America and capital investment flow abroad.63 United States based businessmen found their first major transnational area of extended hegemony in Mexico after the period of continental expansion ending with the last Indian Wars and completion of the transcontinental railroad.64 They also found an accessible, migratory, and cheap labor force that by 1910 had

Rebel Army surrendering arms—Tijuana, June 22, 1911. ©SDHC #95:19385-16.
already become an essential demographic component of the “dark”/“unskilled” positions in the racial geography of labor that characterized the southwestern United States.65

One of the characteristics of the Anglo acquisition and occupation of lands in Mexico during the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the erection of fences and the exclusion—sometimes at gunpoint—of Mexicans and indigenous people who formerly had longstanding customary claims to occupation and usage of the land. The border became a new locus of such division as the Mexican Revolution began, “for a high wire fence has been erected, and during the battle was patrolled by our troops.”66 The demarcation of physical space, however, was only one element of the new geographical terrain of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands in the time preceding the outbreak of revolution. Economic and cultural geographies were also transformed, in which new transnational flows of capital and labor changed regional social and economic relationships. A racially segregated residential settlement pattern and division of labor were established by corporate led economic development. “Corridors of migration” opened up for the displaced or ‘undesirable’ to seek better opportunities where their labor was in higher demand.67 These changing geographies resulted from a pattern of uneven development and increased disparities of wealth in the border region, exemplified in Baja California by the mostly foreign owned export enclave of the Mexicali Valley in contrast with the surrounding relative poverty of the northern part of the peninsula.68 This newly developed cultural and economic geography
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was bolstered by a new geography of power as well. State and corporate forces on both sides of the border cooperated with each other enforcing the mutual interests between American and Mexican border elites in the suppression of dissent and labor organizing.69

Mexico underwent a widespread privatization and enclosure process of land tenure during the second half of the nineteenth century.70 Díaz’s economic policies accelerated this trend and opened up Mexican land and natural resources to foreign ownership and promoted foreign investment on easy terms, which aligned perfectly with investors desires from north of the border that supported economic penetration and domination of Mexico but not territorial acquisition. While Mexico’s elite and small middle class also benefited from the economic growth during the Porfiriato, land ownership became highly concentrated.72

Sufficient rural and urban employment was not developed in domestic industry or in the expanding cash crop-export sector to absorb Mexico’s displaced rural population. Many rural Mexicans lacking formal title were dispossessed through the denunciation of “vacant lands” processes that increased under the Porfiriato. Private investors, often Anglo American, frequently obtained lands with a history of communal use from surveyors who did not disclose potential conflicting claims. Many were unaware of the questionable legality of the titles they had obtained and resentful or unconcerned with the opposing claims of the displaced peasantry.73
Uprooted campesinos and ruined artisans fed the growth of a large migratory labor force in Mexico during the late nineteenth century as they were pushed from their customary homes and pulled northward by the higher earning potential available to waged mine and ranch workers in the northern states of Mexico. By the first decade of the twentieth century, transnational migratory labor crossing over from the northern states of Mexico became instrumental to the development of the southwestern United States. The migratory response of Mexican workers to land enclosures eased pressure on the Mexican state to ensure their integration into its modernizing economy, thus facilitating economic growth in the southwestern United States where Mexican labor was in high demand. Mexican workers received discriminatory treatment in the new foreign owned industries, mostly mines and ranches, on both sides of the border. Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants only became regionally predominant after rising numbers crossed the border after 1910 and labor demand increased with the outbreak of World War I, although they had been a vital part of the local labor force in southern California and other areas adjacent to the international border since the American conquest.

Mexican and Indian labor were already instrumental in several industries in San Diego County before World War I, including the Imperial Valley area established as Imperial County in 1907. These included agriculture, road and railroad maintenance, mining, real estate construction, city and county public works projects, and other industries requiring unskilled and semi-skilled labor.
Intense discussion was then underway among large employers of unskilled and migratory farm labor in California about how best to meet their desire for cheap and expendable seasonal labor.\textsuperscript{77} A racial geography of labor, with Mexican and Mexican Americans on the bottom of the socioeconomic scale, developed on American owned properties on both sides of the border.\textsuperscript{78} An article by Wilbur Jay Hall during the formative period, published by \textit{Sunset Magazine} in 1910, suggested that the Imperial Valley was “Just Like Dixie Land.”\textsuperscript{79} It expresses an explicit desire for a racial division of labor to take hold in the newly irrigated lands. In essence, Anglo owners and employers throughout the Southwest would benefit from migratory Mexican labor. On the other hand, Anglo labor would be privileged with respect to job opportunities, living conditions, and membership in a superior caste.\textsuperscript{80} A successful PLM-IWW revolution in Baja California might have stood in the way of these trends favored by transnational capital.

\textbf{Conclusion: Historical Memory in 1911 and 2011}

Recalling a past social revolutionary uprising is an exercise in treading thin ice, especially when it has generated as much controversy as the events of the Baja California uprising of 1911. An interpretive path of least resistance adheres to clearly marked pathways along a borderland both joining and dividing two countries of unequal political-economic power. Around the boundary line, culturally constructed frontiers and zones of interaction overlap superimposed

\textit{Rebels at Fort Rosecrans, San Diego, June 1911. ©SDHC #OP 259.}
on the territorial division. Unlike physical borders that are defined in terms of the inclusion or exclusion of space, the geography of cultural frontiers are shaped by ever changing states of negotiation and reconstitution influenced by the daily encounters of diverse individuals and groups, and the popular memory of past interactions. Transnational economic interests and powerful institutional forces, reaching across physical as well as cultural geographies, have shaped lives on both sides of the border. In so doing, the economic power of transnational capital has influenced popular understanding of events challenging to its hegemony.

The events of 1911 in Baja California were enmeshed within developing regional political-economic trends in Mexico and the southwestern United States; global partnerships and rivalries were stoked by increased United States imperialism in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War. The limited advances achieved in political, economic, and cultural life for the average Mexican during the revolution reflect the contingent nature of cultural and political-economic systems in historical time and physical space. The distribution of land ownership remains a vital issue in Mexico; and the elimination of the caste system, recognition of labor rights, limitations on the power of the Catholic Church, and a partial restoration of Mexican hegemony over its natural resources, have only been partially realized in practice and remain hotly contested.

From the perspective of 2012, with political unrest and revolutionary ferment having erupted across the globe, the international character of the 1911 revolution in Baja California seems more readily apparent. The importance, and perils, to Mexico of its increased global economic interdependence in the later nineteenth
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century—specifically the reliance upon foreign capital and the exploitation of cheap labor for national economic development—was strikingly paralleled in many ways by Iran, China, and Russia. Events outside these countries resulted in a dramatic curtailment of foreign credits during the first decade of the twentieth century after a period of increased agricultural commercialization and expanded foreign investment. National elites in all four countries who were eager to modernize their culture and economies became dependent on the steady flow of capital to maintain employment and political order due to the uneven course of economic development characterized by land enclosures, externally oriented export enclaves, and growing wealth inequality. Subsequent contraction in the availability of foreign direct investment turned boom to bust and helped undo these national elites as fiscal crisis combined with combative populations resulted in destabilized national governments and revolution.

Contemporary understandings of the 1911 Baja California episode in the greater Mexican Revolution were bitterly contested, like the disorders of 2011, and they were colored by the ideological, ethnic, gender and class positions from which the participants viewed it. In 1994, coinciding with the launch of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Zapatista movement in Chiapas appropriated and used Ricardo Flores Magón’s legacy along with the other Mexican working class revolutionary heroes—Emiliano Zapata and Francisco Villa—as a stark
reminder to the Mexican and United States ruling class of the persistence of revolutionary unrest in the countryside in rural Mexico. Zapatista popularity in the 1990s, and the moral support they received from many urban dwellers on both sides of the border, was an unnerving spectacle for the governments and business elites who had promoted NAFTA for its echo of the revolutionary times at the beginning of the century. In 2006, another rebellion with large scale indigenous participation occurred in Magón’s ancestral home state of Oaxaca, and his inspiration was readily apparent among some of the rebels. The continuing relevance of the legacy of Magón to indigenous groups in Mexico who have claimed his memory as their own shows the persistent power of his ideals to Mexico’s dispossessed.

NOTES

2. Ibid., 1, 8.
3. Ibid., 8.
4. Ibid., 10. Mexican Indians from multiple groups were, in fact, involved in the Baja California Revolution. Carson’s statement is more reflective of the prevailing attitudes of Anglos in the Southwestern United States to view indigenous groups as Mexicans, and vice versa. Anthropologist Roger C. Owen’s field work with Indian groups in Baja California produced important details and narrative strands about the involvement of local Indians with both the rebels and government forces. See Roger C. Owen, “Indians and Revolution: The 1911 Invasion of Baja California, Mexico,” Ethnohistory 10, No. 4 (Autumn, 1963), 373-395.
5. “Anglos” is used in this context, as in common practice in U.S. southwestern history, to refer generally to the “white” Americanized immigrants and American-born of European descent from north of the border. Although the true etymology of the moniker – wobbly or wobblyies – is unknown, IWW lore most often refers to an exchange with a friendly Chinese restaurateur from Vancouver, British Columbia in 1911 who would extend credit to members. When asking if someone was an IWW, he would unsuccessfully try to pronounce the “w” by saying “I Wobble Wobble.” Local members, amused by the mispronunciation, began to jokingly call themselves “I Wobbly Wobbly.” Another possible explanation refers to the “wobble saw,” a type of circular saw mounted askew for cutting wider grooves. Canadian labor historian Mark Leier notes the first explanation’s popularity in wobbly lore reflected that the wobbles considered it a humorous effort to counter racism and simple way of practicing internationalism. See Mark Leier, Where the Fraser River Flows: The Industrial Workers of the World in British Columbia, (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1990), 35, 54 n. 8.
6. Even though the PLM leadership would later openly proclaim anarchist principles, after the Baja California Revolution was defeated, only some of the members of the PLM or the IWW among the armed rebels were inspired by anarchist or syndicalist ideas. Both organizations nonetheless shared a common ideological outlook that parliamentary political action was a useless farce, and they both advocated the tactics of direct action, the general strike, and sabotage to achieve their goals. See Troy Robert Fuller, “Our Cause is Your Cause: The Relationship Between the Industrial Workers of the World and the Partido Liberal Mexicano, 1905-1911”
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(M.A. Thesis, The University of Calgary, Alberta, 1997). Fuller has written a well argued thesis on the connections between the PLM and IWW, with his interpretation stressing the role of Mexican American dual members of the rank and file and local leadership in both organizations as critical to forging the linkages that resulted in a PLM-IWW alliance by the time of the Baja California Revolution in 1911. See also, Norman E. Caulfield, “The Industrial Workers of the World and Mexican Labor,” (M.A. Thesis, University of Houston, 1987).

7. For a more colorful early account of the foreign legion in Baja California, with as much a journalistic as a literary treatment of the subject matter, see Peter B. Kyne, “The Gringo as Insurrecto,” Sunset Magazine, 27 (September 1911), 257-267. Kyne became a prolific and well-known author of short stories and novels soon after; many of his works became early screenplays during the silent film era.

8. Camp talk within the foreign legion, according to Carson, held it as “general knowledge” that rebel soldiers would be paid one dollar per day and be granted 160 acres for their services should the revolution succeed. Ibid.

9. The excerpted “Manifesto to the Workers of the World,” dated April 3, 1911, was printed with a prominent headline on the English language page, as well as leading the front page in Spanish. PDF files of the complete collection of Regeneración (1900-1918), among other texts, are now available online at the Archivo Electrónico Ricardo Flores Magón established by Mexico’s Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia. Accessible online: http://www.archivomagon.net/Periodico/Regeneracion/Regeneracion.html

11. The term “Magonista” to refer to the partisans of the Los Angeles based PLM junta, once in common usage, has fallen out of favor in more recent scholarship. One reason for the loss of favor is a growing recognition that the anarcho-syndicalist inspired ideology of the PLM strongly opposed leader glorification and hierarchy. Like the IWW, the PLM identified caciquismo or “bossism” as instrumental to the capitalist, governmental, and religious authority structures that stood in the way of workers putting control of the land and factories into their own hands. For a similar acknowledgment, citing Magón and a supporter, see Benjamin Maldonado Alvarado, Ante el centenario de la Revolución Mexicana: Magonismo y vida comunal mesoamericana, (Oaxaca: Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes, Oaxaca Secretaria de Cultura, 2010), 11, fn. 1.

Mexican revoltoos in the United States, see W. Dirk Ratt, Revoltoos: Mexico's Rebels in the United States, 1903-1923, (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1981), passim, especially pp. 175-243. For a more probing analysis of the role of American economic penetration of Mexico beginning in the nineteenth century, and its resultant political influence on the Mexican Revolution, see also John Mason Hart, Empire and Revolution: The Americans in Mexico since the Civil War, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). Hart’s latter work, based on extensive archival research in Mexico and the United States, draws on many declassified files from the American-Mexican claims commissions arising out of the Bucareli Accords of 1923, covering claims arising out of events from the 1910s through the 1940s. Yet, he also notes in a bibliographical essay at the end of the book that “[t]he United States Government, its officials, and American businesses, entrepreneurs, and persons who went to live in Mexico have lost or kept secret many of the facts regarding their experiences there. The papers of Wilson and Roosevelt administration officials in private collections, the National Archives, and the Library of Congress have been carefully culled to remove damaging or embarrassing material.” Hart, Empire and Revolution, 542.

14. Hart, Revolutionary Mexico, passim.


18. Hart, Anarchism, 88. See also Hart, Revolutionary Mexico, 88; Albro, Always a Rebel, 5; Blaisdell, Desert Revolution, 4; Cockcroft, Intellectual Precursors, 74; Hanlen, “Ricardo Flores Magón,” 5; Gómez-Quiones, Sembradores, 20-21; Langham, Border Trials, 7; MacLachlan, Anarchism, 2; Turner, Ricardo Flores Magón, 18; Turner, Revolution, vii.

19. Sources are contradictory regarding the year of Ricardo Flores Magón’s birth. A brief chapter has been dedicated to the issue in Benjamin Maldonado Alvarado, Ante el centenario de la Revolución Mexicana, 93-5. The most widely accepted birth year is 1873, with several adherents that include his intimates like Ethel Duffy Turner and Nicolás T. Bernal, although 1874 has gained supporters based on the remembrance of his brother Enrique – who has not always been an accurate source on details. The year 1864 has been asserted by Mexican historian José C. Valadés, and 1875 has been suggested based on a letter written by Ricardo Flores Magón to his defense attorney Harry Weinberger on May 9, 1921. Maldonado Alvarado states that the municipal authorities of Eloxochitlán produced a birth certificate confirming 1873 during a 1986 seminar organized by the Centro de Investigación y Documentación sobre Temas y Autores Oaxaqueños, de la Casa de la Cultura Oaxaqueña.
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23. Albro, Always a Rebel, 5-22; Blaisdell, The Desert Revolution, 5; Hart, Anarchism, 88-89; Raat, Revoltosos, 18-20.
25. The Industrial Worker, September 17, 1910, 3, as cited in Fuller, “Our Cause is Your Cause,” 94-95.
27. Fuller, “Our Cause is Your Cause,” 91-106.
28. For the term gringo insurrecto, I borrow from Kyne, “The Gringo as Insurrecto.”
30. Chicano historian Richard Griswold del Castillo dubbed the Baja California Revolution the “discredited revolution” in one of the three other articles published by this journal addressing the insurgency in Baja California in 1911. He specifically considers the question of why the PLM did not attract more Mexican recruits and its attendant loss of political appeal, identifying the non-Mexican character of the army as a major political liability. Richard Griswold del Castillo, “The Discredited Revolution: The Magonista Capture of Tijuana in 1911,” The Journal of San Diego History, Vol. 26, No. 6 (Fall, 1980), 256-273.
33. Blaisdell, The Desert Revolution, 73-6. See also Turner, Revolution in Baja California, 10, 23-4; Martinez, A History of Lower California, 471-4.
34. Blaisdell, The Desert Revolution, 81, 83.

41. Humphries, *Gringo Revolutionary*, 163-172, especially 171. Humphries concludes on page 171: “Pryce’s departure was tactical. Desertion would have been wholly uncharacteristic of a man whose life had been spent courting danger.”


47. Blaisdell concluded: “As a journalist and a theoretician, he approached, and at times achieved, greatness. On the other hand, as a leader of men, his incompetence was truly breathtaking.” Blaisdell, *The Desert Revolution*, 204. Richard Griswold del Castillo also reached a similar conclusion: “The P.L.M.’s failure was not due primarily to its ideology. Indeed most of the party’s platform was later enacted into law in the Mexican Constitution of 1917. The key to the failure rather was due to the party’s lack of pragmatic leadership.” Griswold del Castillo, “The Discredited Revolution,” 263-5, 271. See also: Fuller, “Our Cause is Your Cause,” 117-120.


49. A personal visit to the National Archives, Pacific Division, confirmed the lack of trial records pertinent to Ferris and Pryce.

50. Spreckels was also heavily invested in the San Diego and Arizona Railroad under construction.


52. Headline and subheadline from Felix J. Koch, “Will Uncle Sam Move His Border Line?” *Overland Monthly*, 57, 6 (June, 1911), 646.


54. Koch, “will Uncle Sam,” 646.

55. Ibid., 650, 646-7.


57. Koch, “will Uncle Sam,” 646.

58. Ibid.,


60. Ibid., 650. For a nuanced analysis on the value of travel writing as a window to the discourse about empire, see also David M. Wrobel, “Exceptionalism and Globalism: Travel Writers and the Nineteenth-Century American West,” *The Historian*, 68, 3 (Fall 2006), 431-60.


62. Ibid., 649.
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64. Hart, Empire and Revolution, 1-267, passim.


66. Margaret L. Holbrook Smith, “The Capture of Tia Juana,” Overland Monthly, Vol. 28, No. 1, (July, 1911), 4. This article describes the capture of Tia Juana on May 8-9, 1911, by the rebel insurrectos from the perspective of an American observer watching from north of the line. The barbed wire fence had been erected by U.S. troops as part of their containment efforts to cut off all means of support to the insurrectos from north of the border.


68. See, for example, the “Yankee enclave” characterization of the Mexicali Valley in Dorothy Pierson Kerg, “Yankee enclave: The Colorado River Land Company and Mexican agrarian reform in Baja California,” (Ph.D. Diss., Univ. of CA, Irvine, 1988).


70. Hart, Revolutionary Mexico, passim, especially 33-51.


72. Baja California was exemplary due to its remoteness and low population density compared to central Mexico. In Empire and Revolution, one of Hart’s appendices lists the following large property holdings in Baja California: the California-Mexican Company tracts totaling 1,949,702 acres; the Circle Bar Ranch totaling 1,000,000 acres owned by R.H. Benton and the Norte Circle Bar Cattle Co.; the Colorado River Land Co. totaling 860,655 acres owned by Harrison Gray Otis and Harry Chandler, et. al.; Diversos Baldios totaling 1,480,939 acres owned by Delbert J. Hoff; the Isla del Carmen totaling 540,000 acres owned by the Pacific Salt Co.; the Mexicali town site of 100,000 acres owned by Guillermo Andrade heirs, Hiram W. Blaisdell, and Willam Hefferman; Rancho Ensenada totaling 1,100,000 acres owned by Marfa Amparo Ruiz de Burton; San Pedro Martyr totaling 288,000 acres owned by Sam A. and Frank T. Thing; the Sociedad Irrigacion land tract of 100,000 acres owned by Sociedad de Irrigacion S.A.; and 235,000 acres of various tracts owned by the heirs of John MacManus. Not included in this list, however, are the holdings of John D. Spreckels. Hart, Empire and Revolution, 511-525.

73. Sophisticated investor syndicates were more aware of their questionable land titles. Consider the lengths to which the Colorado River Land Company went to research and secure title documentation and related information to prepare for inevitable counter claims: Kerig, “Yankee enclave,” 70-127.

74. Marc Reisler notes that after 1910, Mexico became the “prime source” of the migratory work force in California agriculture north of the border and Mexican workers performed nearly all the construction and maintenance work for municipal streetcar systems and public works in Southern California. Reisler, By the Sweat of their Brow: Mexican Immigrant Labor in the United States, 1900-1940 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1976), 6-8.


76. See Frederick L. Ryan, The Labor Movement in San Diego: Problems and Development from 1887 to


78. Almaguer, Racial Fault Lines.


82. The threads of global causation in the Mexican Revolution are amply described in Hart, Revolutionary Mexico, passim, especially chapter seven, 187-234.


BOOK REVIEWS


Reviewed by Robert M. Senkewicz, Professor, Department of History, Santa Clara University.

Over the past few decades, those studying California before the American conquest have written accounts that foreground the actions and experiences of California’s native peoples. Scholars from a variety of disciplines, employing a diverse array of conventional and unconventional sources, have greatly expanded our understanding of the fashion in which the overwhelming majority of people who lived there reacted to the incursion of European colonists, beginning with the founding of San Diego in 1769. Quincy D. Newell’s study of the Native Californians who lived in and around the site of Mission San Francisco de Asís is an important and compelling addition to this literature.

Newell uses the copious sacramental registers compiled by generations of Franciscan missionaries as her primary source. Focusing on the notes and comments with which the missionaries annotated the records of the ecclesiastical rituals they regularly administered, she constructs a vivid picture of the ways native peoples strove mightily and creatively to preserve their traditional identities and beliefs in the midst of profound social and cultural changes.

The volume is effectively organized into a series of thematic chapters. Newell studies the ways native peoples functioned within the mission community. Some San Francisco Indians appear to have fully embraced Catholicism, and others appear to have fully rejected it. Most, however, lived in a kind of middle ground. While adapting on the surface to new forms of religion, family structure, labor, and agriculture, they actually grafted these new experiences onto their traditional beliefs and folkways.

Newell demonstrates the persistence of native forms in food preparation, architecture, domestic spatial arrangements, and many other aspects of California life. The fact that so many births and deaths took place away from the mission, for instance, indicates that even baptized Catholic Indians sought out their traditional rituals for these important occasions. Indians appear to have used the spaces available to them. For instance, neophytes sometimes chose godparents for those being baptized to re-create the traditional extended and lineal relationships that
were under siege by the missionaries’ insistence upon the sanctity of the nuclear family. Native peoples were quite aware that the entire Spanish colonial enterprise needed their labor. Some, who either refused to enter the mission or who left it, were able to carve out roles for themselves as relatively independent laborers at the nearby presidio or at the pueblo of San José.

Hovering over all of this was the appalling demographic catastrophe that the children born at Mission San Francisco experienced. Newell demonstrates that the mean life expectancy for these native San Franciscans averaged 4.2 years during the entire existence of the mission. Indeed, from 1793 until 1821, “it never exceeded 2.0 years” (p. 167). This brutal fact makes the determination of the people at the mission to preserve their own heritage at once heroic and tragic. What must it have been like for the four wives of Uichase (1774-1831), who collectively bore ten children, none of whom reached the age of three? In recovering this story, and many more like it, Newell has performed a signal service. This book deserves to be in the library of anyone interested in the colonial history of California and the Southwest.


Reviewed by Dave Bush, Adjunct History Instructor, Shasta College.

“We, that is to say, Alfred Rix & Chastina Walbridge, are married – Therefore, according to custom & law the said Alfred Rix will retain his name and gain a wife, while the said Chastina Walbridge will lose hers [sic] and gain a husband – time and trial will determine whether one or both have got ‘shaved’ in the exchange” (p. 27). Thus begins a sometimes-humorous daily journal that offers a glimpse into a wide range of topics: the loving relationship of newlyweds, small-town New England life, the couple’s views on major political issues, their separate decisions to travel to California, Chastina’s journey west by way of Panama, burgeoning San Francisco, and gender roles among the mid-nineteenth century white middle class.

In 1972, Lynn Bonfield discovered the journal in the California Historical Society collection. Over the years, Bonfield researched the people and events mentioned in the journal and collected family letters and pictures, adding depth to the journal.
entries. To make the journal easily comprehensible, Bonfield identifies each entry’s author, divides the journal into chapters, adds detailed chapter introductions, and includes an epilogue based largely on family letters and histories. Bonfield has done a fantastic job creating an informative and enjoyable book from a mix of dry factual entries, personal reflections, and thoughtful observations. To make the journal easily comprehensible, Bonfield identifies each entry’s author, divides the journal into chapters, adds detailed chapter introductions and explanatory footnotes, and includes an epilogue based largely on family letters and histories.

Alfred and Chastina met in Peacham, Vermont, when Alfred arrived in town to begin college preparatory classes at Peacham Academy in 1841. Alfred attended the University of Vermont, then returned to Peacham and became the Academy’s principal (with significant teaching duties) prior to their marriage.

In Vermont, they recorded everything from the establishment of their first and second homes, visits with friends and neighbors, Sunday sermons (or their decision to sleep in), the birth of their first child, and the weather to a libel suit against a local merchant and troubles with a landlord. Alfred’s entries often describe events outside the home: managing the school and teaching, fishing trips, becoming a lawyer, resigning as principal, his work establishing a local cooperative store, and involvement in local politics. Yet he does not exclude domestic life: Alfred regularly comments on Chastina’s monthly period as a visit from the “old lady” while he considers the best time to have children (p. 72).

Soon after marrying, Chastina began teaching at the Academy, but as wife of the principal she was not paid. In her entries, she comments on her teaching experiences, her poor health, concern about Alfred’s long work schedule, and local births and deaths. She regularly mentions her long days of housework as in this November 1850 entry, “Alfred read newspapers, & for my own self, did a large ironing & attended to other domestic business” (p. 170).

The pair also writes about larger issues of the day. They attend several temperance meetings, and issues around slavery are repeatedly referenced: the Wilmot Proviso, the Compromise of 1850, rumblings of secession, the Fugitive Slave Act, and Uncle Tom’s Cabin. After finishing Stowe’s novel, Chastina writes, “It makes my heart bleed to think of the horrors attendant upon the abominable system of Slavery” (p. 274).

California plays a major role in the journal. At first there are sporadic mentions of friends and family heading to the gold fields, and then letters begin trickling back to Peacham; by 1851, Alfred has resolved to head west. With Alfred away, Chastina writes longingly of missing her husband, the hardships of living alone and caring for a baby, and yearning for Alfred’s return. When Alfred sends word that he has left the gold mines without success and is working in San Francisco, he
asks Chastina to move to California. Surprised by the request, Chastina confides in the journal her significant concerns about moving west, but after much thought and planning, she and her baby make their way to California.

In San Francisco they fill their journal with city life: reports of duels, attending a ball, the first telegraph line to San Jose, and talk of a transcontinental railroad. With the birth of their second child, Chastina’s life is increasingly confined to the home and house work: “it is nearly six weeks since I have been in the street, and I dont [sic] get time to read the papers, so we are likely to have rather a dry Journal” (p. 336). For his part, Alfred returns to teaching and then the law, eventually being elected a local judge. Over time the entries become shorter; in 1854, the journaling ends except for a final entry in 1857.

Anyone interested in daily mid-nineteenth century America life would enjoy reading this diary. For faculty, assigning several pages of the journal would offer students the opportunity to analyze a primary source document while reading an engaging text. Whether studied in whole or in part, no one reading the journal will be “shaved in the exchange.”


Reviewed by Frank P. Barajas, Associate Professor, History Program, California State University Channel Islands.

Frederic Caire Chiles’ intriguing book is a story of immigrant parents that pursued the American dream of reinvention and the establishment of a legacy for their progeny. But the realization of this fantasy was a mixed bag of rewards and familial rancor. Justinian Caire and his wife Albina envisioned Santa Cruz Island as a demesne that would bond the families of their sons and daughters into the future. Instead, it divided the Caire siblings against each other. Ultimately, the National Park Service, in cooperation with the Nature Conservancy, gained control of the island. Although this focus on family conflict may not have been Chiles’ intended thesis, it is this framework that dominates the book’s narrative.

Justinian Caire was born in 1827 to a family of privilege in the French city of Briancon. After excelling in a liberal education, Justinian left school at the age of eighteen to partner with a cousin “to learn the world of business” (p. 22). Thus the Caire family’s immigrant origins were not of the huddled masses that entered
the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During the California Gold Rush era, Justinian took advantage of the social and commercial capital of his family to found the Justinian Caire Company that, like many merchants of the time, mined the wealth of independent miners and sold heavier equipment and supplies to companies that would quickly dominate this industry.

The success of his company allowed Justinian the opportunity to cement his family’s legacy in the realization of the California Dream. He partnered with San Francisco investors that purchased the island from William Barron in 1869. The Santa Cruz Island Company then lost the island in a financial scheme that nearly bankrupted the Justinian Caire Company. But Justinian persevered through the crisis and in the process acquired all the stock of the Santa Cruz Island Company, making the landmass his. To him, the property was much more than acquired real estate; it was a seigniorial possession that would secure his family’s future.

Instead of securing family unity, however, the island fragmented the Caire clan. Whereas Justinian and Albina Caire imagined their children gratefully benefiting from the dividends of the Santa Cruz Island Company, their sons-in-law sought to liquidate the stock bequeathed to the Caire daughters: Amelie who married Pietro Carlo Rossi and Algæ who married Goffredo Capuccio. Hence, after Justinian’s death in 1897 at the age of 70, a bitter legal battle commenced that outlasted most of the plaintiffs as the matriarch Albina and her sons Arthur and Frederic fought to maintain control of the island up to 1937. But a transformed economy in California, coupled with recurrent droughts and floods and mounting legal expenses, served as the coup de grâce of this “California Dynasty.”

In detailing this family saga, Chiles judiciously examines the legal dispute from the perspectives of the plaintiffs and defendants. For example, he details the Caire view toward the island as property to be passed onto future generations for their enjoyment; on the other hand the sons-in-law, their wives, and their offspring desired the immediate monetary rewards from the division and sale of the island. Chiles’s description of the legal maneuverings of both sides is one of the more engaging aspects of the book and demonstrates how property can be more a burden than a prize.

Where the book falls short is in fully contextualizing this family narrative in the larger landscape of California’s history as the subtitle promises: it is not clear what made the Caire family a dynasty in the Golden State. The “dynastic” nature of the family could have been explored more fully if Chiles had elaborated upon the Justinian Caire Company’s economic importance in San Francisco during and after the Gold Rush. In relation to Santa Cruz Island, the author also had the opportunity to analyze the decline and transformation of the Californios in the Santa Barbara region. Instead, Mexican vaqueros (cowboys) are largely depicted as
bit players who rounded up and sheered sheep. As a result, this limited depiction of ethnic Mexicans restricts the larger narrative to an intergenerational family dispute over Justinian’s will.

Historians interested in the history of Southern California’s Channel Islands, of which Santa Cruz is the largest, will be able to glean from this work potential research projects regarding the role of Mexican laborers, fishing, and the federal government’s acquisition of this archipelago. And hopefully the author will donate his archive of Caire diaries, records, memoirs, and journals to a research library so that scholars can investigate the larger historical questions subsumed into the background of this curious family tale.


Reviewed by Arnoldo De León, Professor, Department of History, Angelo State University, Texas.

In this enlightening tome, Mark Brilliant expands upon traditional studies on civil rights by moving the setting out of the South and westward to California. Between the start of World War II and 1978 (when the Supreme Court ruled on the Bakke case), California became the epicenter of judicial struggles involving Japanese Americans, African Americans, Mexican Americans, and Chinese Americans. Decisions made on these several cases, Brilliant informs us, influenced civil rights efforts throughout the rest of the nation.

The author structures the work chronologically, with chapters sequentially focused on different racial groups. Most appropriately, it begins with Japanese Americans, the victims of internment and land dispossession during World War II. Some of the plaintiffs found justice in _Oyama v. California_ (1948), a case which involved an Issei man who had purchased land in the name of his Nisei son, Fred. The American-born Fred Oyama questioned the constitutionality of the Alien Land Law (1913) which prohibited aliens ineligible for citizenship from acquiring land in California. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that as a U.S. citizen, Fred Oyama was entitled to recover his dispossessed property (although foreign-born Japanese could not). Mexican Americans faced obstacles acquiring an adequate education amid a segregated school system, but in the case of _Méndez v. Westminster_ (1947), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in California sided with the aggrieved,
concurring that Mexican ancestry determined segregation (and not language problems, as school officials maintained). African Americans attacked covenants that prohibited home sales to blacks, and in Shelly v. Kraemer (1948), the U.S. Supreme Court declared that such real estate restrictions violated the Fourteenth Amendment (while not a California case, the Golden State nonetheless honored the decision and dismissed all active suits on said restrictions).

As demonstrated in the above cases, each group saw its difficulties with mainstream society differently and chose to tackle the problem (or problems) most troublesome to them. Consequently, assembling a multi-racial coalition committed to the cause of civil rights proved challenging. The Democrats, who advocated most strenuously for these groups, could not please them all, and in obliging some – by enacting fair housing laws to protect African Americans, for example – simultaneously alienated many in their ranks as well as those minorities who felt abandoned on other fronts. While the civil rights movement in California ultimately lost its post-World War II momentum with Ronald Reagan’s election in 1966, new issues of a multi-racial character surfaced due to problems created by court-mandated busing, by appeals for bilingual education, and by calls for special linguistic programs for Chinese Americans. The Supreme Court recognized the character of this multi-racial phenomenon in the Bakke case, acknowledging that racism was not the simple binary of black and white.

This work advances several useful considerations. For one, it suggests historians should more closely study the civil rights activism of other marginalized people (besides African Americans), for they also took up their own struggles, as shown by the California example. Further, it recommends modifying the meaning of white oppression, for as Brilliant indicates, groups viewed racism according to their particular experiences: it might mean housing discrimination to African Americans, school segregation based on ancestry to Mexican Americans, and the infringement on cultural rights to Chinese Americans. Also, it encourages scholars to rescue from anonymity other historical actors who undertook feats similar to those launched by the activists, lawyers, politicians, and reformers that Brilliant identifies. Scholars would do well to heed the conclusions in The Color of America Has Changed and consider their application to other states, such as Texas.
The documentary film *Finding God in the City of Angels* celebrates the unparalleled religious diversity of Los Angeles. After watching it, however, I wished the filmmakers had set their sights higher, had striven not merely to celebrate that diversity but to analyze, historicize, or contextualize it. Certainly director Jennifer Jessum and writer Simon Joseph had the tools to do so – the film was produced by the Institute for Signifying Scriptures at Claremont Graduate University, which promotes the scholarly study of the “practices, representations, ideologies, and power dynamics” of holy texts. In its description of *Finding God in the City of Angels*, the Institute describes the film as highlighting how “scriptural traditions are made both to shape and secure and to undermine identities, positions, agency, and power.” Yet there is very little of this kind of explicit analysis in the film itself, which is earnest and uplifting rather than critical or argumentative.

Structurally, the film is a mosaic, compiled of dozens of short segments each focused on a specific tradition, sect, or movement. In each segment, interviews with practitioners are edited together with footage of worship practices, architecture, and material culture. The film’s first hour focuses on major world religions as expressed in Los Angeles: Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Bahá’í. The second hour shifts to “alternative communities and new religious movements,” although I doubt many of the groups included would consider themselves “alternative” or “new.” Mormons, Scientologists, Goddess worshippers, Gnostics, Hare Krishnas, and members of Mata Amritanandamayi Center, Agape International Spiritual Center, Love at Work: The Exchange, and Self-Realization Fellowship make appearances. Atheists at the Center for Inquiry also receive attention.

As you would expect from such a long list of traditions, the filmmakers are only able to dedicate a few minutes to each group, resulting in a film that is wide but not deep. Although it is beautifully shot, with lush and vibrant colors, its overly celebratory tone and lack of analysis makes it unfit for use in most religious studies or history college classes. I can imagine it being useful in California high schools, where it might give students a first, sympathetic glimpse at the multicultural religious diversity that surrounds them.
Ultimately the film’s greatest strength is its interviews, and the filmmakers deserve credit for winning the trust of so many different people and for capturing multiple memorable moments. These range from the member of the Self-Realization Fellowship who confesses he is striving to be “spiritually badass” to the evangelical Protestant pastor who, likely sensing the universalist thrust of the film project in which he was participating, declares, “It’s very important for people to understand, there’s a great difference between any [other] religion and Christianity.” His statement is a reminder that many (if not most) religious Los Angelenos do not believe that all spiritual paths lead to the same place or that similarities among religions overshadow the differences, contra the message of this film.

BOOK NOTES

Clark Kerr’s University of California: Leadership, Diversity, and Planning in Higher Education. By Cristina González. New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction, 2011. Bibliography and index. xvi + 254 pp. $49.95 cloth. In Clark Kerr’s University of California, Cristina González traces the development of the university president’s concept of the “multiversity.” The book explores issues such as organizational strategies and diversity in higher education while offering solutions to some of the challenges currently confronting American universities.

From Bible Belt to Sunbelt: Plain-Folk Religion, Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Evangelical Conservatism. By Darren Dochuk. New York: W. W. Norton, 2011. Illustrations, map, notes, bibliography, and index. xxiv + 520 pp. $35.00 cloth. $18.95 paper. Dochuk’s monograph examines the impact of Depression-era migrants on California politics. These “plain-folk” migrants from the Dust Bowl region helped provide the foundation for an evangelical movement that influenced Republican politicians such as Barry Goldwater, Richard Nixon, and Ronald Reagan.

Living for the City: Migration, Education, and the Rise of the Black Panther Party in Oakland, California. By Donna Jean Murch. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010. Illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography, and index. xiv + 312 pp. $22.95 paper. This book traces the roots of the Black Panther Party to the migration of African Americans to the San Francisco Bay Area, especially during the Second World War. Historian Murch then examines how Merritt College and other institutions of higher education radicalized students and allowed them to develop critiques of American political and economic life. These experiences provided a platform from which the members of the Black Panthers could challenge the approaches of mainstream civil rights organizations.
Making the San Fernando Valley: Rural Landscapes, Urban Development, and White Privilege. By Laura R. Barraclough. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011. Illustrations, notes, bibliography, and index. xii + 319 pp. $24.95 paper. While the San Fernando Valley is part of the second largest city in the nation, it displays many features of rural life, including citrus groves, equestrian centers, and dirt roads. This volume argues that such elements of the environment represent not a lack of modern development but a conscious planning decision to create a landscape rich in meaning about white privilege.

Migra! A History of the U.S. Border Patrol. By Kelly Lytle Hernández. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010. Illustrations, bibliography, notes, and index. xvi + 311 pp. $55 cloth. $21.95 paper. This narrative history of the Border Patrol traces the evolution of this agency from its humble beginnings in 1924 to the 1970s. Hernández draws on American as well as Mexican sources to develop an account that is transnational in its focus.

The Sleepy Lagoon Murder Case: Race Discrimination and Mexican-American Rights. By Mark A. Weitz. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010. Chronology, bibliographic essay, and index. viii + 203 pp. $34.95 cloth. $17.95 paper. Attorney and historian Mark Weitz investigates the causes and consequences of the famous 1942 Sleepy Lagoon murder case, in which seventeen Mexican American youth were convicted in a decision later overturned after Mexican American activists, Hollywood celebrities, and liberal attorneys (including Carey McWilliams) organized an appeal. Weitz explores the racial tensions of wartime Los Angeles as well as the legacies of the trial for the principles of defendants’ rights.
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