The Journal of San Diego History
SAN DIEGO HISTORICAL SOCIETY QUARTERLY
Fall 1988, Volume 34, Number 4
Thomas L. Scharf, Editor
by Rickey D. Best
Auburn University at Montgomery
Some three thousand miles from the main theatre of battle, San Diego escaped the bloody impact of the Civil War. With the advent of Reconstruction and the “Great Barbecue” of internal improvements following the war, San Diego saw an opportunity to grow in importance as a city. By becoming the western terminus of a transcontinental rail line, San Diego would be able to break free of the monopoly on transportation held by the Central Pacific Railroad and its owners, Collis Huntington, Leland Stanford, Charles Crocker, and Mark Hopkins. A competing railroad, San Diegans believed, would result in population and commerce rushing to their city. Property values would rise, and untold wealth would accrue to those willing to risk investing in the city. In this, San Diego was no different from a score of other cities across the nation that hoped to cash in on the economic benefits of the Reconstruction era, an era marvelously lampooned in a novel of the time, The Gilded Age by Mark Twain. San Diego had been awaiting a rail connection with the east since the 1850’s, when surveys had indicated the practicality of three routes across the nation for a transcontinental road. The route most valuable to San Diego lay along the 32nd parallel, and it was this route which had been heavily favored by the southern states. The sectionalism of the nation before the Civil War had prevented a road from being built along this route, however. By 1871, though, the arguments of economic justice to the recently defeated south offered San Diego a hope of getting a rail connection. The road being proposed to make the connection was the Texas and Pacific.
The story of the Texas and Pacific and its efforts to come to San Diego reads like a chapter from The Gilded Age. Charges of corruption, ignorance and fraud abounded, from the halls of Congress to the streets of San Diego. The Texas and Pacific railroad was truly a reconstruction era story, a story of local activity impacted by national events. These events included a national economic crisis, and political compromises between the nation’s dominant capitalists and political parties. That San Diego would not get its rail connection for almost two decades more was the result of forces beyond the city’s control. Throughout the decade of the 1870’s, the city would live in hope, a hope that was never to be realized.
The efforts of San Diego to become tied to the rest of the nation began in 1854, with the organization of the San Diego and Gila, Southern Pacific and Atlantic Railway Company.1 The officers and directors of the company, being among San Diego’s wealthiest individuals, convinced the city to “donate” 8,850 acres of land to be used for railroad purposes. The land included valuable waterfront lands.2 These lands were to be used in helping the company to get its charter, and to provide land to be used in constructing the road. In 1868 after fourteen years of failing to raise money for construction, the railroad reorganized as the San Diego & Gila Railroad Company. The capital stock of the company was four million dollars, divided into forty thousand shares of $100 each, with San Diegans subscribing liberally.3
Following the reorganization of the company, Thomas Sedgewick, an agent for the San Diego & Gila, negotiated a contract with the Memphis and El Paso Railroad to sell the franchises and privileges of the San Diego & Gila from the San Diego Bay to the Colorado River. As a part of the agreement, stockholders were to receive stock in the Memphis and El Paso in exchange for their San Diego & Gila stock.4 Following the collapse of the Memphis and El Paso in 1870, San Diego continued its search for a rail outlet to the east.5
San Diegans saw their future intertwined with that of a rail connection eastward along the 32nd parallel. An article in the San Diego Union observed:
“Hitherto San Diego has been almost entirely sustained by money brought from abroad for investment in real estate. This money has steadily flowed out to San Francisco in exchange for lumber and other building materials and supplies of all kinds. None of it has remained here. We have really been living on our hopes of the future.”6
And the future, it was hoped, would include a Pacific Railroad naming San Diego as the western terminus. With bills before Congress to support the construction of a transcontinental line along the 32nd parallel, both San Diego and the southern states held their collective breaths.
The interdependence between San Diego and the south for the grandest internal improvement of them all, a railroad, is an interesting one. San Diego had been blocked from consideration as the terminus of the earlier transcontinental line by sectional prejudice and the Civil War.7 The south, as well as San Diego, had escaped relatively untouched by the “Great Barbecue” of internal improvements doled out by Congress during and after the war. During the period from 1865 to 1873, the south had received $9,469,363 for internal improvement projects, while the north and west had received a total of $93,825,138.8 With the return to power in the southern states of the Democratic party during the early 1870s, an increased pressure was placed upon the federal government to spend more on internal improvements in the south. The argument used by southerners was one of economic justice to the south. This view was a prominent feature in newspapers throughout the south and areas which stood to benefit from Pacific railroad legislation. An article in the Washington Chronicle, reprinted in the San Diego Union, typified this view:
“However regarded, this magnificent work [the Texas and Pacific Railroad bill] will become a magical agency in the development of the South. As a measure of reconstruction, it can not be overestimated. . . . Its passage will be hailed with joy North and South, as one of the noblest evidences of generosity of Congress and the Executive to the late insurrectionary States.”9
And, as the San Diego Union had claimed in 1869,
“It is certainly one of the principal duties of a government to foster and aid those individual enterprises that promote sectional intercourse, enhance commerce and develop the agricultural resources and mineral wealth of the newer section of the national domain.
“Why should not the United States government loan her credit in aid of a national system of interoceanic railways? The public treasury is depleted to improve rivers and harbors, without intention of reimbursement, yet the objectives are identical.”10
Sentiment in San Diego followed these lines, perhaps partially out of a feeling of justice for the South, but more likely out of a realization of practical benefit for the West in particular and for San Diego specifically. As E.W. Morse wrote:
“. . .public sentiment will in justice demand that the South be treated somewhat like the North, and. . . .that a southern route will prevent a monopoly [by the Central and Union Pacific Railroads] of the business and travel across the continent.”11
By doing “justice” to the South and constructing a competing transcontinental railroad, San Diego hoped to reap the benefits of an improved real estate market and commercial development.
The efforts of San Diego to become the terminus of a southern transcontinental route were tied in with the desire of the Southern states to have their own rail route. At the National Railroad Convention in St. Louis in November of 1875, the argument which had been made for the preceding four years was advanced yet again. The Chairman of the Convention’s Executive Committee, Col. James O. Broadhead, claimed that construction of the Texas and Pacific through the South would “resurrect and rehabilitate the South” by “passing through that fertile but distracted region of our country a perpetual tide of the world’s commerce, vitalizing its railroad system and revitalizing its paralyzed industries.”12 The convention continued its support of the Texas and Pacific as a transcontinental railroad for the South by declaring that the road should be constructed:
“As an act of justice and encouragement to the people of the Southern states, who have reason to complain of the partiality of the Government, which since its organization has expended for public improvements in the Northern states and territories $175,000. . .while in the Southern states and territories the public expenditures for similar purposes have been but $19,000,000”13
The convention also passed a resolution that the rail line should be constructed from Shreveport, Louisiana to San Diego on or near the 32nd parallel,14 thus ensuring that the road would maintain a southern orientation. This was a later effort, however, as by the time of the convention the Texas and Pacific was struggling to survive. Its beginnings had been somewhat different.
As Congressional debate over the passage of the Texas and Pacific bill of 1872 lengthened, San Diego became anxious. The efforts of the town to become the western terminus of the proposed road had been great, and the city’s elite were becoming concerned lest they should be passed by again. Wrote E.W. Morse: “. . .the Railroad is our only hope, almost life or death to us, and literally ruin or salvation to many of us.”15 The city’s anxiety was such that Morse, writing to one of San Diego’s railroad lobbyists in Washington, stated:
“I hoped they (the House of Representatives) would take the bill as it passed the Senate, for we want a railroad and don’t care who builds it.”16
Two days later, Morse wrote
“We are suffering another drouth this year, but if the railroad bill passes we can stand it, but if that fails God help us. . . .”17
The mood of the nation was changing, however. National suspicion was being aroused against the generosity of the federal government. “It seems to me” wrote Morse, “this Congress must pass it [the Texas and Pacific bill] or it will never pass. The Democrats will make it a rallying cry in the next campaign ‘No more land grants’ and the feeling of the country is setting strongly against them even though all admit there should be a competing line across the country to keep down the other great monopoly.”18
The Texas and Pacific Railroad Company was chartered by an act of Congress on March 3rd, 1871. The act empowered the company to construct a road from Marshall, Texas “by the most direct and eligible route to San Diego, California, to ship’s channel in the Bay of San Diego. . . . “19 The act required that construction on the road commence simultaneously from San Diego and Marshall. Fifty consecutive miles from the eastern boundary was to be completed and in running order within two years, the entire roadway within ten.20 The difficulties to be faced by the roadway were soon apparent. Tom Scott, president of the Texas and Pacific, soon realized the impossibility of meeting the construction requirements set by the original act. In 1872, a new Texas and Pacific bill was introduced in Congress. This bill permitted the Texas and Pacific to begin construction eastward from San Diego within one year of the bill’s passage, and required only ten miles of construction eastward by the end of the second year. Following the second year, a minimum of twenty-five miles per year would be required to be constructed between San Diego and the Colorado River, where the connection would be made with the line from the east. Support for the bill was overwhelming, and it passed the House 103 to 23.21
The Texas and Pacific act marked the end of an era, though no one realized it at the time. The act included the last federal subsidies, through land grants, for railroad construction.22 The land grant clauses in the Texas and Pacific’s charter included forty alternate sections of public lands along the route in the territories of Arizona and New Mexico, and ten alternate sections in California. The generosity of the federal government approximated some 16,000,000 acres of land, in addition to lands donated by state and local governments.23
The beneficence of the grants given to the road was apparent to many, including the owners of the Central and Southern Pacific Railroads. California’s Big Four (Huntington, Stanford, Crocker and Hopkins) were the owners of California’a only rail link with the east, the Central Pacific. They were also owners of a new company, the Southern Pacific, which held a franchise to build to Ft. Yuma to connect with any roads coming into the state. The Big Four jealously guarded their monopoly over the state’s transcontinental rail connections, and saw in efforts to pass the Texas and Pacific act an opportunity to acquire new lands for their road, the Southern Pacific, Wrote Collis Huntington to his partner, Mark Hopkins:
“The Texas Pacific Railroad bill passed the Senate last night, and I am disposed to think that it will pass the House. If it should, it will give us a very large grant of land, and I am having a map made to file as soon as it passes.”24
Huntington was counting on the fact that the Southern Pacific would be able to construct its line in time to connect with the Texas and Pacific and to keep that road from entering the state. It was in an effort to prevent another company from breaking the Central Pacific monopoly on eastern rail transportation that Huntington acquired the Southern Pacific.25 Huntington’s hope was that by building the Southern Pacific through to Ft. Yuma the Texas and Pacific would be prevented from running its tracks into California, and the Southern Pacific would be able to apply for their land grants.
Land was an important issue in railroad construction in the nineteenth century. Because building railroads was far too expensive an undertaking for any single individual to fund, governments from the federal to the local level were involved in making grants of land to the roads to help raise money for construction. Roads which received large land grants were able to mortgage those lands at high levels to pay for construction. Land was also used in the early stages to entice railroads to choose a city as a terminus, or to construct the roadway near by. San Diego had done this during the late 1860s and early 1870s, when discussions about the Texas and Pacific had first begun. Writing to a friend, Morse had observed
“I have just received a telegram from Capt. Sherman at Washington. He says The people of San Diego must be aroused and help pass our bill or we fear defeat, arouse our people to action, send us all the land you can get’. . . .”26
San Diego’s desires for a railroad are evident from Morse’s letters. That desire was predicated upon the benefits a railroad would bring. As described in H.C. Hopkins’ History of San Diego: Its Pueblo Lands and Water, the city wished the railroad to be built because: 1) it would assist the city trustees in disposing of the Pueblo lands while building up the city’s population; 2) city fathers hoped that an influx of population would stimulate business in the community; and 3) men like E.W. Morse believed that the road should be built.27 What Hopkins didn’t mention, however, was that “men like E.W. Morse” would greatly benefit from reasons one and two. Morse’s letters reveal more than an altruistic businessman out for the good of his community. His letters instead reveal a sharp businessman, out to benefit himself while his community grew. As time went on without the beginning of construction on the Texas and Pacific, Morse beseeched his correspondents for news of Scott’s decision on when to begin construction. Writing to Thomas Sedgewick, Morse asked:
“Do you think that there is any danger that Scott will ask Congress to allow the Company to build entirely from the eastern end?
If I could obtain early news, either good or bad, it would be a good deal of information to me pecuniarily . . . . “28
By 1875, Morse believed that it would “make more than a hundred thousand dollars difference to me whether the railroad is built or not.”29 Presumably, this one hundred thousand dollars was to be made in stock speculation on the railroad and on real estate, and it was real estate and its harbor which made San Diego’s being named the western terminus possible.
The reasons for land grants has been described above. San Diego’s practices in acquiring land for railroad construction had been in existence since the San Diego and Gila had been franchised. Efforts to acquire land continued almost incessantly, as long as there was hope for a railroad coming to the city. Acquiring land, however, was not terribly easy. Morse described some of his difficulties in convincing fellow San Diegans to donate land for railroad use in a letter to Mathew Sherman.
Today I telegraphed you that deeds will be made for fifteen blocks in Horton’s addition, and two hundred acres worth seventy-five thousand dollars [and] probably two hundred acres more. . . . I can say that I raised this amount without help from anyone. . . .
I urged Mannasse & Schiller to canvass Old Town. . . they. . . returned your letter leaving word that no one would give anything. . . . I then went to Old Town and talked with them plainly. . . .
I asked them what the devil (I had to swear some) these lands were worth without a railroad. . . . there was a possibility these lands were necessary to help pass the bill, and if so we had better throw away half what we have than to feel our parsimony had caused a failure of the bill.”30
Morse’s arguments were effective, apparently. He recorded the following donations: Rose 80 acres; Schiller 30; Sloane 20; Crosthwaite 10; Abels 20; Lyons 5; Cleveland 5; Starr 5; Marston 1; Bryant 5; Horton 10 blocks; Morse 6 blocks; Arnold & Choate 1 block (in Old Town).31
Getting promises of land were one thing, Morse was to learn. Collecting on the promises was something else. J.S. Mannasse backed out twice before deeding over a promised 30 acres.32 Some of Morse’s greatest frustrations, however, were with the father of New Town, Alonzo Horton. Morse wrote of the following incident to Sherman, expressing his frustration with “Father” Horton:
“Horton. . . wanted to know how much Sherman was doing, I told him Sherman was spending his time as well as over $200 in money and at least one block, probably more of land, yes he nags, but that was all to get the Collectorship. It made me mad and I told him he had better a d—-d sight be on to Washington spending his money and land as Sherman was, than remain here and do nothing but find fault with those who were doing something.”33
Morse was able to get Horton’s donation, but apparently not before threatening him with an embarrassing public disclosure. Following Horton’s complaints about Sherman, Morse wrote, “I came very near reading him a lecture on his free love actions. However, I think he is frightened enough to give liberally.”34 This was in reference to Horton’s dalliance with a Mrs. Dowlin, described by Morse as “the good looking Milliner.” Horton’s interest was sufficient to attract the town’s attention. Some practical joker, Morse reported, had placed a sign over Mrs. Dowlin’s residence proclaiming “Mrs. Horton No. 4.”35
The issue of raising land to donate to railroads was a divisive one during this period in San Diego’s history. Morse and others accumulated some 848 lots, in addition to 558 acres, for use in the campaign to name San Diego as the western terminus of the Texas and Pacific. A committee made up of Morse, David Felsenheld and Daniel Cleveland, with the assistance of George P. Marston, evaluated the donations and appraised the lots as being worth $126,000, and the acreage at $56,000. The Committee’s estimates were based upon what they believed the property would be worth six months after the Texas and Pacific bill passed Congress. Said Morse, “I think it was a fair estimate, though Horton abused the Committee shamefully for putting so low an estimate upon it.”36
Horton’s feelings were evidently shared by others in the community. Some confusion arose over to whom the deeds were to be made out when Thomas Sedgewick requested the lands be deeded to him in trust for use in lobbying. When Sherman asked for similar treatment, Morse replied:
“It is impossible to deed them to either Sedgewick or you. . . . the deeds are signed and deposited with the bank. And even if none were signed I would not dare to have gone to the parties and proposed to them to deed to you in the present state of feelings, they would back square out. . . “37
In spite of Morse’s fears, contributions of land continued. In addition to the amounts already listed, Morse contributed an additional 20 acres in Pueblo lot 450, and Mannasse and Schiller were so heavily involved in the railroad scheme, wfote Morse, that “only the passage of the bill will save them from ruin.”38
With legislation before Congress to amend the Texas and Pacific Bill passed in 1871, San Diego decided to take more direct action to protect its status as the western terminus of the road. In March of 1872, a Citizens’ Railroad Committee of Forty was appointed, with Thomas Nesmith as its chairman.”39 The Committee, which included Horton and Morse, was to serve as arbiter in the negotiations between San Diego and Tom Scott over the right of way for the railroad. The Committee was soon to get a first hand look at San Diego’s saviour, as he was called. Tom Scott was coming to San Diego.
Prior to Scott’s arrival in August of 1872, the city bubbled with speculation regarding where construction would begin, and on the route that the road would take. Morse and others rued the delays in construction particulary, fearing that “the enterprise would fall through and Real Estate values would fall.”40 San Diego counted heavily upon the quick beginning of construction. Construction, it was believed, would ease the city’s “blues” over the passage of the amended Texas and Pacific bill, which permitted a longer time for the completion of the western end of the road. In spite of their “blues” San Diegans continued to believe in the wisdom of their investments in the city.41 The city also continued its activities to make itself attractive to railroads. Among these activities were local surveys to establish a practical route for a road. These surveys, however, were not cheap. The citizens of San Diego were investing their fortunes in hopes of larger returns on their business and property interests. Members of the Committee of Forty were assessed the costs of the surveys. Juan Forster and Cave Couts were assessed $600 and $300 respectively to cover their share of the expenses.42 The assessments, though steep for a cash poor economy, would be a mere pittance in comparision with the returns the citizens were expecting. The Committee of Forty hoped to negotiate a large settlement with Scott in exchange for the franchise of the San Diego and Gila. The settlement would reimburse the stockholders of the San Diego and Gila for their expenses encumbered in lobbying and surveying activities. All that was required was to negotiate a settlement with Scott.
Thomas A. Scott in 1871-1872 was one of America’s most powerful businessmen. Beginning his railroad career “by serving as the Assistant Secretary of War under Lincoln, Scott had been responsible for supervising all government railways and transportation lines during the Civil War. Following the war, he served as Vice President of the nation’s largest railway, the Pennsylvania Central, of which he became President in 1874. Scott’s activities involved other railways as well. He served briefly as President of the Union Pacific Railroad in 1872, before selling out to Jay Gould. From 1872 until 1880, he was President of the Texas and Pacific. A dynamic businessman, Scott was also shrewd, as San Diego found out in August of 1872.
Scott, along with Grenville Dodge (chief engineer of the Texas and Pacific), and J.W. Throckmorton, a U.S. Senator and former governor of Texas, arrived in San Diego on August 26th. Reported the World, “Their landing was greeted with a roar of welcome. . . . “43 In his opening speech, Scott received another roar by reminding the audience of the advantages their city held:
“. . .your location south of San Francisco and in a direct line of the Great Orient. . .gives you unrivaled advantages.”44
With the public greeting out of the way, Scott and party retired to the Horton House. The next day was spent sight-seeing before a meeting with a committee of citizens representing the owners of the San Diego & Gila franchise. The meeting was to negotiate the surrender of the Gila’s franchise to the Texas and Pacific.
Representing the owners of the San Diego & Gila were Morse, Horton, C.L. Carr, and Jeff Gatewood. This committee’s purpose was to report back to the San Diego and Gila’s board of directors Scott’s proposal for acquiring their franchise. Scott’s propositions, as reported by the San Diego Union, were that the franchise and lands given to the San Diego and Gila be transferred to the Texas and Pacific; that the Texas and Pacific be given a right of way 100 feet wide through the city and county of San Diego; that the tract of land (located at the foot of Spring Street) lying west of the Courthouse and measuring 1500 feet in length by 600 feet in width and fronting the bay be given for use as a depot; and that the city give 100 acres of tide lands, or the same amount within Horton’s addition joining the shore.”45 Wrote Morse of the meeting and Scott’s propositions:
“He [Scott] would make no arrangement with us, said he did not come here to purchase anything, thought the citizens should obtain the lands [and donate them]. . . ,”46
A dispute arose briefly over 160 acres of lands which had been included in the San Diego & Gila’s franchise. The lands were in the area east of Mannasse’s Addition, and were known as the “railroad lands.”47 During the meeting with Scott, Horton asked if he would be willing to take the San Diego & Gila’s franchise, and let the committee keep the 160 acres. When Scott refused, Horton offered $100,000 for the tract.48 Scott again refused, and Morse told him that “the Central Pacific would give more to keep him out.”49 Scott ignored this insinuation, and gave the committee one hour to decide whether or not to accept his offer. Members of the committee were nervous. Scott had spent a part of the day at National City, visiting with Frank Kimball. He had also had discussions with Louis Rose about locating the terminus of the road at Roseville. Wrote Morse, “It was said Kimball had offered Scott 20,000 acres for the terminus and. . .Rose had offered Scott in writing all the land he wanted at Roseville. . . . “50 Spencer Menzel later disputed the amount of land Kimball had offered, claiming the figure was “only” 11,000 acres.51
The committee recognized the futility of further argument, and recommended that the San Diego & Gila company accept Scott’s proposals. The citizens of San Diego were required to pay the San Diego & Gila for its franchise, and then to donate the franchise to the Texas and Pacific. As Morse observed, “he (Scott) knew the citizens could buy our franchise cheaper than he could.”52 Reporting to Charles Poole, a fellow stockholder in the San Diego & Gila, Morse wrote:
“The Committee. . . agreed to pay us our expenditures with a fair interest on them and our liabilities, the whole sum not to exceed one hundred thousand dollars.
The net amount for us to divide will be about. . .ten dollars per share.”53
The only remaining issue was the amount to be paid for the franchise. The committee representing the San Diego & Gila, led by Jeff Gatewood, demanded $100,000 to surrender the road’s franchise.54 Morse was in an unenviable position, being a member of both the San Diego & Gila negotiation committee and the city’s railroad Committee of Forty. Being on both sides of the issue, Morse could understand the reluctance of the city to pay such a large sum. He did not, however, feel the city’s feelings were entirely justified. Morse felt that the city was “trying to cut us down to the lowest possible figure, without regard to justice or fairness.”55 Negotiations were finally concluded with the city paying $58,000 for the franchise, in addition to $4,000 in taxes owed by the corporation.56 The lands and the franchise of the San Diego and Gila were finally turned over to the Texas and Pacific on December 11th, 1872, with the final transfer of subsidy lands being completed January 14th, 1873. All told, some 9,000 acres of land, in addition to 51 lots in San Diego and vicinity were given to the Texas and Pacific to assist in the construction of the road.57
As 1872 advanced, San Diegans began to become impatient. While negotiations for the release of the San Diego and Gila’s franchise remained, the basic issues of the road coming to the city seemed settled. All that remained was for the beginning of construction. Short on money and lacking the Gila franchise, the Texas and Pacific was in no hurry to begin construction on the western end of the line. The interests of the company required that the utmost effort be placed on construction in Texas, where the state had offered a large land grant to the road provided target dates in construction were met. Before construction could begin, however, the issue of the route for the road had to be settled.
Surveyors for the Texas and Pacific had been engaged in San Diego since July of 1872 in surveying potential routes for the road.58 Earlier surveys conducted for the San Diego and Gila had chosen the route preferred by most San Diegans, a direct route east from the city to Ft. Yuma. Led by James Evans, the surveying crews of the Texas and Pacific examined four routes, only one leading directly east. While not pleased at the possibility of another route being adopted, San Diego continued to support the work of the Texas and Pacific. “Gen. Evans, resident engineer of the Texas and Pacific Railway,” wrote The World, “lost a pair of gold eye glasses the other day. We insist that they. . .be hunted up and restored to him. It won’t do to have the Texas and Pacific people disabled.”59
Surveys for the road ran from National City, beginning at what is now the foot of G street in Chula Vista, north through Old Town, up the coast through Rancho Santa Margarita, turning east to Temecula and then on to the San Gorgonio Pass. From the pass, the survey line turned southeast to Ft. Yuma. According to Spencer Menzel, routes were also surveyed via the Sweetwater River, Campo, Jacumba, and Poway.60 Disputes over survey routes were frequent, because so much was at stake. The selection of a route for the Texas and Pacific would mean a financial windfall for those whose property bordered the railroads. The selection of a route would also mean great fortunes for those building the road.
To construct the Texas and Pacific, Tom Scott and Grenville Dodge, president and chief engineer of the road, organized the California and Texas Railway Construction Company. The stockholders of the company included Scott, Dodge, J. Edgar Thompson, president of the Pennsylvania Central, and Senator Throckmorton, among others.61 The construction company was to be paid $35,000 per mile to construct the road in California. As designed, the company became the owner of the railroad’s capital.62 As the owners of both railroad and the construction company, Scott and friends had a great deal to gain from the construction of the road along the northern route, through the San Gorgonio pass. Roughly, $100,000 more, according to estimates by Morse.63
Morse was suspicious about the surveyors of the Texas and Pacific, feeling that they were more interested in their own benefit than that of San Diego. “Maj. Evans, Chief engineer, California Division, Texas & Pacific Railway, came in yesterday. . .from the Railroad camp at Jamul [on the line directly east from San Diego] and pronounces ‘Sedgewick line impracticable'” wrote Morse.64 In a letter to Thomas Sedgewick dated August 20th, 1872, Morse’s cynicism of the capabilities and integrity of the surveying parties came through:
“General (so called) Butler. . .came here drunk, remained so several weeks til his wife was sent for and arrived, claimed great ability and experience in Railroad building and even after he became sober, telegraphed Scott that ‘he had run a line over the mountains finding a better route than Sedgewick and shorter. . . saving. . . several millions of dollars’ while Butler himself had not been five miles from town, nor his surveying party twenty.”65
Surveyors, of course, had their own reasons for laying out their survey lines. Butler’s survey line ran south through National City before turning east. According to Morse, when asked why he ran the survey so far south, Butler replied, “we ran this course to go through National City, if we had run east from San Diego we could not have gone through National City.” Morse dutifully recorded the rumor that Butler owned “several blocks in Kimballville.” The implication was that if the route chosen for the road ran through National City, both Butler and Frank Kimball would make a tidy profit from the increased value of their property.
While the surveys dragged on, San Diego became impatient, awaiting the beginning of construction. Some thoughts were given to transferring the franchise of the San Diego & Gila to the Central (Southern) Pacific in hopes of seeing construction begin sooner. Wrote Morse:
“We can undoubtedly sell our franchise to the Central Pacific, and some of our directors would prefer to do so rather than be humbugged longer by the Texas & Pacific.”66
The Central Pacific’s interest in San Diego was slight, however. The road maintained a perfunctory interest, but really had no desire to build to San Diego, in part, perhaps, because it could not get the donations of land that it wanted. Frank Kimball had met with Charles Crocker in San Francisco in August of 1871 to discuss the possibility of the Central Pacific’s building to San Diego. Reported Kimball:
“He told me, when I refused to sell to the Central Pacific 6 miles of waterfront which we own, that I should never live to see a railroad laid to the Bay of San Diego nor in the states east of California, which they did not lay and that no competition should come into the state. ‘Further’ he said, ‘We have our foot on the neck of San Diego and shall keep it there.’ “67
Negotiations with the Central Pacific had been going on since the late 1860s,68 and would continue as long as the Texas and Pacific remained a threat to the monopoly of the Central Pacific. The reluctance of the Central to build to San Diego did not mean that the road completely ignored the city, particularly after the passage of the Texas and Pacific bill and the elections of 1872 and 1876. In 1872, in an effort to prevent San Diego from joining with Tom Scott, the Central Pacific offered to examine plans for constructing a San Diego and Los Angeles Railway. Wrote Morse:
“. . . Stanford is coming down here in April. . . and while here we propose to talk to him about the San Diego & Gila franchise and. . . if Scott refuses to act honestly by us to make an alliance with the Central Pacific.”69
Opinion remained divided over such a prospect, however. “Southern California must have railroads” proclaimed an editorial in the San Diego Union, “but not built by the people to be run by the Central Pacific monopoly.”70 Nothing was settled, however, and the city continued to await the selection of a route and the beginning of construction by the Texas and Pacific.
In early 1873, Scott formally announced that the northern route through Temecula had been selected.71 Construction on the roadway began on April 21st, 1873. Ground was broken for the grading of the road on the company’s lands a quarter of a mile southeast of Mannasse’s Addition. Alonzo Horton was chosen to break ground for construction, and proclaimed it “the greatest honor the people of San Diego. . . could confer” on him.72 Construction was not brisk, however, as only eleven men were employed in grading the roadway. Work continued slowly throughout the year, as both money and materials were in short supply. Because of the lack of money, Tom Scott sailed for Europe in an effort to attract investors in the railroad. While Scott was overseas, a total of ten miles of roadway were graded in San Diego, with the road running through Old Town. Tracks were being readied for laying when the financial panic of 1873 struck, dampening construction activities.73
The panic of 1873 signified the end of the “Great Barbecue.” The panic was caused by the failure of a number of business firms, the most notable of which was Jay Cooke and Company, the nation’s premier banking house. The shock of the closure of Cooke and Co. on September 18th was nearly complete. As a result of Cooke’s failure, the New York Stock Exchange closed for ten days, and the ensuing depression was one of the severest experienced by the country up to that time. By 1875, over 500,000 men were unemployed.74 The economic crisis was worldwide, and resulted in Scott being unable to attract European investors for the Texas and Pacific.
With the panic, the Texas and Pacific owed over a million dollars in Texas and the South alone. Its debts in California were somewhat smaller because of the delays in beginning construction. By January of 1874, Morse reported that the Texas and Pacific owed the California and Texas Construction Company over seven million dollars. In San Diego, the construction company owed $13,000 to San Diego businesses for labor and supplies.75 The road’s chief engineer in San Diego, James Evans, tried to get permission to sell off the piles, ties and lumber in order to pay off the debts to local merchants. Permission was refused.76 Efforts were made to continue construction. A Mr. Wood, superintendent on the construction line, proposed to continue work on the road if local merchants would furnish funds to pay the hands and to purchase provisions. The merchants agreed, and through January, 1874, twelve men were kept employed grading the road bed.77 Construction on the road ceased at the end of the month, while Scott searched for means to extricate the company from its financial difficulties.78
“. . .the future looked bright and promising when the eastern panic fell. . . .” wrote Morse. “It was like a clap of thunder from a clear sky to the people of San Diego.”79 It was like a clap of thunder to Tom Scott as well. The Texas and Pacific was in a quandary. In all, only 445 miles of roadway in Texas had been completed.80 Because enough of the road had not been constructed the company had not earned any of its state or federal land grants. Lacking land, the company had nothing to mortgage to raise funds to pay its debts or to continue construction. Its only hope lay in receiving additional federal subsidies. The new battleground for San Diego’s hopes shifted eastward, to the halls of the 45th Congress.
The Texas and Pacific’s efforts to acquire a subsidy suffered from two elements: 1) the public’s general attitude against more land grants to railroads, particularly in a stagnant economy, and 2) Collis Huntington and the Central/Southern Pacific’s opposition to the Texas and Pacific’s construction into California, along with a desire for that road’s land grants. Scott’s efforts to gain congressional support for a subsidy centered on support in the southern states. Agents of the Texas and Pacific implored the legislatures of these states to pass resolutions and endorsements in favor of the railroad. The allies of the Texas and Pacific depicted their efforts as an attempt to break free of a northern transportation monopoly.81 While Scott was involved in garnering support for his road, Huntington and the Southern Pacific sought to defeat Scott’s efforts to obtain a federal subsidy. Without a subsidy, Scott would be unable to complete his road. Huntington planned to continue construction of the Southern Pacific during the struggle over a subsidy.
Huntington’s thoughts on how to defeat any bill Scott proposed involving a subsidy were clearly defined. Explaining how Scott’s proposals could be defeated, Huntington wrote to Charles Crocker saying “we. . . should say we would build this road, and did not want any aid. . . . “82 The grading of the Southern Pacific crews had not been halted by the panic, and the road was rapidly building towards the San Gorgonio Pass. From there, it would be on to Ft. Yuma. “I propose to say to Congress” wrote Huntington, “that we will build east of the Colorado to meet the Texas P. without aid, and then see how many members will dare to give him aid to do what we offer to do without.”83 By completing construction to Ft. Yuma, and then continuing eastward through Arizona without a subsidy, Huntington would prevent a challenge to the monopoly his company held in California. In addition, he hoped to acquire the land grants the Texas and Pacific had received, but had not yet earned.84 The conflict between Scott and Huntington would assume greater proportions over the next three years, with each side wooing congressional representatives. San Diego’s interest in the legislative battles was keen, yet the city realized its isolation. Emotions alternated between hope and despair as the city awaited the verdict on its fate. Would Congress grant the Texas and Pacific a subsidy, or would the Southern Pacific cut off any hope of its reaching San Diego?
Throughout 1874, efforts were made by Scott and Huntington to pass legislation that would benefit both of their roads. With each side blocking the efforts of the other, no railroad aid bill was passed in Congress. Realizing the pressing need for money and the lack of time available to him, Scott determined to try compromising with Huntington. Direct negotiations between the two appear to have begun on September 17th, 1874. Following their first meeting, Huntington wrote to Leland Stanford:
“Tom Scott called yesterday and wanted to know if I would help him on his Texas and Pacific. . .bill in Congress next winter. I told him no, unless he changed it. . . . I said that if he would strike out all [of the Texas and Pacific’s line] west of the Colorado I would help him. He said no, that he would build to San Diego. . . .”85
Scott declined Huntington’s offer of “help” and continued with his efforts to obtain a subsidy from the House Railroad Committee. Scott’s goal was to get from Congress a 5 % interest guarantee on the railroad bonds, with all land grants and dividend liens as security for the guarantee.86 An additional element of Scott’s proposal was that $5,000 worth of bonds per mile, with interest guaranteed by the government, were to be deposited in the Federal Treasury pending the construction of the road. Scott’s proposal contained a unique element in that the government was
“asked to create a property of liability of its own, then accept what it created as security against its liability, but without requiring any definite amount of capital stock to be furnished by the subsidized corporations to contribute to the security of the government.87
The proposed bill Scott was attempting to push through Congress also did not include the completed and most profitable portions of the road, which had been constructed in eastern Texas.88
Scott’s efforts to pass his bill were defeated by Huntington’s determined opposition, and by northern Democrats. The Democratic party had regained control of the House of Representatives in the 1874 elections, marking the first time the party had been in control of a branch of Congress since before the Civil War. L.Q.C. Lamar, a Democrat from Mississippi, rose to report Scott’s Texas and Pacific Bill from the House Committee on the Pacific Railroad. Upon reporting the bill, William Holman, a Democrat from Indiana and chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations objected. The bill as reported removed the penalty forfeiting the Texas and Pacific’s land grants for failure to complete construction within the specified time frame. The bill also divided the construction of the road with the Southern Pacific, permitting that road to construct the western portion of the road. Holman’s objections were that the bill, by removing the penalty of forfeiture, resulted in an appropriation of government property. Such an appropriation required a hearing of a committee of the entire House. Following Holman’s objection, a substitute bill was offered pruning all of the branch roads from the Texas and Pacific, eliminating the subsidies to Huntington, and providing additional security for the government. The bill was placed on the calendar to be heard by the Committee of the whole House. With thirty-four bills ahead of it, the bill was not brought up again during the session.89 Lacking subsidies beneficial to the Southern Pacific, Huntington’s lobbyists prevented the bill from being brought up for a vote.
In addition to his efforts to influence individual members of Congress, Huntington also attempted to subvert local support for the Texas and Pacific. San Diego’s congressional representative, Peter D. Wigginton (R.,Merced), was told that the Southern Pacific would build east from the city in return for San Diego’s aid in Congress. Huntington’s orders to his associates in California, however, were that they should sound San Diego out, but make no definite promises.90 This they did.
In letters written in late 1874, Huntington acknowledged the necessity of maintaining San Diego’s interest in the possibility of the Southern Pacific building there. Writing to David Colton, Huntington announced he was sending an amended copy of Scott’s bill (which he was trying to get the Texas and Pacific chief to accept). “Of course,” wrote Huntington, “the San Diego people will not like it, unless you agree to build a road from their place up to connect with our road, and you may think best to do that.”91 San Diego’s concern over its fate was ever present. Writing to Charles Crocker, Huntington recalled
“A Mr. Wetmore, a newspaper correspondent from S.F. (or possibly he calls San Diego home), has been into the office here several times. . . and said there must be a branch to San Diego. . .”92
Huntington offered to permit Wetmore to amend the bill he was proposing to include San Diego as a branch of the Southern Pacific. Wetmore did so. The bill also included a section transferring all rights and privileges of the Texas and Pacific acquired in San Diego to the Southern Pacific.93 The result of this bill was to offer San Diego a position as the terminus of a branch road to the Southern Pacific should one be constructed. No requirement for the Southern Pacific to build to San Diego was included. In spite of the lack of guarantee for construction, the proposal aroused the interest of some San Diegans, especially as it became apparent by 1875 that the Southern Pacific would control the river crossing at Ft. Yuma. Throughout the year, rumors circulated regarding the possibility of the Southern Pacific coming to San Diego. “I myself. . .met and talked with Huntington, Crocker, and Col. Gray of the Southern and Central Pacific. …” wrote Morse. “Their talk with us was not very satisfactory, they. . .didn’t think it would pay for them to build their road down. . . unless we could make it for their interest. . . . “94 After hearing an offer by the Southern Pacific’s directors to pick up their tracks running through the San Gorgonio Pass and to build directly from San Diego to Ft. Yuma, Morse dismissed the offer as an electioneering attempt by the railroad to defeat San Diego’s congressional candidate, Sherman Houghton, a strong supporter of the Texas and Pacific.95
Morse’s distrust of Huntington and the Southern Pacific remained strong. Others, however, were not as supportive of the Texas and Pacific. In July of 1875, Alonzo Horton left for San Francisco in an effort to convince the Southern Pacific to build its road to San Diego. Horton was offering $50,000 for the road to be built to San Diego.96 His efforts were unsuccessful. The teasing of San Diego by the railroad continued, however. Morse reported that he was told that if San Diego “would throw off Scott, Stanford would agree to build the. . .road from San Gorgonio to San Diego.”97 Stanford and the Southern Pacific, however, were continuing to construct their road to Ft. Yuma. By November of 1876, the Southern Pacific had built as far as Indian Wells.98 The nearest rail construction on the Texas Pacific was occurring in Texas. The big question was whether the Southern Pacific would build eastward once it reached the Colorado River.
By the end of 1876, word was spreading that Scott and Huntington had reached a compromise on legislation that would benefit both of their roads. In a series of conferences held in late November and early December, Scott and Huntington had moved closer to a consensus. Following the failure to get two bills assisting the Texas and Pacific through Congress, Scott succumbed. An agreement was reached with Huntington which provided that 1) Huntington would cease opposing the subsidy for the Texas and Pacific; 2) that the Texas and Pacific would concede the building of the western end of the rail line in California to the Southern Pacific; 3) that the new railway would be an “open highway” for each road to transport their goods over the other’s tracks; and 4) that Scott would use his influence to support a federal subsidy for the Southern Pacific.”99 The second element in the agreement is an important one. By the agreement, Scott conceded not only the construction of the western portion of the line to the Southern Pacific, but also the land grants in California given to the Texas and Pacific.100
The news of the compromise between Scott and Huntington greatly dismayed San Diego. The Citizens’ Railroad Committee telegraphed Scott, reminding him of his promise to build to San Diego. Scott’s reply to the Committee offered them no hope:
“Phila. Dec. 18th. Trustees & R.R. Committee. Have used my utmost efforts to secure San Diego a railroad line on such route as can best effect the object and if you can effect it in any better shape than I can, I should be very glad to have you take it up and adjust it with any party or on any terms that you may think best, but in taking these steps I shall expect you to relieve me of all possible obligations.”101
The failure of the Texas and Pacific to construct the road was no fault of the company’s, reported the road’s Vice President Frank Bond, “unless poverty is a crime.”102
By May of 1877, the possibility of constructing the Texas and Pacific to San Diego was completely ended when the Southern Pacific reached Ft. Yuma.104 Following the inauguration of Rutherford Hayes as president, Huntington’s Southern Pacific began constructing their rail line into Arizona by bridging the Colorado River and beginning construction across the Indian reservation at Ft. Yuma. As a counter measure, the Texas and Pacific rushed a surveying crew to Ft. Yuma to survey a line for that road. This was in an attempt to preserve the right of the Texas and Pacific to construct its line through Arizona. With the two roads heading for conflict, the Secretary of War issued an order for both to cease construction in the reservation until a decision could be reached on who had the right to construct a roadway. Scott believed that Congress, when it met again, would uphold the right of the Texas and Pacific to construct the roadway. Huntington, ever the realist, took a more direct approach. Defying the War Department’s orders, Huntington ordered the Southern Pacific to continue construction, which they did at night after the soldiers on the reservation withdrew from the area. Traveling to Washington and meeting with President Hayes, Huntington received an executive order permitting the Southern Pacific to build through the reservation.104 Building the road into Arizona, Huntington ensured that the Texas and Pacific would not receive a subsidy to continue construction to California. Nor would private investors provide the necessary capital to continue construction on a road that would parallel the tracks of an existing and operating railroad. By 1881, the Southern Pacific would join tracks with the Texas and Pacific at Sierra Blanca, ninety-one miles east of El Paso.105 The requiem for San Diego’s hopes for the Texas and Pacific were recorded by Herbert Crouch in his recollections:
“The Texas and Pacific R.R. Co. had busted up and the piles and lumber they began with were lying all along the track from San Diego to Selwin Canyon.”106
Along with the lumber and the ties lay the dreams of the city. In an era of large plans, San Diego had dreamed boldly, but had been outmaneuvered by fortune. Another decade would go by before the city would receive a rail connection.
While San Diego had invested thousands of dollars on behalf of the Texas and Pacific, they had also donated 9,000 acres of valuable real estate. With the failure of the road, the most important issue immediately before the city was whether it could reacquire the land. By 1876, lawsuits had been filed against the Texas and Pacific demanding the return of the land grants. Unfortunately, the city had made no agreement with the company requiring the return of the land should the road not be built. Suits over the grant would continue until a settlement was reached in 1880. According to this settlement, San Diego and the Texas and Pacific each split the land grant by alternately selecting lots in the “railroad” lands lying between Mannasse & Schiller’s Addition and National City.107 The portion of the grant falling to the Texas and Pacific was sold, along with the railroad, to Jay Gould in 1880. Gould, in turn, sold the land to the Southern Pacific.108
The Texas and Pacific story in San Diego resulted in some benefits and some losses for San Diego. The decade from 1871 to 1881 saw a slight increase in the city’s population and, in spite of some serious economic problems in the nation, an overall growth in the area’s economy.109 The losses included the fact that the city did not enjoy as great a level of prosperity as it had originality hoped. Morse was unable to realize his one hundred thousand dollars from the construction of a rail line. And, what Morse had decried all along, Huntington and the Southern Pacific had gained a foothold in San Diego, and would continue their monopoly over California transportation for another decade. Had not the economic collapse of 1873 occurred, San Diego would have received its rail connection with the east a decade sooner. This change might conceivably have changed the history of the state. With a direct connection by rail to the east, San Diego might have controlled the shipping traffic which went to Los Angeles with the construction of the harbor at Wilmington. In turn, San Diego might have become the major city of Southern California. But this, like the dreams for the Texas and Pacific, is mere speculation, worthy of Beriah Sellers. Or E.W. Morse.
1. Lewis B. Lesley, “The Struggle of San Diego for a Southern Transcontinental Rail Road Connection, 1854-1891” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1933), p. ii.
2. San Diego Herald, 27 January, 1855.
3. Earl Samuel McGhee, “E.W. Morse, Pioneer Merchant and Co-founder of San Diego” (M.A. Thesis, San Diego State University, 1950), pp. 89-94.
4. McGhee, “Morse, Pioneer Merchant,” pp. 90-96.
5. Lewis B. Lesley, “A Southern Transcontinental Railroad into California: Texas and Pacific versus Southern Pacific, 1865-1885,” Pacific Historical Review, (March 1936): p. 53.
6. San Diego Union, 28 July, 1870.
7. Lesley, “A Southern Transcontinental Railroad into California,” p. 52.
8. U.S. Treasury Department. Report on Public Works in States and Territories, Senate Executive Documents, 43rd. Cong., I Sess., No. 12; p. 59.
9. The Washington Chronicle, 5 March, 1871, reprinted in The San Diego Union, 30 March, 1871. Vertical File 625.2, Transportation. Railroads. San Diego History Center Research Archives
10. San Diego Union, 13 October, 1869.
11. E.W. Morse to George P. Marston, 8 August, 1870. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego History Center Research Archives.
12. National Railroad Convention, St. Louis, 1875, Proceedings of the National Railroad Convention at St. Louis, Mo., Nov. 23rd and 24th, 1875, p. ix.
13. National Railroad Convention, Proceedings, p. 14.
14. National Railroad Convention, Proceedings, p. 16.
15. Unaddressed letter from Morse, 17 January, 1871. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego History Center Research Archives.
16. Morse to Mathew Sherman, 19 January, 1871. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
17. Morse to J.R. Bleeker, 6 February, 1871. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
18. Morse to Sherman, 1 February, 1871. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
19. U.S. Statutes at Large, XVI, 1871, p. 574.
20. U.S. Statutes at Large, XVI, 1871, p. 578.
21.Congressional Globe, 29 April, 1872, p. 2889; see also U.S. Statutes at Large, XVII, 1872, p. 60.
22. Ralph N. Traxler, “Collis P. Huntington and the Texas and Pacific Railroad Land Grant” New Mexico Historical Review (April 1959), p. 117.
23. U.S. Statutes at Large, XVI, 1871, pp. 576-578; Traxler, “Collis P. Huntington. . .,” p. 119; and C. Vann Woodward, Reunion & Reaction (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966), p. 72.
24. Collis P. Huntington to Mark Hopkins, 7 June, 1870. Collis P. Huntington Letters, on Microfilm, Bancroft Library, University of California Berkeley.
25. Paul V. DeFord, Jr. “In Defense of Empire” (M.A. Thesis, University of California at Berkeley, c 1948), p. 7.
26. Morse to Frank Frary, 20 January, 1870, Morse Letterpress Books. San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
27. H.C. Hopkins, History of San Diego: Its Pueblo Lands and Water (San Diego: City Printing Co., 1929), p. 200.
28. Morse to Thomas Sedgewick, 17 January, 1872. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
29. Morse to J.L. Pearson, 4 March, 1875, Morse Letterpress Books. San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
30. Morse to Sherman, 19 January, 1871, Morse Letterpress Books. San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
32. Morse to Sherman, 25 January 1871. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
33. Morse to Sherman, 29 January 1871. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
35. Morse to Sherman, 15 December [1871?]. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
36. Morse to Sherman, 31 January 1871. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
37. Morse to Sherman, 1 February 1871. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
38. Morse to Sherman, 7 February 1871. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
39. McGhee, “E.W. Morse, Pioneer Merchant,” p. 128.
40. Morse to Thomas R. Darnell, February, 1872. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
41. Morse to J.R, Bleeker, 19 February, 1871. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
42. From a note in Morse Letterpress Book for 1872, p. 556, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
43. The World, 27 August, 1872.
44. The World, 27 August, 1872.
45. San Diego Daily Union, 28 August, 1872; see also San Diego Union, San Diego: The California Terminus of the Texas and Pacific Railway, p. 18, in Ms. Collection 260, Railroads, Texas and Pacific File. San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
46. Morse to Sedgewick, 1 September, 1872. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diggo Historical Society Research Archives.
48. Morse to Bleecker, 16 October, 1872. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
49.Morse to Sedgewick, 1 September, 1872. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
51. Spencer Menzel, “Paper Railroads of the 1890s” (s.l. : s.n., 1943), p. 13.
52. Morse to Col. Ferrel, c. 9 September, 1872. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
53. Morse to Charles Poole, 7 September, 1872. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
54. Morse to Ferrel, 12 October, 1872. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
55. Morse to Pool, 11 November, 1872. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
56. Morse to Sedgewick, 3 December, 1872. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
58. The World, 28 July, 1872.
59. The World, 15 January, 1872.
60. Menzel, “Paper Railroads of the 1890s,” p. 16.
61. J.R. Perkins, Trails, Rails and War: The Life of General G.M. Dodge (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril, c1929), pp. 247-248.
62. Woodward, Reunion & Reaction, pp. 73-74; also, Morse to Whaley, 31 January, 1874. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego History Center Research Archives.
63. Morse to Bowers, 10 March, 1874. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
64. Morse to Sedgewick, 15 August, 1872. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
65. Morse to Sedgewick, 20 August, 1872. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
66. Morse to Sedgewick, 16 March, 1872. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
67. Irene Philips, The Railroad Story of San Diego County (National City: South Bay Press, 1956), pp. 12-13.
68. Huntington to Charles Crocker, 28 April, 1868. Huntington Letters, on Microfilm, Bancroft Library, University of California Berkeley.
69. Morse to Sedgewick, 26 March, 1872. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
70. San Diego Union clipping in Vertical File 625.2, Transportation. Railroads. San Diego History Center Research Archives.
71. Richard V. Dodge, “The California Southern Railroad: A Rail Drama of the Southwest” reprinted from Bulletin No. 80, The Railway & Locomotive Historical Society, p. 15.
72. The World, 22 April, 1873.
73. Morse to Brown & Brown, 23 April, 1875. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
74. Dictionary of American History, Revised Edition, v. 5 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1976), p. 207.
75. Morse to Whaley, 31 January, 1874; and Morse to Howard, 22 April, 1874. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego History Center Research Archives.
76. Morse to Howard, 3 May, 1874. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
77. Morse to Howard, 9 January, 1874. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
78. Texas and Pacific Annual Report, August 10, 1875; p. 11.
79.Morse to Mrs. M. L. Clarke, 10 January, 1874. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
80. Texas and Pacific Annual Report, August 10, 1875, p. 11.
81. Woodward, Reunion & Reaction, pp. 79-81.
82. Huntington to Crocker, 11 November, 1874. Huntington Letters, Microfilm, Bancroft Library, University of California Berkeley.
83. Huntington to D.D. Colton, 8 December, 1874. Huntington Letters, Microfilm, Bancroft Library, University of California Berkeley.
84. Woodward, Reunion & Reaction, pp. 82-83; see also Lesley, “A Southern Transcontinental Railroad into California:” pp. 52-60.
85. Huntington to Leland Stanford, 18 September, 1874. Huntington Letters, Microfilm, Bancroft Library, University of California Berkeley.
86. DeFord, “In Defense of Empire,” p. 10.
87. Woodward, Reunion & Reaction, p. 130.
88. Woodward, Reunion & Reaction, pp. 130-131.
89. Woodward, Reunion & Reaction, pp. 127-133.
90. DeFord, “In Defense of Empire,” p. 16.
91. Huntington to Colton, 8 December, 1874. Huntington Letters, Microfilm, Bancroft Library, University of California Berkeley.
92. Huntington to Crocker, 11 December, 1874. Huntington Letters, Microfilm, Bancroft Library, University of California Berkeley.
94. Morse to Hollister, 19 August, 1875. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
95. Morse to Henry Swyerkamp, c. August, 1875, p. 161. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego History Center Research Archives.
96. Morse to Howard, 31 July, 1875; and Morse to Nash, 13 August, 1875. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego History Center Research Archives.
97. Morse to Pierce, 25 September, 1876. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
98. Morse to David Felsenheld, 28 November, 1876. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego History Center Research Archives.
99. Woodward, Reunion & Reaction, pp. 113-116.
100. Morse to Howard, 29 January, 1877. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
101. Morse to Pierce, 24 December, 1876. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
102. Morse to Bryant Howard, 28 April, 1877. Morse Letterpress Books, San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
103. McGhee, “E.W. Morse, Pioneer Merchant,” p. 189.
104. Woodward, Reunion & Reaction, pp. 235-236.
105. McGhee, “E.W. Morse, Pioneer Merchant,” pp. 189-190; see also Lesley, “The Struggle of San Diego for a Transcontinental Rail Road Connection,” pp. 509-510.
106. Herbert Crouch, “Recollections-Biographical Notes” (s.l.: s.m., n.d.), p. 64. San Diego History Center Research Archives.
107. Memorandum of Agreement between the City of San Diego and the Texas and Pacific Railway Company, Ms. Collection 260, file 63. San Diego Historical Society Research Archives.
108. Mrs. Joseph Weidel, comp., “Fragments of San Diego, California Railroad History: Excerpts from the San Diego Union, 1871-1875,” scrapbook, p. 3. San Diego History Center Research Archives.
109. U.S. Census Abstracts 9, (1870) & 10, (1880), Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
THE PHOTOGRAPHS are courtesy of the San Diego History Center’s Title Insurance and Trust Collection. The map on pages 264-265 is from the SDHC Research Archives.